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The published work which forms the basis of this submission by the 
applicant for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy represents an extensive 
research which has extended the boundaries of knowledge and 
understanding in relation to the jurisprudential adjudications by the Court 
of Justice concerning the application of the TFEU freedoms of goods, 
persons, services and capital to national measures. The publications 
maintain thematic analytical focus on the jurisprudential employment of the 
EU principles of non discrimination, market access and the rule relating to 
the ‘selling arrangement’ that are used as the modus operandi in the 
acquisition of Treaty free movement rights. The thread is law making; the 
published work evidences inconsistencies, complexities and confusions in 
the application by the Court of Justice of the modus operandi used to 
ensure acquisition of Treaty free movement rights. The research depicts a 
goods, persons, services and capital jurisprudence which displays a want 
of thematically consistent underpinning and some doctrinal diversity. It is 
the purpose of this Submission to exhibit the cohesiveness of the 
published work under review in the context of the contribution made to the 
knowledge and understanding of the jurisprudence of goods, persons, 
services and capital in European Union law.  
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Statement supporting Submission for Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy by Published Work 
 
The articles referred to in this Submission which underpin the application 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Published Work are inextricably 
linked by the thread of scrutiny of the law making process of the Court of 
Justice. The articles focus on the adjudication by that Court on the 
application of the Treaty free movement rights of Goods, Persons, 
Services and Capital to national measures restrictive of such rights. There 
is focus on the principles of non discrimination and market access wherein 
those principles have operated as modus operandi of Treaty free 
movement rights. The exposition includes consideration of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ within the free movement of goods. There is an identification 
of common themes and depiction of a want of thematically consistent 
underpinning to free movement jurisprudence. The articles evidence 
doctrinal diversity and exhibit the existence of a degree of complexity, 
even confusion within the jurisprudence of free movement.  
 
It is acknowledged that within free movement jurisprudence, in the cause 
of the application of Treaty free movement rights to national measures 
there is recourse to principles of mutual recognition and of proportionality. 
Both principles are crucial in the equation of the application of Treaty free 
movement rights at the national level. The principles of mutual recognition 
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and of proportionality merit separate study in their own right; they do not 
retain a prime focus in the context of this research.   
 
A. Introduction 
 
i. General  
 
My academic and professional interest in the jurisprudence relating to the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital was first 
engendered as a research assistant to Dr C.L. Vincenzi (Huddersfield 
Polytechnic, 1985-1986). A Study was published in result: Dr. C.L. 
Vincenzi & Connor T., (1986) 'EEC Nationals and Rights of Free 
Movement of Labour within the UK'. It compared UK immigration law and 
practice in the United Kingdom with the requirements of EC law in the 
context of the treatment of EC nationals who were either working or 
seeking work in the UK. The empirical investigation embraced interviews 
with the national regulatory authorities and EC nationals who were ‘end 
users’ within the United Kingdom. In the preparation of the Study, 
interviews were undertaken with the Home Office, The Immigration 
Service, DHSS (European Section), EC Commission (London), 
Ambassadors, MPs, The Immigration Advisory Service, law centre and 
citizens advice bureau advisors and trade unions. The published report 
was reported by the Daily Telegraph and the Financial Times newspapers. 
A copy is filed in the Library of the House of Commons. The expertise 
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acquired during the writing and conduct of the study formed the basis of 
the M. Phil entitled 'EEC Nationals & Their Right to (Seek) Work within the 
United Kingdom’ (awarded 1990).  
 
The published study and the M.Phil acted as a platform of knowledge to 
support further publications concerned with free movement jurisprudence 
(listed within this Submission at pg 43). These papers evidence strong 
lineage, a demonstrable longstanding interest in the jurisprudence of free 
movement within the European Union. The earlier case notes are offered 
because thematically they relate to particular aspects of free movement 
jurisprudence. They present a demonstrable trajectory of continuing 
academic development; from response to particular issues arising from the 
practical application of EU law at the national level to the more particularly 
conceptual work on free movement that is evidenced within the more 
recent published articles.  
 
The early publications supporting this Submission focused on a response 
to particular underlying tensions and practical problems that had been 
associated with inadequate reflection of EU free movement law at the 
national level. In this context for example 'Article 39 (ex 48) E.C. Offers no 
Protection where Restriction on Free Movement rights arises from act of 
Migrant Worker: Citibank International PLC v. Kessler’ concerned 
commentary on particular difficulties arising at the interface between 
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European Community1 and national law. Kessler evidenced failure by the 
national court to reflect EU law. The Court of Appeal obfuscated the scope 
and the application of Article 39 EC (now Art 45 TFEU)2 in ruling lawful in 
that instance a mortgagee’s insistence that a mortgagor EU national 
comply with the terms of a mortgage. The judgment by the national Court 
was effective to prevent the latter’s return to work in the home state.   
 
Other case notes concerned particular instances of underlying tensions 
and problems which had resulted from incorrect applications of EU law at 
the national level. In both ‘Non-Community Spouses: Interpretation of 
Community Residence Rights’. Boukssid v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department’, together with ex parte Zeghraba and Sahota’, the 
source residence rights respecting spouses of UK nationals who returned 
to the UK after working in Netherlands, Ireland and Germany was 
attributed incorrectly by the Court of Appeal to national and not EC (now 
EU) law. The commentary contained in ‘Migrant Community Nationals: 
Remedies for Refusal of Entry by Member States  Joined Cases C-65/95 
& 111/95  The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex 
parte Shingara and Radiom [1997] E.C.R. I-3343’ critiqued the UK’s 
appeal system. The Court of Justice interpreted the requirement imposed 
on Member States to provide ‘the same legal remedies’3 as a requirement 
to accord the ‘general’ but not the specific remedies provided at the 
                                                          
1 Now European Union.  
2 In failing to account for the judgments of Even or the concept of ‘social 
advantages’. 
3 Article 8, OJ 056, 04/04/1964 P. 0850 – 0857. 
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national level to challenge the acts of the administration. The Court 
additionally ruled that prior to the execution of administrative decisions4 an 
opinion of a ‘competent authority’ must be obtained; also that a decision 
refusing first residence permit or expulsion before issue will require an 
‘opinion’ where there is either no right of appeal to a court of law or where 
the appeal cannot have suspensory effect.   
 
The final commentary concerned the free movement of goods in the 
context of trade mark protection and market partitioning. In Pharmacia & 
Upjohn v. Paranova, the approach to the assessment of market 
partitioning with respect to trade mark replacement was clarified, the Court 
of Justice, choosing to stir into the pot an element of objectivity. The 
element of objectivity has made it more difficult for the trade mark holder to 
reply on trade mark rights. The judgment maintains the thematic of the 
Court; it exposed yet another example of further support for the free 
movement of goods.     
  
These commentaries maintain the same trajectory as that adopted 
previously in the research study (undertaken for The Polytechnic 
Huddersfield) and the M.Phil. The commentaries exposed particular issues 
arising from specific examples of failures to reflect adequately EU law at 
the national level. The commentaries adopted the perspective that failure 
to reflect EU free movement rights in national legal systems was both 
                                                          
4 Article 9 Id.  
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unlawful and practically effective to deny or the hinder the enjoyment of 
EU free movement rights. 
 
 ii. Focus  
 
The focus of the work published by the applicant relates to the acquisition 
and knowledge relating to the jurisprudence of EU law which has applied 
the rights given by the free movement provisions of the TFEU.5 The 
jurisprudence relating to free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital within the European Union supplies a discrete area for study.  
 
There are many other aspects of EU law that equally would have supplied 
a fruitful research platform; EU Competition law, Agriculture and State Aids 
are to name but a few. Enquiry was not extended thus far; the research 
process would have been disparate and unmanageable.  For the same 
reason enquiry into free movement case law was limited to the 
jurisprudence which applied Treaty rights to national measures. That 
which was concerned for example with social security and deportation 
issues was omitted from investigation.   
 
 
B. Free Movement Literature  
 
                                                          
5 And of the Treaty of Rome 1957. 
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The applicant is aware that the jurisprudence of EU free movement has 
been the subject of abundance of research by academics, practitioners, 
EU institutions and professional bodies. Within the framework relating to 
freedom of movement law, the sources of information are multifaceted. 
Operating at the EU Institutions level for example, White Papers have 
been produced by the European Commission in relation to the Internal 
Market: Completing the Internal Market Com (85) 310 Final and The 
Internal Market for Goods (COM (2007) 35 Final). Various communications 
have been produced, for example in relation to goods on the practical 
application of mutual recognition (OJ C 265, 4.11.2003). In addition the 
Commission operates a Market Access Database containing information in 
relation to import duties and related studies on market access related 
topics. Other EU sources exist, for example the report by the High-Level 
Panel on the Free Movement of Persons (April 1997). Free movement 
research has been conducted by other bodies; academic and empirical 
studies have been conducted at the national, European and International 
levels; for example the Robert Schuman Centre and Academy of 
European Law, The European Univ. Institute, Florence and the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne and UACES in 
the United Kingdom. In addition, The European Network on Free 
Movement of Workers within the European Union is coordinated by the 
University of Nijmegen's Centre for Migration Law (under the European 
Commission's supervision); the Thematic Report Application of 
10 
 
Regulation 1612/68  for example was produced in January  2011 in co-
operation with the AIRE Centre, London.  
 
An extensive library of materials has been published in relation to EU free 
movement. Research presented in the form of scholarly articles, 
monographs (for example Barnard6) and reports into free movement within 
the European Union has been conducted by academics at Universities 
within the United Kingdom, Europe and beyond, including America. The 
German Law Journal for example, the publisher of two of the articles 
supporting this Submission is published by Universities based in USA and 
Canada. Articles and monographs exist in languages other than English; 
they were not considered. The language of research in this area of law is 
almost overwhelmingly English, to an extent reflecting the growing lingua 
franca of that language within the European Institutions. 
 
From the outset, the research undertaken adopted an interpretative 
approach which would find favour with that adopted by English lawyers. A 
list of sources that have been consulted during the course of the 
completion of the research is included a ‘General List’ of Publications; 
included in this Submission at Appendix 2.  
 
                                                          
6 Barnard, C. The Substantive Law of the EU The Four Freedoms (OUP, 
3rd edn, 2010). 
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Throughout this Statement there exists reference to the articles identified 
within the ‘General list’, so as to position the applicant’s published work 
within the context of the general body of academic literature that has been 
produced on EU free movement jurisprudence.   
 
C. Thematics of the published work  
 
The triumvirate of articles that form the core for this Statement exhibit 
common themes. In the cause achieving a better understanding of the 
Court’s adjudication in relation to the application of Treaty free movement 
rights to national measures, the published articles and case notes maintain 
focus on jurisprudence which has developed the principles of non 
discrimination and market access into the modus operandi used by the 
Court of Justice in the acquisition of Treaty free movement rights. The role 
of the ‘selling arrangement’ together with the justification of measures held 
restrictive of Treaty free movement rights are considered in that same 
context.  
 
The articles supporting this Submission (i) Goods, Persons, Services and 
Capital̙in̙the̙ European Union: Jurisprudential Routes to Free 
Movement, (Goods, Persons, Services̙and̙ Capital̙in̙the̙European 
Union), (2010); (ii) Market Access” or Bust? Positioning the Principle 
Within the Jurisprudence of Goods, Persons, Services, and Capital 
(Market Access” or Bust?); (2012) and (iii) Accentuating the Positive: the 
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"selling arrangement", the first decade and beyond (Accentuating the 
Positive), (2005) are thematic in nature.  
 
The achievement of the articles, the presentation of a greater knowledge 
and understanding with respect to free movement jurisprudence is 
represented in this Statement. A vast and complex jurisprudence has been 
established by the Court of Justice through which Treaty7 free movement 
rights have been applied to national measures. The jurisprudence of the 
Court that has been concerned with the application of the Treaty 
provisions relating to Goods8, Persons,9 Services,10 and Capital11 is 
characterised by complexities and even confusion. The aim of the 
research which supports this Submission has been to identify and to 
evaluate such complexities and confusions within jurisprudence through 
which national measures alleged to have been restrictive of free 
movement rights have been scrutinised for legality. It is research which 
depicts a want of thematically consistent underpinnings to the free 
movement case law.  
 
The Statement commences with an exposition of the contribution of the 
principle of non discrimination in Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in 
the European Union. This exposition is maintained in the subsequent 
                                                          
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
8 Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC). 
9 Article 45 TFEU (ex Article 39 EC), Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 EC). 
10 Article 56 TFEU (ex Article 49 EC). 
11 Article 63 TFEU (ex Article 56 EC). 
13 
 
article Market Access” or Bust?. The later publication presents focus on 
the principle of market access as modus operandi of Treaty free 
movement rights. The same thematic analysis is maintained within 
Accentuating the Positive with respect to the more discrete jurisprudence 
relating to the free movement of goods. That paper is concerned with the 
‘selling arrangement’; the effect of that rule on goods jurisprudence 
together with a contextualisation of the rule and an analysis which extends 
to encompass the recent re-engagement of the Court with the principle of 
market access.  
 
1. Non discrimination   
 
This section of the Submission is concerned with the furtherance of 
knowledge and understanding of free movement jurisprudence with 
respect to the principle of non discrimination operated by the Court as 
modus operandi of free movement rights. The proposition explored by 
Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union is that 
recourse to the principle of non discrimination within the jurisprudence of 
free movement will be realigned as a result of a recent refocus by the 
Court of Justice on the restriction to the free movement right.  
 
It is recognised by the Court, the academic community and within the 
published work under consideration that early free movement 
jurisprudence was founded on the application of principle non 
14 
 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality.12 The article Goods, Persons, 
Services and Capital̙in the European Union makes a major contribution to 
the knowledge and understanding of free movement jurisprudence in the 
promotion of what is considered to be a new perspective. In relation to the 
operation of the principle non discrimination as modus operandi of Treaty 
free movement rights in early jurisprudence, the Article provides focus on 
a pertinent question. ‘Why was the concept of discrimination allowed to 
remain for so long in the vanguard of the attack on the national measure 
that hindered the exercise of the free movement right’? The question 
evidences new perspectives which respect an ability to understand 
accurately the overall mapping of free movement jurisprudence by the 
Court of Justice. It represents a new critique on the ‘structure’ of early free 
movement jurisprudence. Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the 
European Union in this context expresses the view that the early focus on 
the principle of non discrimination was effective to place a straight jacket 
on the future development of free movement jurisprudence. The published 
article maintains that ‘It is arguable that the terminology of restriction and 
obstacle in the context of asserting free movement rights bears a more 
honest reflection of the intent of Treaty free movement provisions.’  
 
It is in the present context that Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in 
the European Union offers a novel contribution in the claim that had such 
                                                          
12 Founded on Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 12 EC). ‘Within the scope of 
application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions 
contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited’. 
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honest reflections of Treaty intent been followed by the Court in the early 
stages of adjudications on national measures, it would have removed a 
pressure at that particular time to impose the subdivisions of direct or 
indirect with respect to the application of non discrimination. The article 
does not suggest that the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination ought never to have been made, but maintains the view that 
the Court’s concentration on the distinction in initial jurisprudence was 
effective to skew the compositional development of free movement 
jurisprudence. The article argues that the initial concentration on the non 
discrimination principle was effective to impose a developmental 
straightjacket on free movement jurisprudence. For example, in the field of 
goods, this was effective to open the Court to the influence of Directive 
70/5013 and the resultant nomenclature of the distinctly and indistinctly 
measure.14 A further perspective is maintained; an additional ramification 
of such exposure was the failure to engage initially with the non-
discriminatory restriction as a conduit for achieving Treaty free movement 
rights (for example Debauve: services). This resulted in the operation of an 
incomplete weaponry against restrictive national measures in early free 
                                                          
13 L 013 , 19/01/1970 P. 0029 – 0031. 
14 This is terminology has been referred by the Commission as recently as 
2010. Free movement of goods: Guide to the application of Treaty 
provisions governing the free movement of goods (2010), p.28. Other 
academic writers have used the same terminology. Woods, L Consistency 
in the chambers of the ECJ: a case study on the free movement of 
goods C.J.Q. 2012, 31(3), 339-367, 353; P. Wenneras, Towards an Ever 
Greener Union? Competence In the Field of the Environment and Beyond 
(2008) 45 CML.Rev. 1645, 1654-1655; Enchelmaier, S The ECJ's Recent 
Case Law on the Free Movement of Goods: Movement in All Sorts of 
Directions (2007) 26 YEL 115-156, 127. 
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movement jurisprudence. The article adopts a novel critique of the 
judgments of this period, observing ‘that it would not have been an 
insurmountable hurdle for the Court in the first instance to envisage an 
equation encompassing obstacles rather than one routed in discrimination’ 
and that engagement with the nomenclature of the Treaty would have 
been effective to produce jurisprudence which contained a clarity of 
constructive purpose, reflective of the aims of the Treaty. It is implicit from 
the arguments exposed in the article that the initial focus on non 
discrimination in the jurisprudence of free movement was effective to 
introduce unnecessary complexity.    
 
Published academic research to date appears not to have fully addressed 
the issues which surround the application of the principle of non 
discrimination as the early driver of free movement jurisprudence. Wilsher 
for example considers the terminology of ‘indistinctly applicable’ but in the 
context of a view that the Court of Justice ‘perhaps deliberately eschewed 
the language of discrimination’ in Cassis.15 Aside this aspect, the 
perspective given to the effect of the nomenclature appears to have 
remained unconsidered. On the other hand, in this context, the analysis 
within Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union 
provides an understanding of the importance of the early influences on 
free movement jurisprudence that are now alleged to have shaped the 
                                                          
15 Encapsulating a test of regulatory, not market equivalence. D. Wilsher 
“Does Keck discrimination make any sense? An assessment of the non-
 discrimination principle within the European Single Market” (2008), 33 
ELRev 3-22, 11. 
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format of the case law of the Court of Justice. That a detrimental effect on 
the emergent structure of free movement jurisprudence might have 
occurred is a claim which exposes doctrinal diversity; between the Court’s 
overarching focus on the principle of non discrimination and the Treaty 
exhortations with respect to the identification of the restriction to the free 
movement right. The existence of such diversity is for example exemplified 
within the article by the observation relating to the subsequent 
establishment of an ability to examine the ‘non-discriminatory requirement’ 
which ‘arguably explodes any residual notion that the concept of 
discrimination alone was ever the sole battle-ground with respect to the 
achievement of the right of free movement’.The contribution of the article 
to furthering understanding of the jurisprudence of free movement is clear. 
It adds a perspective of an evolution within free movement jurisprudence; 
a trajectory which has moved from a jurisprudence which promotes 
primacy focus on the modus operandi principles of Treaty free movement 
rights to one which more recently has presented focus on the restriction to 
the free movement right.  
 
In the context of the exposition of complexities and confusions within free 
movement jurisprudence, Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the 
European Union adopts a novel perspective, that the recent focus upon 
the restriction to the free movement right has resulted in the principle of 
18 
 
non discrimination being subsumed within the enquiry16 as to the legality 
of the national measure. Set against the context of academic reference to 
‘internal-market case law on what constitutes discrimination, whether 
direct or indirect…is highly confused’,17 the paper acknowledges the 
contra-distinction of the Court’s continued use of the principle of non 
discrimination on a ‘standalone-basis’. In the furtherance of understanding 
the direction of free movement jurisprudence, the paper suggests a novel 
perspective in advocating that the recent approach adopted in Contse (C-
234/03 Services) may provide a solution to the confusions and 
complexities that have resulted from the use of the principle of non 
discrimination. With the ‘conceptual honesty’ of an enquiry focussed on the 
restriction to the free movement right, the admission conditions in Contse 
for respiratory treatment were held to be ‘applicable without distinction’.18 
Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union observes 
that the novel mix in the pot relating to ‘applicability without distinction’ 
together with reference which ‘imports connotations of indirect 
discrimination’ ‘gently reinforces a perceived convergence of the tests for 
the application of all Treaty free movement provision’.  
 
2. Market Access 
 
                                                          
16 See also AG Jacobs (C 136/00) R v. Danner. Examples given inter alia 
refer to (C-136/00) Danner, (C-224/97) Ciola, and (C-204/90) Bachmann.  
17 Craig, P & De Búrca G EU Text, Cases, and Materials OUP 4th ed., 
2007, pg 803.   
18 The national court was instructed to assess whether those conditions 
had been met.   
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The rationale of the body of published work which has sought to further 
knowledge and understanding of the intricacies of the operandi principles 
of free move movement rights continues with respect to the principle of 
market access. The examination is timely. Current and ongoing issues 
have arisen as a result of the recent re-engagement with the market 
access principle within the jurisprudence of goods. The principle has been 
adopted in the recent judgments of Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson 
and Roos; in circumstances in which ‘the Court could have arguably 
engaged more readily with the principle of the ‘selling arrangement.’19  
 
i. Re-engagement  
 
Research conducted within “Market Access” or Bust? contributes to 
furthering the understanding of free movement jurisprudence; it 
contextualizes the recent re-engagement of the principle of market access 
not only from the perspective of goods, but in addition from the 
jurisprudence of free movement in general and the concept of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ in particular. Such consequences exemplify a jurisprudential 
doctrinal diversity; it is a re-engagement which bears overtones of shifting 
                                                          
19 The rule of the ‘selling arrangement’ was introduced by the Court of 
Justice into the case law of the free movement of goods by Keck. See 
Joined Cases C-268/91 & C-276/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard 
Keck and David Mithouard, 1993 ECR I-6097, para 16. Roos in judgment 
did not mention Keck, a point made by Spaventa Leaving Keck behind? 
The free movement of goods after the rulings in Commission v Italy and 
Mickelsson and Roos (2009) 34 ELRev 914-932, 918.  
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the sands of emphasis with respect to jurisprudential scrutiny of the 
restrictive national measure.  
 
“Market Access” or Bust? contextualises the analysis of the resurrection of 
the principle of market access within the jurisprudence of goods as 
representing a ‘phoenix from the ashes’.20 In itself, this evidences 
thematically inconsistent underpinning. The published work juxtaposes the 
prospect of a re-engagement with the principle market access21 across all 
free movement jurisprudence in general with analysis that would support 
the maintenance of access to an eclectic mix of modus operandi from 
which to source free movement rights. 
 
The value of the published work in terms of furthering knowledge and 
understanding of free movement jurisprudence lies in the attempts to 
locate a more precise identification of the nature of the principle of market 
access. “Market Access” or Bust? offers the perspective that the principle 
                                                          
20 ‘The effect of the decision in Trailers is that the market access test - first 
introduced by Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 and then 
significantly curtailed by Keck - has risen, phoenix-like, from the ashes.’ 
Barnard, C, Trailing a new approach to free movement of goods (2009), 68 
CLJ 288-290, 290.  
21 Tryfonidou for example argues that ‘However, in Commission v Italy 
(mopeds) and Mickelsson and Roos the Court seems to have followed the 
tide and decided to transpose into the context of the free movement of 
goods, the approach that has been followed in the context of the other 
market freedoms. Accordingly, when determining whether a measure 
amounts to an MEQR on imports or a violation of one of the other market 
freedoms, the question that should now be asked is the same: is there a 
hindrance to access to the market?’ Tryfonidou, A Further steps on the 
road to convergence among the market freedoms (2010) 35 EL.Rev 36-
56, 49. 
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has not operated in isolation from the principles of non discrimination and 
mutual recognition. The view is expressed for example that the principle of 
non discrimination ‘has been allowed to coalesce alongside the principle of 
market access’, that the former has been ‘a principle inextricably mixed’ 
with the latter; initially with respect to goods but then also with respect to 
that of persons, services and capital. “Market Access” or Bust? in the first 
instance delivers new perspectives with respect to the jurisprudential 
composition of goods. It affords a greater understanding of the mix of 
principles operated by the Court as the modus operandi purveyors of 
Treaty free movement rights. It adopts a new critique with respect to the 
principles of market access and non discrimination. It sets out original 
argument which supports a proposition of a ‘simmering symbiosis’ 
between the principles of non discrimination and of market access.22 
“Market Access” or Bust? provides the critique for example that the 
principle of mutual recognition is arguably ‘imbued with notions of market 
access’.23 Exposure by the published work of a symbioticsm between non 
discrimination, mutual recognition and market access arguably represents 
a new critique on the relationship between those principles in the Court’s 
evolving approach to free movement jurisprudence. This too provides 
evidence within the published work of the existence of unnecessary 
complications and confusions within free movement jurisprudence.  
 
                                                          
22 Case noted here for example include (231/83) Cullet and (C-108/09) 
Ker-Optika.  
23 For example 4-75 Rewe-Zentral, para 14. 
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ii. ‘Market access’ or combination of principles? 
 
In an attempt to further knowledge of the nature of the issues arising in 
relation to the establishment of consistency with respect to judicial 
underpinning, “Market Access” or Bust? considers which principle or 
combinations of principles are to be adopted by the Court as modus 
operandi of Treaty free movement rights. The argument is contextualised 
in the context of current academic debate. Of the increasing influence of 
the market access test, the article observes that academics such as 
Tryfonidou have noted that in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and 
Roos the jurisprudence of goods for ‘the first time … expressly adopted a 
market access test;’24 and that the jurisprudence of goods ‘has moved 
closer to reflect that of persons’.25 Such critique would accord with the 
observation of Prechal and De Vries that ‘The market access test has 
been increasing used beyond the context of the free movement of 
goods’.26  
 
The published work contributes to the understanding of free movement 
jurisprudence in arguing that though the observations above may well 
prove to be correct, ‘at present there remains a strong argument for a 
continued use of the principle of non-discrimination in the jurisprudence’. 
This evidences the existence of an underlying tension within free 
                                                          
24 Tryfonidou, A (note 21), 49.  
25 Reflecting the observations of Spaventa (note 19), 918.   
26 Prechal, S and De Vries, S., Seamless web of judicial protection in the 
internal market? (2009) 34 ELRev. (2009), 5-24, ft nt 24.  
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movement jurisprudence respecting the nature of the operandi of free 
movement rights. “Market Access” or Bust? furthers an understanding with 
this aspect of free movement. It observes that although it ‘may indeed 
prove correct’ that market access may be used as the basis of free 
movement jurisprudence, nevertheless it presents the perspective that 
there ‘remains a strong argument for a continued use of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of 
goods’. Such would reflect the view of Enchelmaier; that ‘to declare each 
one of them a ‘test’ [discrimination and market access] and to contrast 
them with one another yields no clear cut results: they are not opposed to 
each other but correlated [emphasis added].27 “Market Access” or Bust?  
in a context wider than goods argues for a ‘back to the future’ approach to 
be adopted by the Court of Justice in which the part of all the ‘old chestnut 
principles’ is clearly enunciated within the application of Treaty free 
movement rights to national measures.  
 
iii. Absence of definition  
 
Other evidence is presented by “Market Access” or Bust respecting the 
complexity and tensions which relate specifically to the Court’s failure to 
define the principle of market access. These issues are addressed by 
“Market Access” or Bust?  by reference to the academic opinion which has 
                                                          
27 The ECJ's Recent Case Law on the Free Movement of Goods: 
Movement in All Sorts of Directions (2007) 26 115-15, 127. 
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conspired to fill that gap.28 The article presents understanding of a market 
access principle which as a concept is ‘inherently nebulous’,29 one which 
is surrounded by an established uncertainty, together with ‘academic 
arguments to the effect that the market access test is one that does not 
readily open itself to particular definition’.   
 
In the exploration of the jurisprudential complexities associated with the 
principle of market access, “Market Access” or Bust evidences the 
uncertainty that the principle is one which remains devoid of definition. 
Academic opinion would support this proposition. Tryfonidou for example 
is of the view that ‘the Court has been particularly laconic and has not 
given any guidance as to what, exactly, it means by an 
impediment/hindrance to market access’ in the context of Article 34 
TFEU.30 Spaventa has argued that ‘the concept of market access has 
adopted an intuitive rather than an economic approach’.31 “Market Access” 
or Bust picks up the logicality of this argument; ‘the adoption of a default 
intuitive approach and the failure of the Court of Justice to use economic 
analysis ‘carries with it the risk of an overbroad interpretation of the notion 
                                                          
28 For example, Jukka Snell, The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a 
Slogan?, (2010) 47 CMLRev 437 – 472; Spaventa, E., From Gebhard to 
Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European Constitution, 41 CMLRev 
743-773, 756-759.  
29 Peter Oliver and Stefan Enchelmaier, Free movement of Goods: Recent 
Developments in the Case Law, 44 CMLRev. 649-704, 674 (2007).  
30 Tryfonidou, A (note 21), 50.  
31 Spaventa E., From Gebhard to Carpenter: towards a (non) economic 
European Constitution (2004) 41 CML.Rev  743-773, 758-759. The 
concept is discussed by Snell. Snell, J., (note 28), 468-469.   
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of a barrier caught by the Treaty’.32 The article alludes to the Court’s 
failure to provide underpinning to the concept of market access and 
argues that since the principle was relied on in Commission v. Italy and 
Mickelsson and Roos ‘without qualification’, that ‘it becomes a more 
compelling reason for the Court of Justice to provide a workable definition 
of the concept’. This addresses a fundamental issue with respect to the 
principle of market access. At present without the ‘workable definition’ the 
article has called for, the ‘seeming inability to establish accurately which 
national rules are to be covered by the concept and which are not’ 
represents a lacuna in the ability to understand fully both the nature of the 
market access principle and the extent or otherwise of its application. 
“Market Access” or Bust records the confusing situation that at present, 
the market access principle could extend to cover ‘national measures that 
impose a barrier to entry to the host market as well as those measures 
that impose restrictions on the product or migrant after entry’.    
 
In the cause of attempting to further understanding of the nature of the 
principle of market access, other associated complexities are addressed 
by “Market Access” or Bust?. From the same stable of complexities, the 
article critiques the perspective that compares the proponents of the test 
qualifying the principle with respect to justification through the route of ‘de 
minimis or notions such as a substantial hindrance to market access’33 
with the significant judgments of Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and 
                                                          
32 Spaventa (note 19), 923. 
33 Spaventa (note 19), 923. 
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Roos ‘because both employ the market access test without such 
qualification’. Such a view would seem to bring a clarity to this aspect of 
the nature and understanding that can be attributed to the principle. 
However, even in this context, academic opinion is divided. Snell for 
example expresses the opposite view that in the context of goods34 ‘the 
Court seems to have finally embraced the idea of a substantial 
hindrance’.35 In the absence of the provision of the ‘workable definition’ 
which has been called for by Market Access” or Bust?, some confusion as 
to proper identification of the nature of principle of market access must 
remain. The importance of Market Access” or Bust? in the context of a 
contribution to the knowledge and understanding of free movement 
jurisprudence relates not only to the identification of the seemingly 
inherent complexities which arise from the absence of definition of the 
principle of market access but also the attempt by the article to provide a 
rationale response to overcoming the deficiencies associated with the 
principle.  
 
3. Selling Arrangement  
 
There is a definable linkage between the papers ‘Market Access” or Bust? 
and Accentuating the Positive: the "Selling arrangement", the First Decade 
and Beyond. The previous section of this Submission considered the effect 
of the re-engagement with the principle of market access on free 
                                                          
34 Also establishment and services.  
35 Jukka Snell, (note 28), 455.  
27 
 
movement jurisprudence in general. This section considers the effect of 
that re-engagement in the context of the rule relating to the ‘selling 
arrangement’ in the context of the free movement of goods.  
 
The consideration of the ‘selling arrangement’ within the applicant’s 
published research which considers an adjudication of the Court of 
Justice’s law making with respect to free movement jurisprudence is 
apposite. In the context of furthering knowledge and understanding of the 
law making process with respect to the free movement of goods in general 
and of the ‘selling arrangement’ in particular, there is demonstrable 
thematic linkage between the principles of market access and the rule of 
the ‘selling arrangement’. The latter rule ‘suppressed’ the principle of 
market access on its creation by Keck and Mithouard.36 The rule of the 
‘selling arrangement’ was the focus of the research undertaken for 
Accentuating the Positive (2005). The resurrection within goods of 
recourse to the principle of market access signalled within the recent 
judgments of Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos formed the 
impetus for the completion of further research with respect to the ‘selling 
arrangement’ within the article, “Market Access” or Bust? (2012). 
 
The furtherance of knowledge and understanding of the rule of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ is conducted within Accentuating the Positive through an 
examination of the complexities and confusions which had arisen as a 
                                                          
36 The case concerned the criminal prosecution of Keck for reselling 
products “at a loss" contrary to French Law.  
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result of the creation by the rule; a number of specific perspectives assist a 
more complete understanding of the effect of the rule of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ within the free movement of goods. The perspective offered 
by Accentuating the Positive is that the ‘selling arrangement’ representing 
a jurisprudential response by the Court of Justice to the width of 
Dassonville was borne from jurisprudential inability to deal with the equal 
burden rule in a consistent manner.  
 
i. Recent jurisprudence  
 
“Market Access” or Bust? capitalises on the contribution of Accentuating 
the Positive to the enhancement of knowledge and understanding with 
respect to the rule relating to the ‘selling arrangement’. Such is 
contextualized within the recent judgments of Commission v. Italy and 
Mickelsson and Roos. The former article is clear to express the view that 
the recent judgments serve to inject a further twist of uncertainty with 
respect to the future operation of the rule of the ‘selling arrangement’ 
within the jurisprudence of goods. It provides an exposition which 
represents a contribution to knowledge and understanding of goods 
jurisprudence which is both current and forward looking in critique. The 
analysis contained within “Market Access” or Bust? maintains thematic 
coherence within the body of work published to date. The section below 
concludes with an examination of the relationship between two 
‘protagonist’ principles of free movement jurisprudence; market access 
29 
 
and the ‘selling arrangement’. The re-engagement by the Court with the 
principle of market access cuts at the heart of free movement 
jurisprudence, the research respecting the nature of the market access 
principle respects the attributes, tensions and shortcomings of a principle 
explored at the core of the article “Market Access” or Bust?. 
 
ii. Future direction 
 
It is clear from “Market Access” or Bust?  that the future direction of the 
‘selling arrangement’ is in issue as a result of the judgments of 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos. It is expressed within the 
articles that the judgments ‘arguably appear to have arrested an unbridled 
march of the use of the concept of the “selling arrangement” [and] in some 
ways [have] trampled through the jurisprudence relating to goods’. The 
contribution to a knowledge and understanding which is to be associated 
with such development is explained from the perspective that were the 
principle of market access to be accorded an automatic prominence to the 
detriment of both the principles of non discrimination and mutual 
recognition, such would represent an ‘obfuscation of the causal reality’ for 
any ruling of illegality. The observation adds to academic debate; other 
writers would not agree. Wenneras & Moen for example have expressed 
the view that the two judgments signal that “that the notion of market 
access may ultimately be the criterion defining the scope of art. 34 TFEU 
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(thus also in effect replacing Dassonville)’,37 that these are judgments 
which may be seen as “a departure from orthodox jurisprudence and the 
beginning of a universal and strict ‘market access’ era.”38 In the context of 
maintaining academic perspective and a furtherance of understanding of 
the ‘renewed’ circumstances under which the rule of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ is to be applied in future, the value of “Market Access” or 
Bust? is in the provision of arguments which advocate a tempering view 
that Commission v. Italy reinforced the ‘abiding respect for the principles of 
non discrimination and mutual recognition’ within free movement 
jurisprudence. The contribution of the article is the perspective of the use 
of not just one principle, market access, but of the ‘stirring into the pot of 
enquiry a range of ingredient principles [which] arguably strengthens the 
potency of the application of Article 34 TFEU’ as maintained in “Market 
Access” or Bust?   
 
Such perspective, the adoption of a mixture of principles of market access, 
non discrimination and mutual recognition adopted in “Market Access” or 
Bust?  as an integral part of an inclusive equation in this context adds 
academic value to current debate in relation to the future direction of the 
rule of ‘selling arrangement’. The perspective provides some 
cohesiveness, it would accord also with adoptive nomenclature by the 
                                                          
37 Wenneras, P & Moen, K., Selling Arrangements, Keeping Keck, (2010) 
35 ELRev 387-400, 287. This was noted also by Szydlo Export restrictions 
within the structure of free movement of goods. Reconsideration of an old 
paradigm 2010 47 CMLRev., 753-789, 771.  
38 Ibid 387.  Support for this proposition may be had from Advocate 
General Jacobs in C-412/93 Leclerc-Siplec, para 41. 
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jurisprudence39 which has allowed ‘the maintenance of a continuing 
respect for the principles of nondiscrimination and of mutual recognition as 
integral parts of the equation in the application of Article 34 TFEU.  
 
iii. Particular considerations  
 
a. Advertising  
 
The lack of clarity together with the inconsistencies that have been allowed 
to exist and to persist within the jurisprudence respecting the rule of the 
‘selling arrangement’ are visited within the applicant’s research papers. 
There is allusion for example within Accentuating the Positive to an initial 
confusion which concerned whether or not the ‘selling arrangement’ 
covered the advertising rule;40 a confusion which had to be addressed 
subsequently in Hünermund.41 From another angle, Accentuating the 
Positive promotes additional understanding with respect to the difficulties 
associated with advertising.42 Uncertainties arise from assessing the effect 
                                                          
39 The eclectic descriptive terminology with respect to the national 
measure of restriction, hindrance, or barrier to the exercise of the free 
movement right. 
40 Echoing Advocate General Jacobs. (C-412/93) Leclerc-Siplec para 37. 
41 Case C 292/92 [1993] ECR 1 6787. In Hünermund, a professional 
conduct rule imposed by a professional association in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, Germany which regulated advertising by pharmacists was 
held to be a ‘selling arrangement’ on the grounds that it did not affect the 
marketing of goods from other Member States in any different way from 
that of domestic products.   
42 A total ban may have effects that are different in law and in fact. In this 
instance, market analysis may be more difficult for the importer to acquire 
in comparison to the domestic producer. Contrast for example the 
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of particular advertisements. For example, the advertising prohibitions of 
both Hünermund and Leclerc-Siplec43 had been ‘relatively insignificant’; by 
contrast, other circumstances may signify a prohibition which ‘may result in 
a loss of turnover to the business’. A total ban may have effects that are 
different in law and in fact. Accentuating the Positive identifies in addition 
that there are inconsistencies and difficulties in the Court’s application of 
the ‘selling arrangement to particular instances’. In this context for 
example, the regulation of shop opening hours classified as a ‘selling 
arrangement’ in Tankstation’t may have actually been more intrusive of 
business activity than the advertising restriction. This observation relating 
to inconsistencies and difficulties with respect to the classification of the 
advert is reinforced by the comments of Gormley. These are selling 
arrangements which have ‘a considerable effect on the behaviour of 
consumers.’44  
 
b. Traditional social practices . . . local habits and customs 
An associated problem which evidences further complexity and lack of 
consistency with respect to the ‘selling arrangement’ is exemplified in 
Accentuating the Positive with the reference to the ability of the Court to 
                                                                                                                                                               
observation made by the same article that classification as a ‘traditional 
social practice’ introduces an objectivity which relives the importer from the 
requirement to produce statistical analysis.   
43 Case C-412/93 1995 E.C.R. 1-179. In Leclerc-Siplec a national law 
which prohibited TV advertising in the distribution sector was held to be a 
‘selling arrangement’. It was not designed to regulate trade in goods 
between Member States and did not prevent distributors from using other 
forms of advertising.  
44 L. Gormley Free movement of goods within the EU: some issues and an 
Irish perspective. Irish Jurist (2011), 46, 74-95, 91.  
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‘stir into the pot factors such as traditional social practices . . . local habits 
and customs’. In introducing the facility to factor in such objective factors, 
the Court has relieved the importer from undertaking market analysis. The 
rationale for such introduction is to inject an ability to compare particular 
products on a more subtle basis rather than merely a ‘like for like’ basis in 
the context of establishing a product market. Accentuating the Positive 
welcomes the attempt to inject meaningful and objective comparison 
between the imported and domestic goods within the process of 
assessment of a product market but observes that the creation of the 
concept of ‘similar’ product is another example of an introduced 
inconsistency and uncertainty within the jurisprudence of free movement. 
Wilsher adopts an argument which is sympathetic to this view. He writes  
‘The Court has remained very unclear about this issue which is at the 
heart of its search for the appropriate balance between Member State and 
EC regulation of trade … the Court almost never seeks to examine the 
product markets to identify suitable comparators amongst domestic 
producers’.45 On a practical basis, the assessment of the similarity of 
products may be inherently more difficult for the importer than it is for the 
producer of the domestic product. The process is made more difficult for 
the importer; this arising from the Court’s failure to deliver clarity 
respecting the identification of the content of the concept of the similar 
product in this context.  
 
                                                          
45 D. Wilsher (note 15), 12-13. 
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The assessment above of the research which concerns the difficulties of 
locating the boundaries of Article 34 TFEU vis-à-vis the ‘selling 
arrangement’ with respect to particular adverts, identification of ‘product 
characteristics’, social practices and customs together with issues of 
remoteness introduced by the Court evidences an inability to supply 
consistency of underpinning. The research of Accentuating the Positive 
and “Market Access” or Bust? in these contexts expose the tensions and 
problems associated with the rule of the ‘selling arrangement’. Such 
exposure by the published work under consideration provides a definable 
contribution to knowledge which has furthered the understanding of the 
rule of the ‘selling arrangement’ in free movement jurisprudence in relation 
to goods.   
 
c. Product characteristics  
 
In the spirit of the identification of the inconsistencies and confusions that 
have surrounded the ‘selling arrangement’, Accentuating the Positive has 
presented focus on the contradictions of the variant terminology that have 
been prescribed by the Court in relation to the descriptions accorded to 
the ‘product characteristic’. The ‘product characteristic’ strikes at the 
‘boundary between the application of Article 28 (ex 30) EC46 and of the 
selling arrangement.’ A fresh perspective is pursued; Accentuating the 
Positive argues that the differing descriptions of product characteristics as 
                                                          
46 Now Article 34 TFEU.  
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‘intrinsic characteristics’ and ‘actual contents’ represent a lack of clarity as 
to preciseness of meaning. The article maintains that in the context of a 
concept operating at the boundary of the application of Article 34 and of 
the ‘selling arrangement’ rule, it is imperative that the ‘semantic 
differences’ in the terminologies prescribed by the Court are clarified. The 
existence of such difficulties and the ramifications which arise from them 
appear not to have been addressed elsewhere in the literature on free 
movement. That such differences are and have been allowed to exist 
within the context of the ‘selling arrangement’ is further evidence of 
another complexity that the Court seems to have allowed both to exist and 
then to have been perpetuated.   
 
d. Justification and remoteness 
 
A novel perspective is expressed by Accentuating the Positive which 
concerns the proposition that ‘the introduction of the mandatory 
requirement … shifted the emphasis from application of Article 30 (now 
28) EC to justification’. It is an original critique with respect to the 
‘mandatory requirement’ to locate it as a control mechanism of Article 34 
TFEU scrutiny; the concept considered to be the ‘new kid on the block’ 
which the article has described as having ‘almost unconsciously and 
seamlessly become the control mechanism which could be used to reign 
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in the unlimited consequences of Dassonville’.47 In effect, Accentuating the 
Positive critiques a jurisprudence in which the ability to justify the 
restrictive national measure is enhanced vis-à-vis an ability to designate 
particular measures as ‘selling arrangements’. The critique is important; 
the designation of a measure as a ‘selling arrangement’ removes the 
scrutiny of Article 34 but perhaps more significantly in this context also 
removes the measure from ‘the uncertainty pertaining to the process of 
justification’. 
 
The argument displayed in Accentuating the Positive, whilst in this context 
representing a novel perspective is also pragmatic. The argument displays 
a logicality which furthers understanding of the consequences for the 
jurisprudence of goods of the introduction of the rule relating to the ‘selling 
arrangement’. So too, contortions and confusions arise in this context 
within the jurisprudence resulting from the description of a measure as one 
which has had ‘too uncertain and indirect’ effect on trade. Accentuating the 
Positive describes the introduction of the concept of remoteness as one 
which ‘can be likened to that of the introduction of a ‘”wild card” in a game 
of poker’.48 Not only is the observation significant in terms of the 
complications and confusions arising from the same, but also as the article 
                                                          
47 ‘All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.’ Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and 
Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para 5.  
48 Noted by Barnard The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms 
(OUP, 2nd edition 2007), pg 166.  
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observes, it has a practical consequence. The recognition of remoteness 
in particular circumstances will be effective to ‘stultify any further enquiry 
either into the applicability of Article 30 [now 34 TFEU] … or the availability 
of the concept of the selling arrangement’. The stirring into the pot of the 
concept of remoteness with respect to the operation of the ‘selling 
arrangement’ is expressed by Accentuating the Positive as ‘not a welcome 
addition to the mix’. It is yet further evidence of the introduction of a 
complexity within the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods 
and one which the article makes clear adds to the uncertainties 
surrounding the operation of the rule of the ‘selling arrangement’ in 
particular circumstances.   
 
4. Restriction to free movement right 
 
In the context of the free movement of persons, services and capital, 
“Market Access” or Bust? raises a novel perspective with respect to the 
‘recent innovation’ relating to the embellishment of the terminology of 
restriction within free movement jurisprudence. The portrayal of restrictions 
in relation to persons and services for example as liable to hamper or to 
render less attractive or as liable to prohibit or otherwise impede are 
described as ‘adjectival descriptions [which] bear overtones of access to 
the market’. Although at one level this presents a new critique of the 
nature of the restriction, it also signifies complexities within the 
jurisprudence. “Market Access” or Bust? has observed that ‘It is arguable 
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that maintaining the focus within the composition of jurisprudence on the 
restriction or obstacle to the free movement right allows for a platform of 
principles to be employed as options for attack on the national measure 
suspected of hindering free movement rights. The perspective of “Market 
Access” or Bust? is clear, the availability of different principles as modus 
operandi to free movement rights may be welcomed; it strengthens the 
Court’s hand in scrutinising alleged restrictions to free movement rights. In 
furtherance of a continuation of the critique on the adoption of the 
adjectival terminology with respect to the restriction, “Market Access” or 
Bust adopts the perspective that such allusions ought to be removed from 
the Court’s jurisprudence. Such removal it is argued would address the 
inconsistencies in the jurisprudence that stem from any preference for 
market access vis-à-vis the renewed respect for the identification of the 
terminology of obstacle/restriction to the free movement right. Such is a 
novel argument, it employs the rationale that such ‘refocus’ of free 
movement jurisprudence would implant clarity of purpose to the scrutiny of 
the national measure that would be in line with Treaty exhortations. The 
argument would allow a consistency of underpinning that appears to be 
currently lacking within the jurisprudence in this context and allow the 
Court to use the plethora of modus operandi principles that are available 
to secure the Treaty free movement right in issue. As such it is a 
proposition that goes some way to exposing the minutiae of the scrutiny 
process; the proposed solution which would expose a transparency of 
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purpose would assist in the fostering of a greater understanding of free 
movement jurisprudence.   
 
i. Effect on justification 
 
Not only does reclassification of the enquiry led by the focus on the 
restriction to the free movement right allow the incorporation of the modus 
operandi principles at the appropriate level, the published work maintains 
that the observation is crucially important in cause of introducing clarity 
into the process of justification. The article Goods, Persons, Services and 
Capital in the European Union provides a novel perspective; the refocus of 
the enquiry onto restrictions/obstacles with respect to the jurisprudence of 
persons and services has been effective ‘partially, at least to displace that 
natural order’ relating to justification of discriminatory and non 
discriminatory measures. The novel critique goes further; the 
reclassification within the jurisprudence has been effective ‘to render 
redundant considerations of the Treaty grounds for justification in 
instances wherein previously the classification of directly discriminatory 
measures would have been used’. The proposition made is that this has 
handed to Member States a wider range of justification grounds for 
measures formerly designated as directly discriminatory and now held 
restrictive of free movement rights. Goods, Persons, Services and Capital 
in the European Union maintains the thematic of this analysis, highlighting 
an ‘inappropriateness of having different grounds for the justification of 
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national measures relating to persons and services dependent upon 
whether the measure is classified as discriminatory or as a non-
discriminatory restriction. Such ‘amalgam’ was advocated by Advocate 
General Jacobs in Danner49 in the context of services; the occurrence of 
such within the jurisprudence would contribute positively towards the 
adoption of transparency.   
 
Nevertheless, Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European 
Union observes that with respect to goods for example, contortions and 
lack of consistency with respect to underpinning the process of justification 
remain with the language of restriction having failed to ‘ferment(ed) a 
fusion with respect to the traditional basis of justification’. The article calls 
for clarity and a consistency from the Court of Justice; the development of 
a ‘symbiosis’ between the justification processes of persons and services 
and that of goods. Such arguments are reflected within those of Oliver and 
Enchelmaier who in the context of the recognition of ‘mandatory 
requirements’ in addition to Article 36 grounds in a number of cases, have 
maintained the view that it would be ‘more honest’ for the Court to admit 
an enlargement of the rules on justification.50 The development of a 
‘symbiosis’ would represent the instigation of a clarity within goods 
jurisprudence; the Court would not have to persist with inconsistencies in 
                                                          
49 Case C-136/00 Danner, para. 40. 
50 Oliver, P & Enchelmaier, S (note 29), 689-690.  
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underpinning the justification process.51 Goods, Persons, Services and 
Capital in the European Union evidences further inconsistency with 
respect to the justification of national measures. Oliver and Enchelmaier 
for example highlight that the Court ‘has on occasion been driven to 
extraordinary contortions to find “distinctly applicable” restrictions justified 
under the mandatory requirements’.52 The article observes that a 
development of the ‘symbiosis’ in the context of goods would both remove 
the pressure relating to an inconsistency of identification of the national 
measure and permit for example the desirability of extending the grounds 
for the justification of the directly discriminatory measure.53  
  
ii. Proportionality 
 
Finally, with respect to the issues surrounding the process of justification, 
Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union makes a 
novel contribution to furthering the understanding of free movement 
jurisprudence in linking the advent of the wider justifications of reclassified 
‘directly discriminatory’ measures with the observation that the Court has 
‘it seems, effectively placed the operation of proportionality into the 
forefront of preservation of free movement rights.’ The article maintains 
                                                          
51 Weatherill observes that if discrimination is present that only Article 36 is 
relevant. ‘The Court established this at an early stage in its shaping of this 
area of the law and it has never recanted.’ Free movement of goods ICLQ. 
2012, 61(2), 541-550, 544. 
52 Id. pg. 690.  
53 For example in C-2/90 Commission v Belgium the grounds imperative 
requirements were not available in relation to an absolute prohibition on 
the dumping of imported hazardous waste.   
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that it is now incumbent on the Court to assist this change in emphasis by 
the provision of defined guidelines as to the application of the principle of 
proportionality, noting that the lack of guidance ‘represents an abdication 
of responsibility on the part of the Court.’   
 
Such shift in emphasis would represent additional evidence of 
inconsistency in the underpinning of free movement jurisprudence in this 
context. The view taken on the increased importance of the principle of 
proportionality adopts new perspectives in its contribution to furthering an 
understanding of the jurisprudence of free movement. Though not directly 
expressed within the literature associated within free movement, it is a 
view which would seem to find support from Spaventa’s comments in the 
context of Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos that ‘the details 
of the way such policies are implemented become increasingly important 
in assessing the compatibility of national rules with Community law. In this 
respect, the proportionality scrutiny becomes [both less] and more 
intensive’ [emphasis added].54  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The body of published work which has supported this Statement has 
maintained focus upon the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in relation 
to goods, persons, services and capital. The case notes and 
                                                          
54 Spaventa, (note 19), 925.  
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commentaries submitted as representative of earlier work were concerned 
with more general notions of free movement, applied in instances of 
particular difficulties. Such concerned the practical application of ensuring 
that migrant EU nationals exercising free movement rights at the national 
level enjoyed the rights to which they were entitled. The published articles 
in concept expose trajectory; from commentary on specified and 
problematical explanations of EU law to academic thematic exposition 
designed to map the judicial development with respect to free movement 
jurisprudence. Such exposition has exposed want of thematically 
consistent underpinnings, complexities, and confusions together with 
some doctrinal diversity within the jurisprudence of free movement. 
Through such modus operandi, the research has added an increased 
knowledge and understanding of free movement jurisprudence; specific 
details of which have been detailed throughout this Submission.  
 
The body of research which finds expression within this output of 
published work represents a substantial and thematic enquiry into the 
jurisprudence of goods, persons, services and capital. The conducted 
research is temporally finite. The jurisprudence however is not static; there 
is an inherent organic evolution. The identified lacuna and issues exposed 
thus far must be addressed by the Court of Justice. Is free movement 
jurisprudence for example to be operated solely by the principle of market 
access or in future to be driven by a combined triumvirate of principles of 
non discrimination, market access and reliance on the principle of mutual 
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recognition? How will the tensions between these principles as the 
driver(s) of free movement be resolved? Is market access to be assessed 
on an economic or intuitive basis? What are the future prospects for the 
rule of ‘selling arrangement’ given the context of the judgments of 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos?. Will the identified 
idiosyncrasies of the rule of the ‘selling arrangement’, for example with 
respect to advertisement or product characteristic be addressed? 
 
On a more general basis, other issues need to be addressed. Will there be 
for example convergence within the jurisprudence relating to the Treaty 
freedoms; how will the jurisprudence of citizenship impact upon the 
jurisprudence of goods, persons, services and capital? Such identified 
lacuna and issues exposed by the published articles remain fertile areas 
for research and enquiry. It is research that will both develop and enhance 
further the level of knowledge and understanding acquired thus far with 
respect to free movement jurisprudence.   
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Articles 
“Market Access” or Bust?  Positioning the Principle Within the 
Jurisprudence of Goods, Persons, Services, and Capital  
 
By Tim Connor* 
 
 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides with respect to the 
free movement of goods that “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all  measures 
having equivalent effect shall  be prohibited.”1  In contrast, the TFEU provides that, with 
respect to the free movement of persons, services, and capital, restrictions at the national  
level on such rights are similarly unlawful.2  
 
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has applied the Treaty’s free movement 
provisions to national measures.  Such measures may be rendered unlawful unless 
justified.3  Within the process of the assessment of the lawfulness of the national measure, 
the Court has had recourse to the principles of nondiscrimination,4 mutual recognition5 
and market access.6  Free movement jurisprudence respects the operation of the three 
principles in the assessment of the application of the free movement provisions to national 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law at Bradford University Law School.  Email: T.Connor@Bradford.ac.uk 
1 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 34, 13 Dec. 2007, 2010 O.J. (C083) 1 [hereinafter 
TFEU]. 
2 This is not strictly true.  With respect to the worker, it has been determined that Treaty free movement 
provisions operate in the same manner as the other Treaty free movement provisions.  See Case 96/85, Comm’n 
v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1475; see also TFEU art. 49 (respecting establishment); TFEU art. 56 (respecting services); 
TFEU art. 63 (with respect to capital). 
3 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 36.  With respect to goods, justification is either by recourse to TFEU art. 36 or to the 
“mandatory requirement”; see also TFEU art. 45(3) (worker); TFEU art. 52(1) (establishment); TFEU art. 56 
(services).  
4 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 18 (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”).  
5 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Rewe-
Zentral].  
6 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837 [hereinafter Dassonville] 
(originally introducing with respect to goods).   
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measures.7  The market access principle notably has been used recently within the 
jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods.  The judgment of Commission v. 
Italy8 held unlawful an Italian law which prohibited mopeds from towing trailers ,9 and 
Mickelsson and Roos10 held unlawful Swedish laws which prohibited the use of personal 
watercraft on waters other than generally navigable waterways.11  Both respective 
measures were held to have prevented the access of the import to the respective national 
markets in those Member States.  The use of the market access principle in relation to the 
assessment of the legality of the Italian and Swedish national measures is important not 
only for the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods, but also in the wider 
context of the jurisprudence for free movement in general.  In particular, the use of the 
principle in Commission v. Italy12 and Mickelsson and Roos13 bears on the status of the 
selling arrangement in the context of the free movement of goods.  
 
This article addresses issues raised by the use of the principle of market access in the free 
movement jurisprudence of goods,14 persons,15 services,16 and capital.17  It concentrates 
initially on the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods.18  The use of the 
principle of market access in the wider context of all  free movement jurisprudence is then 
considered.  The article arose from the composition of the judgments of Commission v. 
                                                 
7 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 35 [hereinafter Commission v. Italy]:  “It is 
also apparent from settled caselaw that Article 28 EC [now Art. 34 TFEU] reflects the obligation to respect the 
principles of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully manufactured and marketed in 
other Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of Community products to national 
markets.”  (emphasis added). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at para. 56 (“A prohibition on the use of a product in the territory of a Member State has a considerable 
influence on the behaviour of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of that product to the market of 
that Member State.” (emphasis added)). 
10 Case C-142/05, Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273 [hereinafter Mickelsson]. 
11 Id. at para. 28 (“Such regulations have the effect of hindering the access to the domestic market.” (emphasis 
added)).  
12 See Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
13 See Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
14 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
15 See TFEU art. 45 (worker); see also TFEU art. 49 (establishment); Case T-266/97, Vlaamse Televisie Maatschapij 
NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-2329 [hereinafter Maatschapij]. 
16 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
17 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.  
18 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
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Italy19 and Mickelsson and Roos20 in the context of the use therein of the principle of 
market access.  In the particular context of the free movement of goods, this article will  
examine the re-engagement with the market access principle which is evidenced in the 
judgments of the Court of Justice in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson.  In this particular 
context, is the principle of market access now to take precedence over the concept of the 
selling arrangement?  This article will  also examine a context wider than the fr ee 
movement of goods.21  Does the rejuvenation and re-engagement with the principle of 
market access within the jurisprudence of goods have ramifications for the jurisprudence 
beyond goods, including that of persons, services, and capital?22  These are issues that are 
addressed within this article.  
 
B.  Positioning Market Access:  Goods 
 
I.  Contextualisation 
 
To contextualise the use of the principle of market access as a benchmark assessment 
point in the measurement of the legality of national measures, the market access principle 
was initially introduced with respect to the free movement of goods in 1974 in Procureur 
du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville.23  As a test in the field of the free movement of 
goods, its use became significantly curtailed some twenty years later by the judgment of 
Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard,24 which was delivered in 
1993.25  Eclipsed by Keck and Mithouard,26 and recently described in the instant context as 
a “phoenix”27 rising from the ashes, the recent recourse to the principle of market access in 
                                                 
19 See Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
20 See Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
21 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.   
22 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45 (for workers); see also TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49 (for establishment); 
TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56 (for services); TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63 (for capital). 
23 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, para. 6 (holding unlawful Belgian requirements relating to proof of origin because 
they prevented access to the Belgian market of Scotch whisky which had imported through third party states).  
Such laws, it was held, “should not act as a hindrance to trade between Member States and should, in 
consequence, be accessible to all Community nationals” (emphasis added).  
24 See Joined Cases C-268/91 & C-276/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and David Mithouard, 1993 
E.C.R. I-6097, Case C-276/91, Comm’n v. French Republic, 1993 E.C.R. I-4413 [hereinafter collectively Keck and 
Mithouard]. 
25  Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Catherine Barnard, Trailing a New Approach to Free Movement of Goods?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288, 290 (2009). 
          [Vol. 13 No. 06 682 Ge r m a n  La w  J o u r n a l  
Commission v. Italy28 and Mickelsson29 may prove to have significant repercussions with 
respect to usage, not only in the theatre of goods, but also in the wider community of 
persons,30 services,31 and capital.32 
 
In the jurisprudence relating to the application of the principle of the free movement of 
goods33 between Member States, “free access of Community products to national 
markets” has been but one of the principles available to the Court as a benchmark of the 
legality of the national measure in relation to the requirements of European Union law.34  
Contextualising the use of that principle in relation to the free movement of goods 35 in 
Commission v. Italy, the Court of Justice held that:  
 
It is also apparent from settled case-law that Article 28 
EC [Treaty Establishing the European Community; now 
Article 34 TFEU] reflects the obligation to respect the 
principles of nondiscrimination36 and of mutual 
recognition37 of products lawfully manufactured and 
marketed in other Member States as well as the 
principle of ensuring free access of community 
products to national markets.38 
                                                 
28 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
29 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
30 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45 (for worker); see also TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49 (establishment); see generally 
Maatschapij, para. 107. 
31 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  
32 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.   
33 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34 (stating a fundamental Treaty principle); see also Case C-333/08, Comm’n v. 
France, judgment of 28 January 2010. 
34 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 1 (imposing this principle in the context of goods by Articles 34); 
see also TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34 (providing that “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports, and all measures 
having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States”).  
35 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
36 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34.  There are many examples of the application of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in jurisprudence relating to the fre e movement of goods.  See, e.g., Tim Connor, Goods, 
Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union:  Jurisprudential Routes to Free Movement, 11 GERMAN L.J. 
159 (2010). 
37 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (introducing the principle of mutual recognition into jurisprudence relating to 
goods).  
38 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 38. 
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Even though interest in the market access principle has been renewed, this passage is 
evidence from the Court that other principles are available to smooth the application of 
Article 34 TFEU to national measures.  Commission v. Italy confirmed the availabil ity of 
such alternatives by referring to Criminal proceedings against Sandoz BV,39 Rewe Zentral40 
and Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard.41  The Sandoz BV 42 
judgment had proceeded on the basis of the application 43 of the principle of 
nondiscrimination.44  The Court in that case held that “[t]he objective pursued by the 
principle of free movement of goods is precisely to ensure for products from the various 
Member States access to markets.”45  Rewe Zentral,46 which held that national measures 
found to be effective in excluding the imported product were “an obstacle to trade,”47 had 
been decided on the basis of the operation of the principle of mutual recognition.48  In the 
judgment of Keck,49 even in the context of the introduction of the concept of the sell ing 
arrangement, the Court acknowledged clear respect for the principle of market access.50  
 
                                                 
39 Case C-174/82, Criminal proceedings against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445 [hereinafter Sandoz BV].  
40 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649.  
41 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097.  
42 Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445, para. 7. 
43 Id. (proceeding to the issue of justification and not considering the detail of this aspect) . 
44 Id. (concerning, in essence, indirectly discriminatory Dutch measures related to the marketing of vitamin -
enriched foodstuffs within Holland). 
45 Id. at para. 26 (emphasis added). 
46 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649.  
47 Id. at para. 14 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. at para. 15 (noting the judgment was decided on the basis that “[t]he concept of ‘measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports’ contained in Article 30 of the Treaty is to be understood to 
mean that the fixing of a minimum alcohol content for alcoholic beverages intended for human consumption by 
the legislation of a Member State also falls within the prohibition laid down in that provision where the 
importation of alcoholic beverages lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State is concerned” 
(emphasis added)).   
49 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097.  
50 Id. at para. 17 (referencing to the imported good, French law was held “not by nature such as to prevent their 
access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products” (emphasis 
added)).   
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The respect, shown in such judgments as Commission v. Italy,51 Sandoz,52 Rewe,53 and 
Keck54 is effective to prove an established respect for the principle of market access.  It is a 
respect which may be latent, as the judgments of Sandoz,55 Rewe,56 and Keck and 
Mithouard57 suggest.  However, it may instead be a patent respect, as exemplified by the 
judgments of Commission v. Italy58 and Mickelsson.59  
 
II.  Market Access: First Amongst Equals? 
 
In assessing the importance of the principle of market access within the jurisprudence of 
goods, a question to be addressed is whether the principle is to be employed as “first 
among equals” or whether the Court is to have recourse to the principles of 
nondiscrimination60 or mutual recognition61 in the context of the application of Article 34 
TFEU.  Is the principle of market access to take a place as only one of a number of 
principles, the use of any of which may trigger the application of the Treaty free movement 
provision?  This section first examines the positioning of the principles of 
nondiscrimination and mutual recognition with respect to that of market access within the 
jurisprudence of the free movement of goods.62  It then examines the role that the 
principle of market access has played in the context of the wider scrutiny of its use within 
the jurisprudence of persons,63 services,64 and capital.65 
                                                 
51 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34. 
52 Sandoz BV, 1993 E.C.R. 2445, para 26. 
53 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, paras. 6, 14–15. 
54 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-519, para. 17.  
55 Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445.  
56 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649.  
57 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097.  
58 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34. 
59 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273, para. 28.  
60 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 18 (noting that the general Treaty provision in this respect provides “within the 
scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”).  
61 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, para. 14 (introducing the market access principle).  
62 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
63 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45 (respecting the worker); see also TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49 (respecting 
establishment); Maatschapij, 1999 E.C.R. I-2329, para. 107 (noting this jurisprudence). 
64 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  
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1.  Nondiscrimination 
 
With respect to the principle of nondiscrimination, Dassonville66 held that national 
measures must not “directly or indirectly” hinder trade between Member States.67  This 
offers an explanation of the jurisprudential references to both direct and indirect 
discrimination.68  It is in this context that one commentator, prior to the judgment of Keck 
and Mithouard, expressed the view that 
 
Prior to the landmark decision of the Court of Justi ce in 
the Cassis case it was generally assumed—and the 
Court’s case law was consistent with this assumption—
that Article 30 (now Article 34 TFEU) had no application 
to a national measure unless it could be proved that 
the measure in question discriminated in some 
way . . . between either imports and domestic products 
or between channels of intra Community trade.69 
 
Yet, a pertinent question may arise as to the relationship between the principles of market 
access and discrimination.  Can the judgments relating to the legality of national measures 
tainted by discrimination in the field of free movement of goods be represented in terms 
of a reliance on the principle of market access?  The composition of a number of 
judgments in relation to the free movement of goods lends support to the validity of this 
argument.  Aside from Commission v. Italy,70 other judgments indicate that a certain 
symbiosis exists between the operation of the two principles of market access and 
                                                                                                                             
65 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.  
66 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.  
67 Id. at para. 5 (“All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.”). 
68 Direct and indirect discrimination are alternatively termed distinctly and indistinctly discriminatory.  
Commission Directive 70/50, art. 2(2), 1970 O.J. (L 13) 29 (EC) (initiating Court use of these terms).   
69 DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 221 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).  Note that 
consideration of the concept of discrimination was also important in the context of the judgment of Keck.  Keck 
and Mithouard, para. 17. 
70 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34 (explaining that “Article 28 EC [now TFEU art. 34] reflects the 
obligation to respect the principles of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully 
manufactured and marketed in other Member States,  as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
Community products to national markets”). 
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discrimination.  In Commission v. Ireland,71 for example, which concerned the 
discriminatory nature of a “buy Irish” campaign,72 there was an implicit recognition of the 
principle of market access.  The Irish law was held “liable to affect the volume of trade 
between Member States.”73  So too, in Henri Cullet and Chambre syndicale des réparateurs 
automobiles et détaillants de produits pétroliers v. Centre Leclerc à Toulouse and Centre 
Leclerc à Saint-Orens-de-Gameville, it was held that the effect of a system of fixing prices of 
partitioning petroleum products “is to partition off the national market.”74  A stronger 
indication of a simmering symbiosis between the principles of nondiscrimination and 
market access was delivered in Ker-Optika bt v. ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete, in 
which a Hungarian measure prohibiting the sale of contact lenses by mail order was held to 
deprive importers75 “of a particularly effective means of sell ing those products and thus 
significantly impedes access of those traders to the market of the Member State 
concerned.”76  In Commission v. UK, it was held that discriminatory national legislation 
relating to origin marking affected the access of the imported good to the national market 
on the basis that it was “liable to have the effect of increasing the production costs of 
imported goods and making it more difficult to sell  them on the United Kingdom market.”77 
 
2.  Mutual Recognition  
 
Within the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods,78 which has applied the 
principle of mutual recognition,79 there is arguably some inherent respect for the principle 
                                                 
71 Case C-249/81, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005, para. 25.  
72 Id. at para. 20.  The introduction of the “guaranteed Irish” symbol was indirectly discriminatory of the imported 
product.  Id. at para 26. 
73 Id. at para. 25 (emphasis added).  
74 Case 231/83, Henri Cullet and Chambre syndicale des réparateurs automobiles et détaillants de produits 
pétroliers v. Centre Leclerc à Toulouse and Centre Leclerc à Saint-Orens-de-Gameville, 1985 E.C.R 305, para . 20 
[hereinafter Cullet] (emphasis added).  
75 Case C-108/09, Ker-Optika bt v. ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete, judgment of 2 December 
2010 [hereinafter Ker-Optika] (noting that hence the Hungarian measure was  discriminatory). 
76 Id. at para. 54 (noting the requirements laid down by the Hungarian law for the marketing of contact lenses 
affected the selling of imported products to a greater degree than the domestic product) (emphasis added). 
77 Case 207/83, Comm’n v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1985 E.C.R. 1201, para 18.  
78 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.   
79 See Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, para. 14 (introducing this principle); see, e.g. Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite 
Digital SL v. Adminstración General del Estado; Distribuidora de Televisión Digital SA (DTS), 2002 E.C.R. I-607; Case 
C-123/00, Bellamy and English Shop Wholesale, 2001 E.C.R. I -2795, para. 18. 
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of market access.80  The concept that “[t]here is therefore no valid reason why [goods], 
provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member 
States . . . should not be introduced into any other Member State” is imbued with notions 
of market access.81  In jurisprudence wherein there has been a reliance on the principle of 
mutual recognition, a respect for the principle of market access has been more prominent.  
For example, in Criminal proceedings against Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik, a 
Finnish system of prior authorisation with respect to the import of ethyl alcohol was held 
“capable of . . . impeding access to the market for goods.”82  In Commission v. Portugal, the 
                                                 
80 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34 (“It is also apparent from settled caselaw that Article 28 EC [now 
TFEU 34] reflects the obligation to respect the principle of . . . mutual recognition of products lawfully 
manufactured and marketed in other Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
Community products to national markets.” (emphasis added)).  
81 Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, para. 14.  The use of the market access principle is in evidence on many 
occasions.  See, e.g., Case 27/80, Criminal proceedings against Anton Adriaan Fietje, 1980 E.C.R. 3839, para. 15; 
Case 53/80, Officier van justitie v. Koninklijke Kaasfabriek Eyssen BV,  1981 E.C.R. 409, para. 11 (“In view of this 
disparity of rules it cannot be disputed that the prohibition by certain Member States of the marketing on their 
territory of processed cheese containing added nisin is of such a nature as to affect imports of that product from 
other Member States where, conversely, the addition of nisin is wholly or partially permitted and that it for that 
reason constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction.”); Case 6/81, BV Industrie 
Diensten Groep v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV,  1982 E.C.R. 707, paras. 6–7; Case 261/81, Walter Rau 
Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PVBA, 1982 E.C.R. 3961, para. 20 (noting the principle of mutual recognition was 
in operation, where a Belgian packaging measure was held unlawful in application to margarine imports “lawfully 
produced and marketed in [other Member] state[s]”); Case 788/79, Criminal proceedings against Herbert Gilli  and 
Paul Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071, para. 12; Case 220/81, Criminal proceedings against Timothy Frederick Robertson 
and others, 1982 E.C.R. 2349, para. 12; Case C-293/93, Criminal proceedings against Ludomira Neeltje Barbara 
Houtwipper, 1994 E.C.R. I-4249, paras. 14–15 (respecting a law indicating their fineness in relation to the quantity 
of pure precious metal used); Case C-30/99, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2001 E.C.R. I-4619, para. 30; Case C-12/00, 
Comm’n v. Kingdom of Spain, 2003 E.C.R. I-459, para. 80 (holding the prohibition on the sale of cocoa and 
chocolate products to which vegetable fats other than cocoa butter had been added  being marketed as 
“chocolate” in Spain liable to obstruct intra-Community trade in those products lawfully manufactured in other 
Member States); Case C-14/00, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 2003 E.C.R. I-513, paras. 70–78; Case C-366/04, Georg 
Schwarz v. Bürgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg,  2005 E.C.R. I-10139, paras. 29–30 (respecting the 
principle of “mutual recognition” which underpinned the judgment that an Austrian measure prohibiting the sale 
from vending machines of non-packaged products from vending machines was a hindrance to trade, noting 
“those same goods can be marketed abroad, in particular in Germany, without packaging” (emphasis added)); see 
also Case 178/84, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Germany,  1987 E.C.R. 1227, para. 29; Case 176/84, Comm’n v. 
Hellenic Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 1193, para. 31 (relying on the principle of mutual recognition  which operated to 
render unlawful a Greek law prohibiting marketing of imported beers manufactured from materials other than 
those stipulated from domestic law); Case 130/80,  Criminal proceedings against Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige 
Voedingsprodukten Kelderman BV, 1981 E.C.R. 527, para. 16. 
82 Case C-434/04, Criminal proceedings against Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik, 2006 E.C.R. I-9171, 
para. 21.  There was a respect too in this instance for the principle of mutual recognition.  The national law was 
capable of “impeding access to the market for goods which are lawfully produced and marketed in other Member 
States.” Id. (emphasis added).  It is noted that the Finnish measure was also considered a “ restriction on trade.”  
Id. at para. 22 (emphasis added). 
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refusal to recognise the equivalence of approval certificates 83 issued by another Member 
State was held to “restrict access to the market” of the host state.84  An obligation to 
obtain a transfer l icense prior to using an imported vehicle was held in Commission v. 
Republic of Finland to be “capable of hindering intra-Community trade in motor vehicles 
and impeding access to the market for goods which are lawfully produced and/or sold in 
other Member States.”85  Finally in Commission v. Belgium, a Belgian requirement relating 
to the prior approval of automatic fire detection systems was held to “restrict . . . access to 
the market of the importing Member State.”86  
 
III.  Selling Arrangements:  Market Access 
 
1.  Scrutiny 
 
Positioning the principle of market access within the jur isprudence relating to the free 
movement of goods87 requires an examination of the position of the sell ing arrangement in 
this context.  The judgment of Keck and Mithouard88 introduced the concept of the sell ing 
arrangement into the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods.89  Keck held 
that a category of measures—“certain sell ing arrangements”90—would fall  outside the 
scrutiny of Article 34 TFEU.91  The concept of the “certain sell ing arrangement” provided an 
exception to the armoury of Article 34 TFEU in the attack on national measures that hinder 
free movement.  A precondition to the operation of the sell ing arrangement is the 
requirement that the national measure under scrutiny is nondiscriminatory and does not 
                                                 
83 Case C-432/03, Comm’n v. Portuguese Republic, 2005 E.C.R. I-9665 (relating to polyethylene pipes).  
84 Id. at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
85 Case C-54/05, Comm’n v. Finland, 2007 E.C.R. I-2473, para. 32 (emphasis added). 
86 Case C-254/05, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2007 E.C.R. I-4269, para. 41.  
87 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
88 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, para. 16. 
89 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
90 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, para. 16 (“National provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling 
arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States 
within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment (Case 8/74 [1974] ECR 837), so long as those provisions apply to 
all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.”).  
91 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, para. 5. (remaining inside that scrutiny, therefore, are product requirements, or 
“requirements to be met” by the goods, such as such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, 
composition, presentation, labeling, and packaging, and residual rules to the extent that they fall within the 
definition of a measure having equivalent effect as given in Dassonville). 
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prevent the access of the imported good92 to the host market.  A national measure that 
satisfies the criteria for a “sell ing arrangement” is removed from the scrutiny of Article 34 
TFEU, and therefore regarded as lawful.  The jurisprudence of the free movement of goods 
since Keck93 is l ittered with examples of national measures which have been deemed 
“certain sell ing arrangements.”94  Later cases such as Commission v. Italy95 and 
Mickelsson96 affected the concept of the sell ing arrangement and the relationship that this 
concept enjoys vis-à-vis the principle of market access.  In both cases, the characterization 
of the measures as “sell ing arrangements” was based upon “traditional” application of 
                                                 
92 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, para. 16 (“By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, 
the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain 
selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member 
States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States.”).  
93 Id. 
94 See Case C-401/92, Criminal proceedings against Tankstation 't Heukske vof and J. B. E. Boermans, 1994 E.C.R. I-
2199, para. 15 (determining that a Dutch law relating to the opening hours of shops fell into the category of 
“certain selling arrangements”); see also Case C-391/92, Comm’n v. Greece, 1995 E.C.R. I-1621, para. 21 (applying 
the same “classification” to a reservation that processed milk be sold only in pharmacies); Case  C-292/92, 
Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-6787 [hereinafter 
Hünermund case] (regarding the German advertising rules prohibiting the advertising of quasi-pharmaceutical 
outside); Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA, 
1995 E.C.R. I-179, para 48 (concerning French measures relating to television advertising); Case C-418/93, 
Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco et al, 1996 E.C.R. I -2975, para. 28 (concerning Italian 
legislation relating to shop opening times); Case C-387/93, Criminal proceedings against Giorgio Domingo 
Banchero, 1995 E.C.R. I-4663, paras. 34–35 (concerning Italian customs legislation limiting tobacco sales to 
authorised retailers); Joined Cases C-69/93 & C-258/93, Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena et 
Comune di Capena and Promozioni Polivalenti Venete Soc. Coop, 1994 E.C.R. I-2355, para. 15. (concerning Italian 
measures relating to Sunday retail closing hours).  For further examples of “selling arrangements,” see Case C -
441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Claudia Schmidt, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 17 (relating to an Austrian 
prohibition on the door stop selling and collecting of silver jewelry); Case C-63/94, Groupement National des 
Négociants en Pommes de Terre de Belgique v. ITM Belgium SA and Vocarex SA, 1995 E.C.R. I -2467 (relating to 
Belgian measures which related to the sale of potatoes with a low profit margin); Case C -20/03, Criminal 
proceedings against Marcel Burmanjer, René Alexander Van Der Linden and Anthony De Jong, 2005 E.C.R. I -4133 
(relating to measures by Belgium relating to the obtaining of prior authorisation with respect to the itinerant sales 
of subscriptions to periodicals); Case C-6/98, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v. PRO 
Sieben Media AG, supported by SAT 1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH, Kabel 1, K 1 Fernsehen GmbH, 1999 E.C.R. I-
7599, paras. 48, 51 (relating to a rule concerning the net principle with respect to television broadcasters was 
held to concern “selling arrangement”); Case C-71/02, Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk 
GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-3025, para. 39 (concerning Austrian legislation prohibiting references in advertisements to 
the commercial origin of goods was similarly classified so as to fall beyond the clutches of Article 28 EC (now TFEU 
art. 34), and in holding that the national legislation was not subject to Article 28 EC scrutiny, the judgment 
respected the balance between the interests of freedom of expression and “ each of the goals justifying 
restrictions on that freedom”). 
95 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
96 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
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Article 28 EC (now Article 34 TFEU) rather than the application of the principles established 
in Keck.  The respective Swedish and Italian measures were held to have the “effect of 
hindering the access to the domestic market” in relation to personal watercraft97 and to 
trailers specially designed for motorcycles.98  It is noted that in the recent judgment of 
Commission v. Portugal,99 for example, the invitation by Portugal to categorise the 
“restriction” on the free movement of capital as a “sell ing arrangement” was ignored.  The 
measure, though applying equally to both residents and non-residents, was held to affect 
access100 to the market place because it had been effective to deter the non-resident 
investor.   
 
2.  Market Access:  Identification 
 
In both Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson, the Court of Justice showed a will ingness to 
engage with the principle of market access in the process of determining the legality of a 
national measure with respect to the application of Article 34 TFEU.  Such engagement 
appears significant, because the Court could have arguably engaged more readily with the 
principle of the “sell ing arrangement.”101  In Commission v. Italy,102 the nondiscriminatory 
national rule was held a “measure having equivalent effect”103 on the basis that it had “a 
considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access 
of that product to the market of that Member State.”104 
 
                                                 
97 Id. at para. 28.  Note, however, that the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Mickelsson concluded that that 
the Swedish measures relating to the use of watercraft be regarded as arrangements for use for products falling 
into the “selling arrangement” category “so long as it applies to all relevant traders operating within the national 
territory and so long as it affects in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and 
of those from other Member States, and is not product-related.” Id. at  para. 114(2). 
98 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 58.  Both national laws could be considered to be “measures having 
equivalent effect” and hence unlawful; subject to “justification pursuant to Article  30 EC [now TFEU art. 36] 
or . . . overriding public interest requirements.”  Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273, para. 28; see also Commission v. 
Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 58 (having a similar application). 
99 Case C-212/09, Comm’n v. Portuguese Republic, judgment of 10 November 2011  [hereinafter Comm’n v. 
Portugal]. 
100 Id. at para. 65.  
101 See Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273, para. 44 (Advocate General Kokott’s remarks).  
102 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 24. 
103 Id. at para. 58.  See also TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34 (providing “quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States”).  
104 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 56.  The Court also relied on the judgment of Commission v. Italy in 
Mickelsson, in which a restriction on the use of personal watercraft was likewise held to be a “measure having 
equivalent effect.”  Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273, para. 24. 
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Such will ingness to engage with the principle of market access in Commission v. Italy105 and 
Mickelsson106 may prove to be significant in the context of questions relating to the future 
use of the concept of the “sell ing arrangement” in particular, and for the wider sphere 
relating to the jurisprudence of goods, in general.  To date, there has been an evident 
respect within the jurisprudence relating to the concept of the “sell ing arrangement.”  In 
Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg,107 for example, 
“sell ing arrangements”—here, national prohibitions on advertising of non-medical 
products outside pharmacies—were held not to affect the access of the imported product 
to the German market place.108  In Criminal proceedings against Tankstation't Heukske vof 
and J. B. E. Boermans,109 while the conditions laid down in Keck were technically 
“fulfi l led,”110 the Court held that “[t]he application of such rules to the sale of products 
from another Member State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not by 
nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to impede access any more than it 
impedes the access of domestic products.”111  In Commission v. Greece, there was an 
acknowledgment that the national legislation reserving the sale of processed milk for 
infants exclusively to pharmacies did not “thereby prevent . . . access to the market of 
products from other Member States or specifically place them at a disadvantage.”112  In 
Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco et al, in which the regulation of 
the opening hours of retail  outlets was held to be a sell ing arrangement, it was found that 
“[t]here is no evidence that the aim of the rules at issue is to regulate trade in goods 
between Member States or that, viewed as a whole, they could lead to unequal treatment 
between national products and imported products as regards access to the market.”113  
Likewise, Italian legislation reserving “the retail  sale of manufactured tobacco products, 
                                                 
105 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
106 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
107 Case C-292/92, Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-6787. 
108 Id. at paras. 19, 21, 22 (“It is not the purpose of a rule of professional conduct prohibiting pharmacists from 
advertising quasi-pharmaceutical products outside the pharmacy, drawn up by a professional association, to 
regulate trade in goods between Member States .”).  See also Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Hünermund, 
para. 29(c). 
109 Joined cases C-402/92 & C-401/92, Criminal proceedings against Tankstation 't Heukske vof and J. B. E. 
Boermans, 1994 E.C.R. I-2199 [hereinafter Boermans case]. 
110 Id. at para. 18.  
111 Id. (emphasis added).  
112 Case C-391/92, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1995 E.C.R. I-1621, para. 20.  
113 Case 418/83, Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco et al., 1996 E.C.R. I-2975, para. 24 
(emphasis added).  See also Joined Cases C-69/93 & C- 258/93, Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena 
and Comune di Capena et al., 1994 E.C.R. I-2355, para. 12 (relating to Italian legislation on the closure of retail 
outlets on Sundays in which this issue was decided in the same manner).  
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irrespective of their origin, to authorized distributors  . . . does not thereby bar access to the 
national market for products from other Member States or does not impede such access 
more than it impedes access for domestic products within the di stribution network.”114  In 
Douwe Egberts, a Belgian law which prohibited the advertising of product characteristics 
was held l iable to impede access of the imported foodstuff more than the domestic 
product.115  Further, in A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Claudia Schmidt, whether 
imported goods in relation to jewelry sales were affected to a greater degree than the 
domestic Austrian jewelry116 by a law relating to doorstop sell ing was left for the national 
court to determine.117  
 
3.  Advocate General Jacobs 
 
Advocate General Jacobs, in his opinion in Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. 
TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA,118 argued that the “sell ing arrangement”—a French 
measure relating to broadcasting119—would fall outside the scope of Article 28 EC120 on an 
alternative basis.121  Although the restriction on shop opening hours may have resulted “in 
                                                 
114 Case C-387/93, Criminal proceedings against Giorgio Domingo Banchero, 1995 E.C.R. I-4663, para. 44 
(emphasis added).  See also Case C-93/94, Groupement National des Négociants en Pommes de Terre de Belgique 
v. ITM Belgium SA and Vocarex SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-2467, para. 12 (noting how a Belgian rule prohibiting the sale of 
potatoes at a very low profit margin was held in to be a selling arrangement as it was “not by nature such as to 
prevent access [of goods] to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic 
products”). 
115 Case C-239/02, Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV and Christophe Souranis, Carrying on Business 
Under the Commercial Name of "Etablissements FICS' and Douwe Egberts NV v. FICS- World BVBA, 2004 E.C.R. I-
7007, paras. 53–54. 
116 Case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Claudia Schmidt, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 25.  See also id. at 
para. 23 (“Such a provision constitutes a measure having equivalent effect only if the exclusion of the relevant 
marketing method affects products from other Member States more than it affects domestic products.”).  
117 Id. at para. 25.  
118 Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA,  1995 
E.C.R. I-179 [hereinafter Leclerc-Siplec]. 
119 Id. at paras. 22–24.  
120 See TFEU art. 34 (replacing EC art. 28). 
121 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 55 (explaining his view that the 
measure fell outside the scope of Art 30 EC (now Art 34 TFEU) because “[t]he restriction affects only one form of 
advertising, although the most effective as far as mass consumer goods are concerned and advertisement of the 
goods themselves is not affected other than indirectly.  As in the case of legislation restricting the opening hours 
of shops . . . the measure may result in a slight reduction in the total volume of sales of goods, including imports.  
But it cannot be said to have a substantial impact on access to the market .  It therefore falls in my view outside 
the scope of Article 30.”)(emphasis added). 
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a slight reduction in the total volume of sales of goods, including imports,”122 the Advocate 
General was of the opinion that “it cannot be said to have a substantial  impact on access to 
the market.”123  The Advocate General was of the view that “one guiding principle”124 
existed in the application of Article 34 TFEU,125 noting that “all  undertakings which engage 
in a legitimate economic activity in a Member State should have unfettered access to the 
whole of the Community market.”126  Such a view defers to the operation of the principle 
of market access; its acceptance by the Court would have had ramifications for the 
continued maintenance of the concept of the sell ing arrangement.  The test, the Advocate 
General argued, should be stated as follows:  “If the principle is that all  undertakings 
should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, then the 
appropriate test in my view is whether there is a substantial restriction on that access.”127  
Advocate General Jacobs concluded that the adoption of this reasoning in situations which 
would otherwise have involved considerations relating to the sell ing arrangement would 
“amount to introducing a de minimis test into Article 30 [now Article 34 TFEU].”128  This 
observation possibly now should be tempered in view of the more recent judgment in 
Commission v. Germany.129  In similar circumstances,130 the Court held that the contested 
measures were l iable to hinder intra-Community trade and hence were to be considered 
“measures having equivalent effect.”131  Such was “without it being necessary to prove that 
they have had an appreciable effect on such trade.”132  Nevertheless, it is clear that, for 
                                                 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at para. 41. 
125 See EC art. 30. 
126 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,  Leclerc-Siplec, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 41 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at para. 42 (emphasis added).  The opinion continues:  “Once it is recognized that there is a need to limit 
the scope of Article 30 (now Art 34 TFEU) in order to prevent excessive interference in the regulatory powers of 
the Member States, a test based on the extent to which a measure hinders trade between Member States by 
restricting market access seems the most obvious solution.”  Id. 
128 Id. at para. 42. 
129 Case C-141/07, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-6935 [hereinafter Comm’n v. Germany]. 
130 Id. at para. 35 (noting that arrangements for sale of medicinal products held to make the supply of medical 
products to German hospitals more difficult and more costly for pharmacies establis hed outside Germany). 
131 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
132 Case C-141/07, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-6935, para. 43 (emphasis added).  See also 
Case C-166/03, Comm’n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-6535, para. 15.  Elsewhere there are express statements that 
even minor restrictions are prohibited and that the effects of a national measure do not need to be appreciable .  
See, e.g., Case C-309/02, Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH & Co. and S. Spitz KG v. Land Baden-
Württembergpara, 2004 E.C.R. I-11763, para. 68 (rejecting a suggestion that the slight effect of rules or the 
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Advocate General Jacobs, what is of consequence is how substantial the restriction133 on 
the free movement right has been.  A significant obstacle to free movement is caught 
within the application of Article 34 TFEU; an insignificant obstacle would not be so caught 
and would therefore be regarded as lawful.134  The Court of Justice did not, however, 
accept the test proposed by Advocate General Jacobs.  It had previously rejected the idea 
that slight hindrances could escape the scrutiny of Article 34 TFEU,135 and, in Leclerc-Siplec, 
the Court followed the Keck approach. 
 
However the Court finally settles the balance in the resort to the concept of the sell ing 
arrangement vis-à-vis that of the principle of market access, for the present it is an issue 
that remains to be determined.  The perception of commentators is that the judgments in 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson have at least renewed the discussion as to the future 
direction of the sell ing arrangement through the appeal in those judgments to the principle 
of market access.136  As a consideration in that context, the assessment of legality of the 
national measure by the yardstick of market access would, for example, leave unsullied the 
classification of national measures in Commission v. Greece137 and Semeraro Casa Uno Srl 
v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbuscoet al 138 as “sell ing arrangements.”139  
                                                                                                                             
availability of marketing of the products could remove the measures from the ambit of Article 34 TFEU); Case 
177/82, Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, 1984 E.C.R. 1797, para. 14; Case 
C-212/06, Gov’t of Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon v. Gouvernement flamand, 2008 E.C.R. I-
1683, para. 51 (in the context of the free movement of persons).  
133 Case C-141/07, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-6935 (noting a substantial restriction to 
market access could include product rules and, for example, the requirement to alter the import in the host 
state). 
134 See Jukka Snell, The Notion of Market Access:  A Concept or a Slogan?, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 437, 450, 455–
60 (2010). 
135 Joined Cases 177 & 178/82, Criminal proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern BV, 1984 
E.C.R. 1797, para. 13.  
136 See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 27, at 290; Snell, supra note 134, at 437–72, 455–58; Eleanor Spaventa, Leaving 
Keck Behind?  The Free Movement of Goods After the Rulings in Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos, 34 
Eur. L. Rev. 914, 921 (2009); Alina Tryfonidou, Further Steps on the Road to Convergence Among the Market 
Freedoms, 35 EUR. L. REV. 36, 50 (2010); Pal Wenneras & Ketil Boe Moen, Selling Arrangements, Keeping Keck, 35 
Eur. L. Rev 387, 399–400 (2010).  
 
137 Case C-391/92, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1995 E.C.R. I-1621, para. 20. 
  
138 Case 418/93, Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbuscoet al,  1996 E.C.R. I-2975, paras. 24, 28.  
See also Joined Cases C-69/93 & C-258/93, Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena and Comune di 
Capena et al., 1994 E.C.R. I-2355, para. 12 (relating to Italian legislation on the closure of retail outlets on Sundays 
which this issue was decided in the same manner).  
 
139 Semeraro, 1996 E.C.R. I-2975, para. 24 (noting the national law “cannot . . . be regarded as limiting access to 
the market”).  See also Case C-239/02, Douwe Egberts NV v. Westrom Pharma NV and Christophe Souranis, 
Carrying on Business Under the Commercial Name of “Etablissements FIC” and Douwe Egberts NV v. FICS- World 
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C.  Commentary 
 
I.  General Support  
 
It should be acknowledged that the general support for the principle of market access 
within the jurisprudence should be positioned against the background of an abiding 
respect for the principles of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition as elements in the 
process of the application of Article 34 TFEU to national measures.  The judgment of 
Commission v. Italy was clear to reinforce the existence of such respect;140 that 
reinforcement plays an important role in the assessment of the future prospects for the 
use of the principle of market access within the jurisprudence relating to the free 
movement of goods.141  That aside, what is possibly of more significance to the instant 
context is the observation by academic writers that, in effect, the judgments of 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson signaled “that the notion of market access may 
ultimately be the criterion defining the scope of art. 34 TFEU (thus also in effect replacing 
Dassonville).”142  The same writers argue that these two judgments may be seen as “a 
departure from orthodox jurisprudence and the beginning of a universal and strict ‘market 
access’ era.”143  Support for such a proposition may be had from Advocate General Jacobs 
in his opinion delivered in Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TF1 Publicité SA 
and M6 Publicité SA.  The Advocate General argued “[t]here is one guiding principle which 
seems to provide an appropriate test:  that principle is that all  undertakings which engage 
in a legitimate economic activity in a Member State should have unfettered access to the 
whole of the Community market.”144  Rather of more importance for present 
circumstances was Advocate General Jacobs’s contextualisation of the presence of this 
principle within the jurisprudence: 
                                                                                                                             
BVBA, 2004 E.C.R. I-7007, para. 53–54 (noting that an absolute prohibition on the advertising of characteristics of 
a product the national law was liable to impede the access of the imported foodstuff to the Belgian market, thus 
deserving scrutiny under Article 34 TFEU). 
 
140 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 34 (“It is also apparent from settled case-law that Article 28 EC 
reflects the obligation to respect the principles of nondiscrimination and of mutual recognition of products 
lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
community products to national markets.”). 
 
141 Id. (vis-à-vis the use of the other principles of nondiscrimination and of mutual recognition in the mechanics of 
the application of Article 34 TFEU). 
 
142 Wenneras & Moen, supra note 136, at 399–400. 
 
143 Id. at 387.  See also Barnard, supra note 27; Thomas Horsley, Anyone for Keck? 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 2001 
(2009); Spaventa, supra note 136, at 921; Peter Pecho, Good-Bye Keck?: A Comment on the Remarkable Judgment 
in Commission v. Italy, C-110/05, 36 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 257 (2009); Snell, supra note 134, 455–60; 
Stephen Weatherill, Free Movement of Goods, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 985, 987 (2009). 
144 Leclerc-Siplec, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 41 (emphasis added). 
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In spite of occasional inconsistencies in the reasoning 
of certain judgments, that seems to be the underlying 
principle which has inspired the Court's approach from 
Dassonville through Cassis de Dijon to Keck.  Virtually 
all of the cases are, in their result, consistent with the 
principle, even though some of them appear to be 
based on different reasoning.145 
 
Further indirect support for the proposition made by Wenneras and Moen may be had 
from Commission v. Italy, in which it was held that Article 34 TFEU not only respects the 
principles of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition, but also renders unlawful “[a]ny 
other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the 
market of a Member State.”146 
 
II.  Renaissance?  
 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson offer strong evidence in support of the claim that there 
is a renaissance in the use of the market access principle.  Whether, however, it is a 
renaissance at the expense of the other available means147 of proving the compatibil ity of 
national measures with Treaty free-movement provisions is another matter.  It may yet be 
too early to suggest that, in such an equation of application, the two principles of 
nondiscrimination and mutual recognition could suffer the indignity of relegation to the 
role of bit-part players.  Both principles have an integral part to play in locating the legality 
of national measures within the jurisprudence of goods.148  Arguably, according automatic 
prominence to the principle of market access in such circumstances may serve to 
obfuscate, in particular instances, the rationale for the application of Article 34 TFEU.  The 
cause of the failure in particular instances of the imported goods to gain access to the hos t 
market may in reality arise from the presence of discrimination in the national measure 
against the imported product.  Any obfuscation of the causal reality for a ruling of i l legality 
would not serve well the cause of transparency in such matters; such a  result may also not 
be intended by the Court of Justice.  The continued use of the principles of 
nondiscrimination and mutual recognition in the equation that is the application of Article 
34 TFEU not only gains credence by circumstances of the appropriate acknowledgment in 
                                                 
145 Id. (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs) (emphasis added).  
146 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 37 (emphasis added).  See also Wenneras & Moen, supra note 136, 
at 398 (2010) (alluding to this aspect). 
147 For example, nondiscrimination and mutual recognition. 
148 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.   
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Commission v. Italy,149 but also, as i l lustrated previously in this article, by the infusion of 
those principles within the jurisprudence of goods.150  
 
There is too abundant evidence that the respect for those principles will  continue.  It will  
be recalled that Article 34 TFEU151 provides that “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and 
all  measures having equivalent effect shall  be prohibited between Member States.”152  This 
provision is the blank canvas upon which the Court has been able to write its script in the 
promotion of the free movement of goods.  It is a promotion which has employed and 
developed an eclectic descriptive terminology with respect to the national measure.  
Measures have been held unlawful 153 where they restrict,154 hinder,155 or act as a barrier156 
or obstacle157 to the exercise of the free movement right.  The adoptive nomenclature is 
                                                 
149 Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
150 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
151 See also EC art. 28 (replaced by TFEU art. 34).  
152 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
153 Although facially some measures would be found unlawful because of their effects on trade, the Court may not 
hold them unlawful if those measures can be justified.  In the context of goods, justification of national measures 
is accomplished either through the application of Article 36 TFEU or through the concept of the mandatory 
requirement.  Article 36 TFEU provides:  “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.  Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a me ans of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.”  Mandatory requirements introduced and identified in Rewe-
Zentral as “relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public he alth, the 
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.”  Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649.  
154 In Joh. Eggers Sohn & Co. v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, for example, the national law was held a restriction 
which “merely consolidates the partitioning of the markets.”  Case 13/78, Joh. Eggers Sohn & Co. v. Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen, 1978 E.C.R. 1935.  The same rationale was applied in Cullet, 1985 E.C.R. 305; Case 4-75, 
Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. Landwirtschaftskammer, 1975 E.C.R. 843; Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, 
Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich, 2003 E.C.R. I -5659. 
155 Note the Dassonville formula with respect to defining the “measures having an equivalent effect” for Article 34 
TFEU purposes.  Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.  See also Case C-17/93, Criminal proceedings against J.J.J. Van der 
Veldt, 1994 E.C.R. I-3537 [hereinafter Van der Veldt]; Joined Cases C-158/04 & C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos 
AE v. Elliniko Dimosio, 2006 E.C.R. I-8135 [hereinafter Alfa Vita]; Comm’n v. Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-6935; Case C-
192/01, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2003 E.C.R. I-9693 [hereinafter Comm’n v. Denmark]. 
156 See Case C-387/99, Comm’n v. Germany, 2004 E.C.R. I-3751 [hereinafter German Vitamins Case]; Case C-
150/00, Comm’n v. Austria, 2004 E.C.R. I-3887 [hereinafter Austrian Vitamins Case]; Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon 
GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1998 E.C.R. I-4473; Case C-297/05, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2007 E.C.R. I-
7467; Alfa Vita, 2006 E.C.R. I-8135. 
157 See Cullet, 1985 E.C.R. 305; Comm’n v. Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-6935; Case 153/78, Comm’n v. Germany, 1979 
E.C.R. 2555; Case 68-76, Comm’n v. France, 1977 E.C.R. 515; Criminal proceedings against Herbert Gilli and Paul 
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wide enough to embrace allusions to any, all, or a combination of the principles of 
discrimination, mutual recognition or market access in the context of the enquiry process 
involved in the application of Article 34 TFEU to national measures.  It is, it seems, a 
nomenclature that is anything but prescriptive in context.  It arguably permits the 
possibility of access not to just one, but rather to a ra nge of principles available to measure 
the legality of the national measure in question.  Stirring into the pot of enquiry a range of 
ingredient principles arguably strengthens the potency of the application of Article 34 
TFEU.  The adoption of such eclectic nomenclature descriptive of national measures allows 
for the promotion not only of the principle of market access 158 in such matters, but also of 
the maintenance of a continuing respect for the principle of nondiscrimination 159 and of 
mutual recognition160 as integral parts of the equation.  Such an inclusive equation 
arguably represents a more honest intent of Treaty aspirations with respect to the free 
movement of goods.161  The judgments of Commission v. Italy162 and Mickelsson163 
arguably appear to have arrested an unbridled march of the use of the concept of the 
“sell ing arrangement” which has in some ways trampled through the jurisprudence relating 
to goods.  While the emphasis in these two judgments on the principle of market access 
                                                                                                                             
Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071; Criminal proceedings against Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten 
Kelderman BV, 1981 E.C.R. 527.  
158 Note the reference to the position occupied by these two principles in the jurisprudence relating to the free 
movement of goods in Commission v. Italy.  See Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519.  
159 See Case 20/64, SARL Albatros v. Société des pétroles et des combustibles liquides (Sopéco), 1965 E.C.R. 29.  In 
the first instance, subdivisions of direct and indirect discrimination were identified and developed by the Court of 
Justice.  The terminology used was distinctly and indistinctly applicable.  The classification, at least in the initial 
jurisprudence, had important consequences for the process of the justification of such measures.  See 
Commission Directive 70/50 1969 O.J. (L 13) 29 (EC).  Note the recent statement by the Court that “ in order to 
provide the referring court with a useful answer, the questions referred must be examined from the perspective 
of Article 12 EC, [now Article 18 TFEU] which enshrines the general principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of 
nationality.”  Case C-382/08, Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Grieskirchen, judgment of 25 January 2011 
[hereinafter Neukirchinger].  For the recourse to that principle, see Case C-531/07, Fachverband der Buch-und 
Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 2009 E.C.R. I -3717 [hereinafter Fachverband].  
160 See, e.g., German Vitamins Case, 2004 E.C.R. I-3751; Comm’n v. Denmark, 2003 E.C.R. I-9693; Van der Veldt, 
1994 E.C.R. I-3537; Case C- 457/05, Schutzverband der Spirituosen-Industrie eV v. Diageo Deutschland GmbH, 
2007 E.C.R. I-8075; Case C-358/95, Morellato v. Unità sanitaria locale (USL) n. 11 di Pordenone, 1997 E.C.R. I -
1431; Austrian Vitamins Case, supra note 156; Rewe-Zentral AG, supra note 5; Criminal proceedings against 
Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten Kelderman BV, 1981 E.C.R. 527; Georg Schwarz v. Bürgermeister 
der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, 2005 E.C.R. I-10139. 
161 Given the internal market, presumably the same arguments could be applied in relation to applications of the 
Treaty provisions relating to: goods, TFEU art. 34; workers, TFEU art. 45; services, TFEU art. 56; establishment, 
TFEU art. 49; and capital, TFEU art. 63.  The internal market “shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
the Treaties.”  TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 26(2).  
162 See Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
163 See Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
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may yet signify resurgence in the use of that principle, there is some argument for 
suggesting that recourse to that principle cannot be to the detriment of a respect for the 
principles of nondiscrimination or mutual recognition.  Further, if there is to be a 
triumvirate of principles—market access, nondiscrimination and mutual recognition—
available to the Court in such matters, the principle of market access should not be 
positioned at its pinnacle.  Rather, in the process of scrutinizing the national measure for 
compatibil ity with Treaty free movement rights in relation to goods,164 it should be 
positioned as but one of a number of principles from which the Court may choose for 
appropriate usage where a hindrance to the free movement of goods 165 is suspected at the 
national level.  
 
Jurisprudentially, the availabil ity of a variety of principles under which the Court can 
scrutinize national measures alleged to impede free movement of goods is to be 
welcomed.  On a micro level, this variety presents an array of principles from which the 
attack on the national measure can be launched.  On a macro basis, the availabil ity of the 
three principles—market access, nondiscrimination, and mutual recognition—potentially 
will  increase the potency and penetration of the Treaty’s promise of free movement of 
goods.166 
  
Rather than the Court nail ing its colours solely to the mast of “market access,” the 
adoption of a broader approach to the scrutiny of national measures would translate into 
the Court gaining/retaining a much greater flexibility in the process of scrutinizing national 
measures suspected of hindering the free movement of goods.  In this context, the 
observation by Wenneras and Moen that Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson are generally 
viewed as signaling that “the notion of ‘market access’ may ultimately be the criterion 
defining the scope of [Article] 34 TFEU (thus also in effect replacing Dassonville)”167 might 
indeed prove to be correct.  Nevertheless, were this to transpire in the jurisprudence, it is 
arguable that the Court would be robbed of a certain amount of l itheness in its abil ity to 
respond to suspicions that hindrances to imports have occurred at the national level.  
 
III.  Market Access:  Affecting Keck 
 
Within the context of the free movement of goods,168 commentators have expressed the 
view that the judgments of Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson have “introduced a strict 
                                                 
164 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
165 Id.  
166 Id.  
167 Wenneras, supra note 136, at 387.  
168 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
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market access test, the effect of which is to replace or at least severely restrict the Keck 
doctrine.”169  The specific ways in which these judgments will  prove to affect the future use 
of the Keck doctrine must, at this stage, remain uncertain.  I t would seem, however, that 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson do not reverse Keck;170 rather, a more informed view 
may suggest that Keck is a judgment that should be confined within the l imits of 
arrangements for sale.171  Barnard notes that “other types of measures will  therefore not 
benefit from the Keck presumption of legality, are l ikely to be considered rules hindering 
market access and so will  breach Article 34,172 leaving Member States to justify their 
existence.”173  With respect to national rules held to be hindering “market access,” a recent 
example is provided by Ker-Optika bt v. ÀNTSZ Dél-dunántúli Regionális Intézete.174  In Ker-
Optika,175 the Hungarian law was held to be categorised as “an arrangement for sale.”176  
In that instance, the measure was not considered to be a “sell ing arrangement”177 because 
national legislation “does not affect in the same manner the sell ing of contact lenses by 
Hungarian traders and such sell ing as carried out by traders from other Member States.”178  
What is of more particular importance to present considerations is that the Court in Ker-
Optika then proceeded to judgment on the basis that the deprivation by the national law 
of a means by which the importer could sell  the product in Hungary “significantly impedes 
access of those traders to the market of the Member State concerned.”179  With respect to 
the concept of market access vis -à-vis the continued recourse to the principle of 
nondiscrimination in the context of the free movement of goods, it is arguable that 
                                                 
169 Wenneras, supra note 136, at 387.  
170 See Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097; see also Fachverband, 2009 E.C.R. I-3717.  
171 CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU:  THE FOUR FREEDOMS 140 (3d ed. 2010).    
172 Such a view would strike an accord with the observation that the two judgments represent “ a departure from 
orthodox jurisprudence and the beginning of a universal and strict  market access era.”  Wenneras, supra note 
136, at 387. 
173 “The Court appears to have adopted a new category of measure which is neither a product requirement nor a 
certain selling arrangement:  measures which hinder ‘access of products originating in other  Member States to 
the market of a Member State.’”  BARNARD, supra note 171, at 140.    
174 Case C-108/09, judgment of 2 December 2010.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Note that, with respect to the “selling arrangement,” the Court held that “[a]s regards the first condition, it is 
clear that the legislation applies to all relevant traders involved in selling contact lenses, which means that that 
condition is satisfied.”  Id.  
178 Id.  
179 Article 34 TFEU was applied on this basis.  The onus was then on the state to justify the national measure.  In 
this instance, it failed to do so on account of proportionality.  Id.   
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Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson “have consolidated and clarified what was implicit 
in Keck, namely that [Article] 34 TFEU prohibits measures that discriminatorily, in law or in 
fact, restrict market access for imported products or which prevent/hinder market 
access.”180  At the same time, however, both judgments “ostensibly introduced a new 
category of measures fall ing within the scope of [Article] 34 TFEU, non-discriminatory 
measures which ‘hinder access to the market.’”181 
 
For the present, however, the intriguing prospect remains that there has finally been an 
attempt to restrict the influence of the concept of the “sell ing arrangement” and that 
future scrutiny of national measures other than those which may be categorised as 
“arrangements for sale” has been returned to the firmer footing of scrutiny clearly within 
the confines of Article 34.182  Neither is the prospect of respecting the principle of market 
access in such circumstances necessarily detrimental to the cause of the use of the other 
principles in the application of Article 34 TFEU.  While “the most obvious solution”183 may 
indeed be the recourse to the use of market access test in such circumstances, it is an 
equation which would not precl ude the use of the other principles of nondiscrimination 
and mutual recognition.184  
 
D.  Market Access:  A Wider Theatre? 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The recent jurisprudence with respect to the free movement of goods appears in part at 
least both to have been refocused on the issues surrounding the re-establishment of the 
market access principle as a (crucial) component in the assessment of the legality of the 
national law under scrutiny.  It has been argued that the market access tests of 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson, both delivered in 2009, appear to have severely 
restricted the Keck doctrine and have together signaled that the principle of market access 
may ultimately be adopted as the criterion which defines the scope of Article 34 TFEU.185  
These particular contemplations aside, even at a primary level of argument, the 
reemergence of the market access test within the jurisprudence of goods raises issues 
                                                 
180 Wenneras, supra note 136, at 398. 
181 Id. at 399. 
182 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
183 Leclerc-Siplec, 1995 ECR I-179 (as stated by Advocate General Jacobs). 
184 Note particularly the respect shown for these principles in Commission v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519.  
185 But see Wenneras, supra note 136, at 387.  
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which relate to the wider use of that test beyond the theatre of goods and to the use of 
that principle within the jurisprudence of persons,186 services,187 and capital.188  
 
This next section considers the question of the realistic establishment of universal use 
relating to the principle of market access which would extend across all  free-movement 
jurisprudence; a presentation of homogeneity with respect to the mechanics of the 
application of Treaty free-movement provisions to national measures.  
 
This paper will  now examine the jurisprudence relating to persons,189 services,190 and 
capital191 and the use therein of the market access principle in the assessment of national 
measures in the context of the TEFU free-movement provisions.  To place the use of the 
principle of market access in its proper context in relation to free movement jurisprudence 
in this wider theatre, this article will  first assess the interpretation the Treaty demands 
with respect to the application of the free movement rights to national measures.   
 
II.  Restrictions  
 
It is evident that the Treaty provisions which source free movement rights in relati on to 
persons,192 services,193 and capital 194 bear reliance upon the prohibition of national 
measures which restrict free movement rights.  For example, with respect to the right of 
the establishment of the migrant EU national in the host state, Article 49 TFEU provides:  
“Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State 
shall  be prohibited.” 195  So too, with respect to the right of the migrant to supply services, 
Article 56 TFEU196 provides:  “Within the framework of the provisions set out below, 
                                                 
186 See TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 45, 49. 
187 See id. at art. 56. 
188 See id. at art. 63. 
189 See id. at arts. 45, 49. 
190 See id. at art. 56. 
191 See id. at art. 63. 
192 See id. at arts. 45, 49. 
193 See id. at art. 56. 
194 See id. at art. 63. 
195 See id. at art. 49. 
196 See id. at art. 56. 
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restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall  be prohibited in respect 
of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of 
the person for whom the services are intended.”197  
 
The prohibition of restrictions—the phraseology of the TFEU with respect to provisions 
establishing the right of free movement—is, in this context, reflected in jurisprudence 
which has upheld free movement rights.  In the cause of locating the position of the 
principle of market access as a lubricant for the application of Treaty free movement 
rights, it should first be assessed how the Court has sought to extend the application o f 
these provisions for national measures.  
 
It is arguable that in the application of free movement principles to national measures, the 
Court of Justice has taken its cue from Treaty terminology.  There is logic to this argument.  
The jurisprudence reflects the aims and terminology of the Treaty by clearly attacking the 
restriction to the free movement right presented by the national measure.198  
 
In its assessment of the mechanics of application of Treaty free movement rights, this 
study now directs its attention to an analysis of the formulation of the free movement 
provisions199 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.200 
 
1.  Treaty Provision:  The Worker 
 
The construction of the Treaty free movement provisions with respect to  persons,201 
services,202 and capital 203 lends focus on the prohibition of national measures which restrict 
the free movement right.  Such focus has been reinforced in the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice.  With respect to the freedoms relating to establishment and services, for 
example, it was held in Commission v. France204 that “it must be recalled that Article 43 
                                                 
197 Id. (emphasis added).  With respect to the free movement of capital, “all restrictions on the  movement of 
capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.”  Id. at art. 
63 (emphasis added). 
198 The Court of Justice has further equated the nomenclature of restriction with that of obstacle. 
199 See TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 45, 49, 56, 63. 
200 See TFEU, supra note 1. 
201 See id. at arts. 45, 49. 
202 See id. at art. 56. 
203 See id. at art. 63. 
204 Case C-389/05, Comm’n v. France, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337 [hereinafter Bovine Case]. 
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EC205 requires the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of establishment,”206 and that 
“Article 49 EC207 requires . . . the abolition of any restriction”208 on the right to provide 
services.  
 
The terminology of restriction to the free movement right, presented within the Treaty 
free movement provisions relating to services, establishment, and capital, is not reflected 
in the terminology of Article 45 TFEU209 with respect to the worker.  That article provides 
merely that “[f]reedom of movement for workers shall  be secured within the Union.”210  In 
this context, reference to (national) restrictions on such right is noticeably absent.  This 
lacuna has nonetheless been fi l led by the Court of Justice, which has determined that the 
Treaty free-movement provision with respect to the worker is to operate in the same 
manner as the other Treaty free-movement provisions211 relating to persons,212 services,213 
and capital.214  
 
The following analyzes the jurisprudence relating to free movement rights of 
establishment,215 services,216 workers,217 and capital218 focusing on an assessment of the 
restriction to the Treaty free movement right presented by the national measure.  
                                                 
205 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49; see also Case C-433/04, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10653; Case C-
208/05, ITC Innovative Tech. Ctr. GmbH v. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007 E.C.R. I-181; Case C-219/08, Comm’n v. 
Belgium, 2009 E.C.R. I-9213 [hereinafter Belgian Posting Case].  
206 Bovine Case, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337 (emphasis added).  See also C-442/02, CaixaBank France v. Ministère de 
l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961 [hereinafter CaixaBank]; Case C-79/01, Payroll Data 
Servs. Srl, ADP Europe SA & ADP GSI SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-8923 [hereinafter Payroll]; Case C-167/01, Kamer van 
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I -10155 [hereinafter Kamer].  
207 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
208 Bovine Case, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337 (emphasis added). 
209 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45. 
210 Id.  
211 See Comm’n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1475. 
212 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
213 Id. at art. 56. 
214 Id. at art. 63. 
215 Id. at art. 49.  
216 Id. at art. 56.  
217 Id. at art. 45. 
218 Id. at art. 63. 
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2.  Restrictions 
 
2.1  Worker  
 
Free movement jurisprudence remains focused on the removal of measures restrictive of 
the free movement of the worker.  In the early judgment of Commission v. France 219 for 
example, it was held that “in so far as the [national] rules have the effect of  
restricting . . . freedom of movement for workers, they are compatible with Treaty only 
if . . . justified.”220  In the later case of Commission v. Belgium, national measures obliging 
security undertakings to have their place of business in that state were held to “constitute 
restrictions on the free movement of workers.”221  In Commission v. Italy, Italian nationality 
measures were acknowledged to be “restrictions on the free movement of workers.”222  In 
Criminal proceedings against Hans van Lent, Belgian measures prohibiting migrant workers 
from driving motor vehicles unless they were registered in Belgium were held restrictive of 
the free movement right.223  So too were Italian laws in Commission v. Italy requiring 
dentists to reside within the district of regis tration,224 and minimum capital 225 
requirements imposed by Holland.226  Such measures were held to constitute restrictions 
                                                 
219 In this instance, national rules related to the occupation of doctor or dental practitioner and also concerned 
the free movement rights relating to establishment and services, s ee id. at arts. 49, 56.  
220 Comm’n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1475 (emphasis added).  The Court continued:  “That is not the case where the 
restrictions are liable to create discrimination against practitioners established in other Member States or raise  
obstacles to access” (emphasis added).  Id.  With respect to the worker, Regina v. Stanislaus Pieck held that “the 
only restriction which Article 48 of the Treaty [EC, now Article 45 TFEU] lays down concerning freedom of 
movement in the territory of Member States is that of limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health.”  Case 157/79, Regina v. Stanislaus Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. 2171, para. 9 [hereinafter 
Stanislaus Pieck].  
221 Case C-355/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R. I-1221, para. 24 (emphasis added).  Also of “freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.”  Id.  
222 Case C-283/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2001 E.C.R. I-4363, para. 9 [hereinafter Italian Private Security Case] (emphasis 
added).  Also of the “freedom of establishment and freedom to provide  services.”  Id.    
223 Case C-232/01, Criminal proceedings against Hans van Lent, 2003 E.C.R. I-11525, para. 22. 
224 Case C-162/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2001 E.C.R. I-541, para. 20. 
225 Kamer, 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, para. 27 (“Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the WFBV, the subscribed capital of a 
formally foreign company must be at leas t equal to the minimum amount required of Netherlands limited 
companies by Article 2:178 of the Burgerlijke Wetboek (Netherlands Civil Code, ‘the BW’), which was EUR 18 000 
on 1 September 2000 (Staatsblad 2000, N 322).  The paid-up share capital must be at least equal to the minimum 
capital (Article 4(2) of the WFBV, referring back to Article 2:178 of the BW).” ). 
226 Id. at para. 104. 
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on both the freedoms of establishment and the worker,227 as were UK measures that 
restricted employment on board fishing vessels  by requiring that 75% of the crew reside in 
the UK as a precondition for the authorisation of the migrant vessel for fishing against UK 
quotas.228 
 
2.2  Establishment and Services 
 
With respect to the Treaty freedoms of establishment and services,229 the early judgment 
of Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann230 held that Italian rules concerning the control 
of foreign nationals in principle “do not involve restrictions on freedom of movement for 
persons.”231  Other jurisprudence has adopted the same approach; the focus is placed on 
the removal of the restriction232 to the free movement right.  In Commission v. Italy, for 
example, Italian nationality provisions with respect to private security activities were held 
to “constitute . . . an unjustified restriction on freedom of establ ishment and freedom to 
provide services,”233 as were Austrian measures in relation to doctors, which prohibited 
                                                 
227 See Kamer, 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, para. 104.  See also Joined Cases C-151/04 & C-152/04, Criminal proceedings 
against Nadin, Nadin-Lux SA & Durré, 2005 E.C.R. I-11203, paras. 5, 6 [hereinafter Nadin]. 
228 Case C-3/87, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food, ex parte Agegate Ltd., 1989 E.C.R. 4459, para. 
41. 
229 Case 118/75, Watson & Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, para. 11 [hereinafter Watson].  “Articles 52 [now Article 49 
TFEU] and 59 [now Article 56 TFEU] provide that restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services within the Community shall be abolished.”  Id.  See also Case C-243/01, Piergiorgio Gambelli & 
Others, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031, paras. 46, 54 [hereinafter Piergiorgio].  With respect to services, see Case 62/79, SA 
Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, & Others v. Ciné Vog Films & Others, 1980 E.C.R. 
881, para. 15; Case C-272/94, Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA, 1996 E.C.R. I -1905, 
para. 10 [hereinafter Guiot]. 
230 Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185.   
231 Id. (emphasis added).  See also Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave & L.J.N. Koch v. Ass’n Union Cycliste  Int’l, 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie & Federación Española Ciclismo, 1974 E.C.R. 1405 [hereinafter Walrave] 
(confirming that Article 56 TFEU “makes no distinction between the source of the restrictions to be abolished”) 
(emphasis added).  It has been held that “the principle of freedom to provide services established in Article 59 of 
the Treaty, [now Art 56 TFEU] which is one of its fundamental principles, includes the freedom for the recipients 
of services to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being obstructed by 
restrictions.”  Case C-348/96, Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa, 1999 E.C.R. I-11 [hereinafter Calfa] 
(emphasis added).  See also Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195. 
232 It also ascribed the nomenclature of obstacle to free movement.  For example, in Piergiorgio Gambelli and 
Others it was held that “[w]here a company established in a Member State . . . pursues the activity of collecting 
bets through the intermediary of an organisation of agencies established in another Member State  . . . any 
restrictions on the activities of those agencies constitute obstacles to the freedom of establishment.”  Piergiorgio, 
2003 E.C.R. I-13031 (emphasis added).  
233 Italian Private Security Case, 2001 E.C.R. I-4363, para. 22 (emphasis added).  The Dutch restriction on multi-
disciplinary partnerships between members of the Bar and accountants was justifiable; it was thus not contrary 
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the exercise in Austria of the profession of Heilpraktiker.234  Other jurisprudence has held 
unlawful French measures which restricted the right of establishment and services in 
controll ing the number of operators permitted to open and manage insemination 
centres235 and French requirements that cross-border distributors of bovine semen use 
artificial insemination centres for storage.236 
 
Further examples of national laws held to be restrictions on the right to supply services 
include:  national legislation which prohibited operators established in other Member 
States from offering games of chance via the internet within Portugal;237 French 
requirements to pay employer contributions in relation to bad-weather stamps in two 
Member States;238 requirements on financial institutions to conclude agreements between 
initial guarantor and credit institutions;239 Swedish measures which affected the cross -
border supply of advertising space with respect to alcoholic beverages;240 and an obligation 
imposed on a provider of services residing in the Netherlands to request the competent 
                                                                                                                             
the free movement provisions of services and establishment.  Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh & 
Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-1577, para. 122. 
234 This is also a profession recognised in Germany.  See Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für 
Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt Gräbner,  2002 E.C.R. I-6515, para. 40 [hereinafter Deutsche Paracelsus]. 
235 Bovine Case, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337.  The French legislation was held to be “a  restriction on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services.”  Id.  See also CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961; Payroll, 2002 
E.C.R. I-8923 (respecting the rights of establishment).  In the context of services, see Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185.  In 
the context of the worker, it has, for example, been held that “[t]he only restriction which Article 48 [now 45 
TFEU] of the Treaty lays down concerning freedom of movement in the territory of Member States is that of 
limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”   Stanislaus Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. 
2171, para. 9.  
236 Bovine Case, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337, para. 55–56.  
237 See Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional & Bwin Int’l Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa 
Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, 2009 E.C.R. I-7633, paras. 52–53 [hereinafter Liga].  The Portuguese rule was 
justified.  Id. at para. 72. 
238 Guiot, 1996 E.C.R. I-1905, para. 13.  
239 See Case C-410/96, Criminal proceedings against André Ambry, 1998 E.C.R. I-7875 (“[R]ules such as those in 
issue in the main proceedings, which require financial institutions situated in another Member State to conclude 
an additional agreement, must be held to constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services laid down by 
Article 59 [now Article 56 TFEU] of the Treaty.” (emphasis added)).  Rules “requiring professional or semi-
professional athletes or persons aspiring to take part in a professional or semi-professional activity to have been 
authorised or selected by their federation in order to be able to participate in a high-level international sports 
competition” were held not of themselves a restriction on the freedom to provide services.  Joined cases C-51/96 
& C-191/97, Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Un ion 
européenne de judo & François Pacquée, 2000 E.C.R. I-2549, para. 69. 
240 See Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l Products AB, 2001 E.C.R. I -1795, para. 39 
[hereinafter Gourmet Int’l.].  
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German tax authority to issue a certificate of exemption as a precondition of escaping 
additional tax on his income in Germany.241  Finally, French rules in Bacardi France SAS 
were held to “entail  a restriction on freedom to provide advertising services insofar as the 
owners of the advertising hoardings must refuse, as a preventive measure, any adverti sing 
for alcoholic beverages if the sporting event is l ikely to be retransmitted in France.”242 
 
2.3  Capital  
 
Examination of the jurisprudence applying the right of the free movement right in relation 
to capital has also focused on the prohibition of national restrictions to that right.  In  Klaus 
Konle v. Republik Österreich, for example, an Austrian system of prior authorisation for the 
acquisition of land was held restrictive of that right,243 and in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v. Friedrich Stefan and Republik Österreich, a measure of the same Member 
State was held restrictive of the freedom of movement of capital where it required a 
mortgage securing a debt payable in the currency of another Member State to be 
registered in the national currency.244  In the recent judgment of Commission v. Portugal, 
national measures which restricted the free movement of capital relating to the holding of 
privileged (“golden”) shares by Portugal 245 were held to be restrictions on the free 
movement of capital.246  Likewise, in Commission v. Belgium, the exclusion of certain types 
of purchasers of immovable property situated in the Flemish Region from the benefit of 
the portability system with respect to taxation on the purchase of immovable property 
intended as a new principal residence were considered restrictive of the right to the free 
movement of capital, although ultimately the Court held that the restrictions were 
justified.247  
 
                                                 
241 See Case C-290/04, FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Eimsbüttel, 2006 E.C.R. I-
9461, para. 56.  It was an obstacle that was justified “in order to ensure the proper functioning of the procedure 
for taxation at source.”  Id. at para. 59. 
242 Case C-429/02, Bacardi France SAS v. Télévision française 1 SA, Groupe Jean-Claude Darmon SA & Girosport 
SARL, 2004 E.C.R. I-6613 (emphasis added).  The French rules were regarded as proportionate.  Id. 
243 See Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. Republik Österreich, 1999 E.C.R. I -3099.  
244 See Case C-464/98, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Friedrich Stefan and Republik Österreich, 2001 
E.C.R. I-173, para. 19. 
245 Comm’n v. Portugal, judgment of 10 November 2011, para. 81.  
246 Id.  
247 The court’s decision was on the basis that such was discriminatory.  Case C-250/08, Comm’n v. Belgium, 
judgment of 1 December 2011 , paras. 62, 82.  
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The foregoing analysis has related to examples within persons,248 services,249 and capital,250 
and has focused on examples where there is a reflection in the judgment of Treaty 
exhortations to prohibit national measures which restrict the rights of free movement.  In 
other jurisprudence applying those same rights, the unlawful measures have been held a s 
obstacles to the exercise of such rights.  The following section considers this jurisprudence 
based on the obstacle terminology rather than the restriction-based approaches surveyed 
above.  
 
3.  Obstacles to Free Movement  
 
The free movement provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union251 
prohibit restrictions to such rights.  However the Court has not relied solely on the 
vocabulary of restrictions when deciding that national measures are unlawful; the Court 
has also used the nomenclature of obstacle to reach such decisions.  The two adjectives —
restriction and obstacle—are used interchangeably by the Court of Justice in the 
description of the national measure.252  For example, Spanish nationality conditions in 
Commission v. Spain held to be “restrictions on freedom of establishment, freedom to 
provide services and freedom of movement for workers”253 were identified by the Court as 
obstacles254 to such rights.  Numerous other examples exist of such transferred 
nomenclature. 
 
In the early judgment of Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann,255 it was established that 
the Treaty free-movement provisions involved the removal of obstacles to those 
freedoms.256  In Walrave and Koch, for example, that “[t]he abolition . . . of obstacles to 
                                                 
248 See TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 45, 49. 
249 Id. at art. 56. 
250 Id. at art. 63.  
251 See TFEU, supra note 1. 
252 For example, in the context of justification, “according to the case-law of the Court it is a further condition 
that, among other things, the restriction which that obstacle places on the freedom of movement of workers does 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued.”  Case C-285/01, Burbaud v. Ministère de 
l'Emploi et de la Solidarité, 2003 E.C.R. I-8219 [hereinafter Burbaud] (emphasis added). 
253 Case C-114/97, Comm’n v. Spain, 1998 E.C.R. I-6717. 
254 See id. 
255 Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185.  See also Case C-57/95, French Republic v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. I-1627.  
256 The judgment of Criminal proceedings against Michel Choquet was phrased in similar terminology.  Case 16/78, 
Criminal proceedings against Michel Choquet, 1978 E.C.R. 2293.  In the context of Treaty rights with respect to 
the worker, services and establishment, German measures could be “obstacles to the recognition of a driving 
licence issued by another Member State [where they were] are not in fact in due proportion to the requirements 
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freedom of movement for persons and to freedom to provide services, . . . would be 
compromised if the abolition of barriers of national origin could be neutralized by 
obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations.”257  The 
Court in Walrave also made reference to the nomenclature of obstacle as according with 
the “fundamental objectives of the Community contained in Article 3(c) of the Treaty,” 
that “the activities of the Community shall  include, (c) an internal market characterized by 
the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital.”258 
 
The use of the nomenclature of obstacle with respect to the worker259 is exemplified by 
The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State 
for Home Department.260  It was held in Singh that the right of free movement “cannot be 
fully effective if such a person may be deterred from exercising them by obstacles raised in 
his or her country of origin.”261  In Commission v. Denmark, it was held that “[l]egislation 
which relates to the conditions in which an economic activity is pursued may constitute an  
obstacle to freedom of movement for workers.”262  In other jurisprudence, the issue of a 
provisional residence document by Belgium was held to “constitute a genuine obstacle”263 
to the exercise of the same freedom as was the disproportionate treatment by Germany of 
                                                                                                                             
for the safety of highway traffic.”  Id. at para. 8 (emphasis added).  In the context of the deportation of a worker, a 
Member State was “not justified in imposing a penalty so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringement that 
it becomes an obstacle to the free movement of persons.”  Stanislaus Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. 2171 (emphasis added).  
See also Bovine Case, 2008 E.C.R. I-5337; CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961; Payroll, 2002 E.C.R. I-8923. 
257 Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405 (emphasis added).  Note also a recent and general statement to this effect in Case 
C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n & Finnish Seamen's Union v. Viking Line ABP & OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007 
E.C.R. I-10779.  See also, with respect to the worker, Case 53/81, D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 
E.C.R. 1035. 
258 Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.  The reference to the same was made in Watson, 1976 E.C.R. 1185. 
259 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45.  
260 Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal & Surinder Singh, ex parte Sec. of State for Home 
Dep’t, 1992 E.C.R. I-4265.  
261 Id. at para. 23 (concerning restrictive national laws relating to the entry and residence of the spouse of the 
worker.  Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom.  See Case C-
464/02, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2005 E.C.R. I-7929 [hereinafter Danish Motor Vehicles Case]; Case C-415/93, Union 
royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Bosman; and Union des 
associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 96 [hereinafter Bosman Case]. 
262 Danish Motor Vehicles Case, 2005 E.C.R. I-7929 (“Legislation which relates to the conditions in which an 
economic activity is pursued may constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers.” (emphasis 
added)).  The judgment related to Danish legislation concerning the taxation of motor vehicles.  See Danish Motor 
Vehicles Case, 2005 E.C.R. I-7929, paras. 35, 37.  
263 Case C-344/95, Comm’n v. Belgium, 1997 E.C.R. I-1035, para. 6 (emphasis added). 
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migrant nationals in relation to the imposition of fines for failure to carry identity cards.264  
In Clean Car Autoservice GesmbH v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, Austrian legislation265 
requiring legal persons to appoint as manager a person residing in the country  “would 
constitute restrictions,”266 as did German legislation which required legal trainees 
undergoing practical training in another Member State to bear the cost of travel relating to 
the stretches of the journey outside their home country themselves.267  In Hanns-Martin 
Bachmann v. Belgium,268 a national law obliging termination of a contract concluded with 
an insurer in another Member State in order to be eligible for a tax reduction was a 
restriction of the freedom of movement for the worker, who in this case was a German 
national employed in Belgium.269  
 
Other examples of national measures held obstacles to free movement were:  Dutch rules 
relating to the avoidance of double taxation which excluded the migrant worker from tax 
concessions;270 Italian rules preventing operators in other Member States from taking bets 
on sporting events;271 and the obligation imposed by Italy on architects to submit 
certificates of nationality and qualifications.272  In Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-
Schwarz v. Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach, German legislation which had the effect of 
deterring taxpayers resident in Germany from sending their children to schools established 
                                                 
264 See Case C-24/97, Comm’n v. Germany, 1998 E.C.R. I-2133 [hereinafter German Residency Case]; see also Case 
C-265/88, Criminal proceedings against Lothar Messner, 1989 E.C.R. 4209.  That the Treaty provision with respect 
to the worker is concerned with the prohibitions of restrictions on such freedom is stated by implication in 
Württembergische Milchverwertung-Südmilch AG v. Salvatore Ugliola, in which it was held that Article 48 EC (now 
Article 45 TFEU) permits “no reservations other than the restriction set out in [Article 48] paragraph (3) 
concerning the public policy, public security and public health.”  Case 15-69, Württembergische Milchverwertung-
Südmilch AG v. Salvatore Ugliola, 1969 E.C.R. 363 (emphasis added). 
265 Case C-350/96, Clean Car Autoservice GesmbH v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 1998 E.C.R. I -2521. 
266 Id.  Restrictions were discriminatory.  Id. at para. 21.   
267 See Case C-109/04, Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2005 E.C.R. I-2421, para. 29.  (holding that the 
German requirements were an obstacle to the free movement of workers).  Id.    
268 Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249. 
269 See id.  In addition, it was also an obstacle to the free movement of services.  Id. at paras. 13, 31. 
270 See Case C-385/00, F.W.L. de Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 2002 E.C.R. I -11819, para. 95. 
271 See Case C-67/98, Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti, 1999 E.C.R. I-7289.  Such were restrictions held to be 
“obstacle[s] to the freedom to provide services.”  Id. at para. 27 (emphasis added). 
272 See Case C-298/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-3129, para. 37 [hereinafter Italian Architect Case].  This 
obligation “gives rise to additional obstacles for all architects applying for recognition of their qualifications.”  Id.  
Note in addition that the Italian rule was also described by the Court as “an impediment to the freedom of 
establishment and to the freedom to provide  services enshrined in Article 52 of the EC Treaty (now, after 
amendment, Article 43 EC) and Article 59 of the Treaty.”  Id.  The judgment was concerned with restrictions on 
the freedoms of establishment and services.  Id. at paras. 3, 5. 
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in another Member State was held to “constitute . . . an obstacle to the freedom to provide 
services.”273  
 
The nomenclature of obstacles operates in the context of the jurisprudence of services274 
and establishment as well.275  In Commission v. Germany, German requirements of 
establishment on national territory for construction undertakings contracting out workers 
from other countries were similarly identified as obstacles to Treaty free movement 
rights276 as were Polish taxation provisions which applied to cross border economic 
activities. 
 
With respect to obstacles at the national level which have restricted the free movement of 
capital,277 it was held in Peter Svensson and Lena Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de 
l'Urbanisme that 
 
Provisions implying that a bank must be established in 
a Member State in order for recipients of loans residing 
in its territory to obtain an interest rate subsidy from 
the State out of public funds are l iable to dissuade 
those concerned from approaching banks established 
in another Member State and therefore constitute an 
obstacle to movements of capital such as bank loans.278  
 
Similarly, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften  
held that a German law relating to tax exemptions on rental income tax might constitute 
“an obstacle to the free movement of capital and payments”279 for the EU company 
operating in the host state. 
 
                                                 
273 Case C-76/05, Schwarz v. Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach, 2007 E.C.R. I-6849.  
274 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
275 See id. at art. 49. 
276 See Case C-493/99, Comm’n v. Germany, 2001 E.C.R. I-8163, para. 18 (“The requirement of a permanent 
establishment is the very negation of the fundamental freedom to provide  services in that it results in 
depriving Article 59 [now Article 56 TFEU] of the Treaty of all effectiveness, a provision whose very purpose is to 
abolish restrictions on the freedom to provide services of persons who are not established in the State in which 
their services are to be provided.” (emphasis added)).     
277 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.  
278 Case C-484/93, Svensson v. Ministre du Logement et de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. I-3955, para. 10. 
279 Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. I-
8203, para. 27. 
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The terminology of restriction or obstacle in the context of identifying national measures 
hindering free movement rights appears to be interchangeable.  In Criminal proceedings 
against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Others,280 it was held that “any restrictions on the 
activities of [intermediate betting agencies] constitute obstacles to the freedom of 
establishment . . . [and] . . . constitute a restriction on the freedom of such a provider to 
provide services.”281  Furthermore, in Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa , the 
automatic penalty of expulsion for l ife applied against Community nationals by Greece was 
held to be “a restriction which clearly constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide 
services,”282 and in Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooije, an income tax 
exemption granted according to the place of the company was held a restriction and 
obstacle to the free movement of capital.283 
 
In this section, the discussion has focused on the scrutiny of the national measures as 
restrictions or obstacles to free movement.  The use of the word “restriction” emanates 
from the terminology of Treaty free movement provisions.284  The inclusion of the term 
“obstacle” in this analysis is the result of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.285  There 
is evidence too of some interchangeability between the two terms within the 
jurisprudence.286 
 
It is arguable that maintaining the focus within the composition of jurisprudence on the 
restriction or obstacle to the free movement right allows for a platform of principles to be 
employed as options for attack on the national measure suspected of hindering free 
movement rights.  Principles such as market access, nondiscrimination, and mutual 
                                                 
280 Piergiorgio, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031.  See also Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, in which Dutch 
measures restricted migrant nationals residing in Holland from investing in foreign companies was held to be a 
restriction on capital movements.  Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-4071 [hereinafter B.G.M. Verkooijen].   
281 Piergiorgio, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031 (emphasis added).  Note also Commission v. Belgium in which it was held that 
“[t]he conditions laid down for the registration of aircraft must . . . not discriminate on grounds of nationality or 
form an obstacle to the exercise of that freedom.”  Case C-203/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 1999 E.C.R. I-4899 
(emphasis added).  
282 Calfa, 1999 E.C.R. I-11 (emphasis added).  
283 B.G.M. Verkooijen 2000 E.C.R. I-4071.  
284 See TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 49, 56. 
285 See, e.g., Case C-114/97, Comm’n v. Spain, 1998 E.C.R. I-6717 (holding that Spanish nationality conditions were 
“restrictions on freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services and freedom of movement for workers” 
and were therefore obstacles to such rights). 
286 See Italian Architect Case, 2002 E.C.R. I-3129, paras. 2, 5, 37 (respecting the variable classification of national 
measures as impediment, restriction, and obstacle to the free movement right).  See also Case C-155/09, Comm’n 
v. Hellenic Republic, judgment of 20 January 2011, para. 74 (referencing examples of obstacles and restrictions). 
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recognition could be all  readily available to the Court and operated, in various 
combinations, as needed in the scrutiny of various national measures.  
 
While the jurisprudence explored in this section focuses on restrictions and obstacles to 
free movement rights, the following section examines judgments which have shown an 
inherent or latent respect for the application of the principle of market access in addition 
to judgments in which that respect has been patent.  
 
4.  Other Nomenclature 
 
The Court has more recently used various descriptive terminologies to embellish the 
category of national measures held to be “restrictive” of Treaty free movement rights.  
Measures have, for example, been held by the Court of Justice as “liable to hamper or to 
render less attractive,”287 “l iable to prohibit or otherwise impede,”288 to “hinder or make 
less attractive”289 and to “prohibit, impede, or render less attractive.”290  
 
Whatever the description accorded by the Court of Justice to the national measure, the 
judgments concern the prohibition of national measures where they have been restrictive 
of or an obstacle to the free movement rights of persons,291 services,292 and capital.293  
Nonetheless, the various adjectives used to describe national measures are a relatively 
recent innovation.  The adjectival descriptions bear overtones of access to the market.  In 
                                                 
287 Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663, para. 32 [hereinafter Dieter 
Kraus].  See Case C-234/03, Contse SA and Others v. Instituto Nacional de Gestion Sanitaria, 2005 E.C.R. 1 -9315, 
para. 25 [hereinafter Contse SA]; Case C-131/01, Comm’n v. Italy, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1659, para. 26 [hereinafter Italian 
Patents Case]; Case C-58/98, Josef Corsten, 2000 E.C.R. I-7919, para. 33 [hereinafter Corsten]. 
288 See Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039, para. 43 [hereinafter Her 
Majesty’s Customs]; Case C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. Calafiori, 2005 E.C.R. I -3875, 
para. 31 [hereinafter Servizi]; Case C-389/95, Siegfried Klattner v. Elliniko Dimosio, 1997 E.C.R. I-2719, para. 16, 
19.  
289 See Case C-246/00, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2003 E.C.R. I-7485, para. 66; Case C-465/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2007 
E.C.R. I-11091, para. 109 [hereinafter Italian Security Guard Case]; Contse SA, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9315, para. 25; Case 
C-330/03, Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos v. Administración del Estado, 2006 E.C.R. I -801, 
para. 25. 
290 See Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, para. 12 [hereinafter Säger]; 
Joined Cases C-369/96 & C-376/96, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL and 
Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, para. 33 [hereinafter Arblade]; Joined Cases 
C-430/99 & C-431/99, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Douane, district Rotterdam v. Sea-Land Service Inc., 2002 
E.C.R. I-5235, para. 38 [hereinafter Douane]. 
291 See TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 45, 49. 
292 See id. at art. 56.  
293 See id. at art. 63. 
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the present context of the assessment of the place of market access in free movement 
jurisprudence, it is a terminology which may prove to be important.  The existence of such 
nomenclature in this context should be acknowledged.  
 
4.1  Measures Liable to Hamper or to Render Less Attractive 
 
The Court of Justice has held, for example, that “[i]t is settled case law that Article 43 EC 
[with respect to establishment] precludes any national measure which . . . is liable to 
hamper or to render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals of the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by the Treaty.”294  The terminology has been used to describe 
national measures held as either restrictions or obstacles to the free movement of the 
worker295 and the right to supply services.296  In Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 
for example, obstacles imposed by Germany concerning the use of an academic title 
obtained in another Member State were held unlawful as “liable to hamper or to render 
less attractive the exercise by [all] Community nationals  . . . of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty.”297  So too, the same description was extended to the obstacle 
to the freedom of establishment in Commission v. The Netherlands;298 the measure at issue 
in that case required those in charge of a company in that Member State to possess 
European Community nationality.  In Isabel Burbaud v. Ministère de l'Emploi et de la 
Solidarité,299 the requirement imposed by France on the worker  to pass a recruitment 
competition was an obstacle300 to the exercise of that right similarly so described by the 
Court.301  
 
4.2  Liable to Prohibit or Otherwise Impede  
                                                 
294 Case C-299/02, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2004 E.C.R. I-9761, para. 15 [hereinafter Netherlands Shipping Case] 
(emphasis added) (“[E]ven though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality.”).  See also 
Dieter Kraus, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663, para. 32; Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, para. 12.  
295 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; Burbaud, 2003 E.C.R. I-8219, para. 4.  
296 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56; Italian Patents Case, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1659, para. 26.  See also Corsten, 2000 
E.C.R. I-7919, para. 33; Case C-43/93, Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, 1994 E.C.R. I-3803, 
para. 14 [hereinafter Vander Elst]; Guiot, 1996 E.C.R. I-1905, para. 10; Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede v. Sandker, 
1996 E.C.R. I-6511, para. 25 [hereinafter Reisebüro]; Case C-222/95, Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary, 1997 
E.C.R. I-3899, para. 18; Arblade, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, para. 33.  
297 Dieter Kraus, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663.  In issue here were the Treaty free movement rights relating to the  worker 
and to establishment.  Id.   
298 Netherlands Shipping Case, 2004 E.C.R. I-9761, para. 20.  
299 Burbaud, 2003 E.C.R. I-8219. 
300 Id. at para. 95. 
301 Id. 
          [Vol. 13 No. 06 716 Ge r m a n  La w  J o u r n a l  
 
It has been held, for example, that the Treaty right to supply services 302 “requires . . . the 
abolition of any restriction liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider 
of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar 
services.”303  In Commission v. Luxembourg,304 national legislation making the supply of 
services by patent agents subject to a requirement to elect domicile with an approved 
agent was held “liable to prohibit or otherwise impede” the activities of the service 
provider.305  
 
Obstacles and restrictions at the national level held liable to prohibit or otherwise impede 
the right of free movement have included:  German legislation which prevented a UK 
company offering specialist patent renewal services in Germany;306 United Kingdom 
measures affecting the importation of lottery tickets in the context of Treaty rights to 
provide services;307 French laws requiring migrant undertakings but providing services in 
France to obtain work permits when employing third country nationals;308 Greek rules that 
prescribed organizing tourist programmes through a mandatory, legal employment 
relationship between tourists and travel agencies;309 an obligation imposed by Germany 
requiring foreign employers to empl oy workers in the national territory to translate into 
German certain documents required to be kept at the place of work;310 and the Greek 
                                                 
302 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  
303 Case C-478/01, Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2003 E.C.R. I-2351, para. 18 (emphasis added).  See, e.g., Case C-
266/96, Corsica Ferries France S. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del  Porto di Genova Coop. arl and Others , 1998 
E.C.R. I-03949 (holding that there was no restriction on the freedom to provide maritime transport services when 
considering the fees imposed by Italy for mooring services ). 
304 Commission v. Luxembourg, 2003 E.C.R. I-2351, para. 18. 
305 Id.; see also Corsten, 2000 E.C.R. I-7919, para. 33; Italian Patents Case, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1659, para. 42. 
306 See Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, para. 14 (holding that there was a restriction on the right to supply services). 
307 Her Majesty's Customs, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039, paras. 43, 59 (holding the measures were an obstacle to the free 
movement of services).   
308 Case C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, 1994 E.C.R. I -3803, para. 14 
(holding the measures were a restriction on the free movement right).  
309 Case C-398/95, Syndesmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion v. Ypourgos Ergasias, 1997 E.C.R. 
I-3091, paras. 16, 19 [hereinafter Syndesmos Case] (finding both a restriction and barrier to the free movement 
right). 
310 Case C-490/04, Comm’n v. Germany, 2007 E.C.R. I-6095, para. 68 (constituting a restriction on the free 
movement of services).   
2012]                                                     717 “Market Access” or Bust?
licensing of self-employed migrant tourist guides who were prevented from supplying 
services if they were not qualified in Greece.311 
 
4.3  Impediment to Free Movement  
 
In other judgments in the free movement jurisprudence, there has been a focus upon the 
impediment to free movement presented by the national measure.312 
  
In Bosman, for example, it was held that transfer rules between football  clubs “directly 
affect players’ access to the employment market in other Member States and are thus 
capable of impeding freedom of movement for workers.”313  Other national laws held 
impediments to the exercise of free movement rights include:  a Danish obligation on a 
migrant company to register a company car made available to employees residing in that 
state;314 a precondition that architects wishing to practice their profession in Italy should 
first submit an original diploma to that state;315 Spanish provisions setting a minimum 
number of persons employed by security undertakings;316 and Finnish national rules 
relating to the operation of gaming machines.317  
 
4.4  Prohibit, Impede, or Render Less Attractive  
 
In Corporación Dermoestética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media , for example, it was 
held that “restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provid e 
services referred to in Articles 43 EC and 49 EC (now Articles 49 TFEU and 45 TFEU) 
                                                 
311 Case C-398/95, Syndesmos Case, paras. 16, 19 (finding that the national law provided a barrier to free 
movement). 
312 Case C-134/03, Vicacom Outdoor SrL v. Giotto Immobilier SARL, 2005 E.C.R. I-1167 para . 39.  In Viacom, the 
issue was whether a municipal tax constituted an impediment to freedom to provide services contrary to TFEU 
art. 56, para. 33.  The Italian law was held to be lawful.  
313 Bosman Case, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 103 (emphasis added). 
314 Nadin, 2005 E.C.R. I-11203, para. 36.  
315 See Case C-298/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-3129, para. 37 (relating to both the rights of services and 
establishment). 
316 Case C-514/03, Comm’n v. Spain, 2006 E.C.R. I-963, para. 48 (finding the provisions made the formation of 
secondary establishments or subsidiaries in Spain more onerous and dissuaded foreign private security 
undertakings from offering their services within the Spanish market).  
317 Case C-124/97, Markku Juhani Läärä v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä), 1999 E.C.R. I-6067, para. 29. 
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respectively are measures that prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of 
such freedoms.”318 
 
The “prohibit, impede or render less attractive” terminology a scribed to the restriction on 
the free movement right has been used on other occasions by the Court of Justice.319  
Examples of such occasions include national measures relating to the payment of 
remuneration on sight accounts;320 restrictions imposed by France “to store semen in 
authorized artificial insemination centers”; restrictions relating to the recognition of 
diplomas in Italy;321 Italian legislation restricting the staffing of data processing centers 
only to employees with Italian qualifications;322 and to the retention by the same state of 
obstacles to free movement such as national and regional rules regarding trade fairs, 
markets, and exhibitions.323  
 
                                                 
318 Case C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media, 2008 E.C.R. I-5785, para. 32 
(emphasis added).  See, e.g., Case C-96/08, CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central v. Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenrzési Hivatal 
(APEH) Hatósági Fosztály, judgment of 15 April 2010, para. 19; Case C-157/07 Finanzamt für Körperschaften III in 
Berlin v. Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH 2008 E.C.R. I-8061, para. 30; Case C-
439/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I305, para. 22; Case C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. 
Giuseppe Calafiori, 2006 E.C.R. I-2941, para. 31; Case C-65/05, Comm’n v. Greece, 2006 E.C.R. I-10341, para. 48; 
Case C-248/06, Comm’n v. Spain, 2008 ECR I-47, para. 21.  See also CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961, para. 12; C-
518/06, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-3491, para. 62. 
319 All such measures “must be considered to be restrictions” on the Treaty free movement rights of services and 
establishment.  Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt Gräbner, 2002 
E.C.R. I-6515, para. 38.  In the context of the right of establishment, see Case C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v. 
Stadt Altensteig, 1993 E.C.R. I-1191, para. 15.  In the context of the freedom to provide services, see Case  C-
205/99, Asociación Profesional de Empresas Navieras de Líneas Regulares (Analir) v. Administración General del 
Estado, 2001 E.C.R. I-1271, para. 21; Case C-429/02, Bacardi France SAS v. Télévision française, 1 SA (TF1), C-
429/02 Groupe Jean-Claude Darmon SA and Girosport SARL, 2004 E.C.R. I-6613, para. 31; Case C-262/02, Comm’n 
v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-6569, paras 27-29; Arblade, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, para. 33; Case C-294/00 Deutsche 
Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt Gräbner 2002 E.C.R. I -6515, para. 38.  See also Case C- 
42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International Ltd v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa 
Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, 2009 E.C.R. I -7633, para. 51; Case C- 451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori 
Commercialisti Srl v. Giuseppe Calafiori, 2006 E.C.R. I-2941 para. 33; Case C-298/05, Columbus Container Services, 
2007 E.C.R. I-10451, para. 33. 
320 The French measure rendered a restriction which was liable to “prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
exercise of that freedom.”  CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961, para. 11.  
321 Case C-153/02, Valentina Neri v. European School of Economics (ESE Insight World Educ. Sys. Ltd), 2003 E.C.R. I-
13555, para. 44 (finding that the restriction “is likely to deter students from attending these courses and thus 
seriously hinder the pursuit by ESE of its economic activity in that Member State”  (emphasis added)). 
322 Case C-79/01, Payroll Data Services (Italy) Srl, ADP Europe SA and ADP GSI SA, 2002 E.C.R. I -8923, para. 26.  
323 Case C-439/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-305, para. 22.  
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National measures imposing restrictions on the free movement right relating to services324 
have similarly been described.  For example, a Dutch rule requiring payment of a tariff by 
sea-going vessels longer than forty-one meters was held “a restriction on their free 
circulation”325 because it was “liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
activities of a provider of services established in another Member State.”326  Similarly so 
described were:  a Belgian requirement that a  service provider should furnish a simple 
prior declaration certifying that the situation of the workers posted to that State who were 
nationals of non-member States was lawful;327 an Austrian requirement that private 
inspection bodies of organically farmed products be established within Austria as a 
precondition to offering inspection services;328 and national measures restricting the right 
to supply services in relation to a Spanish provision requiring maritime cabotage services 
be subject to prior administrative authorization.329  Other examples include, national 
provisions requiring debt collecting agencies in Germany to carry out judic ial debt-
collection work for others only through the intermediary of a lawyer ,330 a Belgian 
requirement that undertakings in the construction industry providing services pay 
employers’ contributions duplicating contributions paid in the state where establish ed,331 
and French legislation requiring employed workers from non-member countries to obtain 
                                                 
324 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  See also Case C-49/98 Finalarte Sociedade de Construção Civil Ld. 2001 E.C.R. I-
7831, para. 30 (relating to German measures imposing an obligation on undertakings in the construction sector 
supplying a service to apply the system of paid leave applicable in the host Member State to workers de ployed for 
that purpose).  A national rule which involved the services provider in expense and additional administrative and 
economic burdens would fall into this category.  See, e.g., Case C-165/98, Criminal proceedings against André 
Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, as the Party Civilly Liable, Third Parties:  Eric Guillaume and 
Others 2001 E.C.R. I-2189, para. 24 (concerning Belgian measures requiring an undertaking established in another 
Member State which provides services in the territory of the first State to pay its workers the minimum 
remuneration fixed by the national rules of that State).  
325 Douane, 2002 E.C.R. I-5235, para. 38. 
326 Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added).  
327 Case C-219/08 Comm’n v. Belgium, 2009 E.C.R. I-9213, para. 13 (describing the measures as being “liable to 
prohibit, impede or render less advantageous”). 
328 Case C-393/05, Joined opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 2007 E.C.R. I-10195, paras. 31–32 (deciding on 
the grounds that the national law “renders impossible, in Austria, the provision of the services in question by 
private bodies established only in other Member States”).  A similar French requirement in relation to biomedical 
analysis laboratories was held unlawful on the same basis .  See Case C-496/01, Comm’n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. 1-
2351, para. 65. 
329 Case C-205/99, Asociación Profesional de Empresas Navieras de Líneas Regulares (Analir) and Others v. 
Administración General del Estado, 2001 E.C.R. I-1271, para. 22.  
330 Reisebüro, 1996 E.C.R. I-6511, paras. 25–26.  
331 Guiot, 1996 E.C.R. I-1905, para. 10. 
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work permits.332  This language was also applied to the prohibition by Germany of the 
provision of a patent monitoring and renewal service,333 a German law providing that an 
undertaking using the services of an undertaking established in another Member State to 
act as a guarantor in respect of the minimum remuneration of workers employed by the 
other undertaking,334 and the establishment by the French courts of a register for 
experts.335  Recently, a less favorable Belgian tax regime was held l iable to prohibit, 
impede, or render less attractive the free movement of services, and was classified as a 
restriction based on this phraseology.336  
 
4.5  Hinder or Make Less Attractive 
 
Dutch rules in relation to information held on driving l icences were held  “liable to hinder or 
make less attractive” the exercise of Treaty free movement rights,337 as were Italian 
measures imposed on the private security sector relating to the obligation to lodge a 
guarantee with a deposits and loans office.338  The Court has referred to the concept of 
national measures “liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty” in the context of the ability of Member States to 
justify national measures.339  Recently, in the context of the exercise of establishment 
rights in Spain, the Court ruled that national rules which concerned the establishment of 
                                                 
332 Vander Elst, 1994 E.C.R. I-3803, para. 14. 
333 Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, para 12.  See also Arblade, 1999 E.C.R. I-8453, para. 33. 
334 Case C-60/03, Wolff & Müller GmbH & Co. KG v. José Filipe Pereira Félix, 2004 E.C.R. I-9553, para 31 (“To the 
extent that it involves expenses and additional administrative and economic burdens.”).  See also Case C-
164/99, Portugaia Construções, 2002 E.C.R. I-787, para. 18 (making a similar comment with respect to collective 
agreements and minimum wages in Germany); Case C-404/05 Comm’n v. Germany, 2007 E.C.R. I-10239, para. 30. 
335 Joined Cases C-372/09 & C-373/09, Josep Peñarroja Fa, judgment of 17 March 2011, para. 50 (holding a 
restriction on the freedom to supply services).   
336 Case C-9/11, Waypoint Aviation SA v. État belge-SPF Finances, judgment of 13 October 2011, para. 22. 
337 Case C-246/00, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2003 E.C.R. I-7485, para. 66.  
338 Case C-465/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2007 E.C.R. I-11091, para. 109 (holding likely to hinder or make less attractive 
the exercise of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services).  
339 Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I-
4165, para. 39; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459 para. 34; Case C-
108/96, Criminal proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen, SA, 2001 E.C.R. I-837, para. 26; Case C-294/00, Deutsche 
Paracelsus Schulen für Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt Gräbner, 2002 E.C.R. I-6515, para. 39; Kamer, 2003 E.C.R. 
I-10155, para. 133; Contse SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-9315, para. 25; Case C-234/03 Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, 
Canales y Puertos v. Administración del Estado, 2005 E.C.R. I-9315, para. 25; Case C-514/03, Comm’n v. Spain, 
2006 E.C.R. I-963, para. 26; Case C-155/09, Comm’n v. Greece, judgment of 20 January 2011, para. 51; Case C-
152/05, Comm’n v. Germany, 2008 E.C.R. I-00039, para. 26; Case C-294/00, Deutsche Paracelsus Schulen für 
Naturheilverfahren GmbH v. Kurt Gräbner, 2002 E.C.R. I-6515, paras. 39–40.  
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shopping centers in Catalonia “ha[ve] the effect of hindering or of rendering less attractive 
the exercise by economic operators from other Member States of their activities”340 in 
Catalonia.341  In Commission v. Hungary, a property purchase tax having a dissuasive effect 
on persons who wished to settle in Hungary was held a restriction on the free movement 
rights of the worker342 and establishment343 on the basis that it would “hinder or make less 
attractive the exercise of [those] fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.”344   
 
The forgoing analysis commenced with an exami nation of jurisprudence which had 
reflected the honest intent of Treaty free movement provisions in the removal of national 
restrictions345 to such rights.  This section then considered the jurisprudence of the free 
movement of persons,346 services,347 and capital348 from the perspective of implementing 
Treaty exhortations with respect to the removal of restrictions or obstacles to free 
movement, together with cases evidencing a respect for “market access” through the 
overlay terminology of “liable to hamper or to render less attractive,” “to prohibit or 
otherwise impede,” and “to prohibit, impede or render less attractive or to hinder or make 
less attractive.”  It is jurisprudence which displayed respect for the principle of “market 
access” through the descriptive terminology accorded to the national measure.  It is now 
pertinent to examine jurisprudence in which the respect for the principle of “market 
access” has been more overtly delivered.  The analysis begins with an exploration of the 
jurisprudence which has relied upon the principle of “market access” as the conduit used 
to establish whether a restriction or obstacle on the free movement right has existed at the 
national level.    
 
III.  Restrictions—Market Access 
                                                 
340 Case C-400/08, Comm’n v. Spain, judgment of 24 March 2011, para. 70 (emphasis added).  
341 Case C-148/10, DHL International NV v. Belgisch Instituut voor Postdiensten en Telecommunicatie, judgment of 
13 October 2011, para. 63 (applying such terminology to hold that the imposition of a mandatory complaints 
procedure on postal services providers did not “hinder or render less attractive the exercise by Union nationals of 
the freedom of establishment that is guaranteed by the Treaty”).  
342 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45. 
343 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
344 Case C-253/09, Comm’n v. Hungary, judgment of 1 December 2011 , para. 69. 
345 Note with respect to the worker, the Treaty omission of the terminology of restriction has  been rectified by 
jurisprudence such as Case 96/85, Comm’n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1475, para. 11.  The adjective is used 
interchangeably with obstacle in the jurisprudence relating to the worker.  
346 For worker, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
347 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
348 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
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This section now concludes with an examination of the jurisprudence of persons,349 
services,350 and capital.351  In these contexts, the reliance on the principle of “market 
access” within the equation of the application of the Treaty provisions to national laws has 
been distinctly overt.  This is jurisprudence wherein the national law has been held 
unlawful, specifically insofar as it has hindered access to the market of the host state.   
 
With respect to the worker,352 for example, in the judgment of Union nationale des 
entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens 
and others,353 there was arguably a reliance on the operation of the principle of market 
access,354 as the Court held that “free access to employment is a fundamental right which 
the Treaty confers individuall y on each worker in the Community.”355  
 
The restriction on the registration of motor vehicles 356 has been described in Criminal 
proceedings against Claude Nadin, Nadin-Lux SA and Jean-Pascal Durré357 as constituting 
“a barrier to freedom of movement”358 which “impedes the access of persons resident in 
Belgium to self-employed work in the other Member States.”359  In the context of the 
employed and the self-employed migrant, it has recently been stated in Angelo Rubino v. 
Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca that both “Articles 39 EC and 43 EC [now Articles 
45 and 49 TFEU] guarantee to the nationals of the Member States access to activities, in a 
                                                 
349 For worker, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
350 For services, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
351 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
352 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45. 
353 Case 222/86, Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du football (Unectef) v. 
Georges Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097 [hereinafter Unectef]. 
354 Member States’ courts are required to give reasons for judgments when judicially reviewing a decision about 
the equivalence of diplomas held by migrant nationals.  
355 Unectef, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, para. 14 (emphasis added).  It was an approach that was arguably confirmed in the 
Bosman judgment in the context of rendering nationality clauses in football unlawful.  Bosman Case, 1995 E.C.R. I-
4921, para. 129.  
356 Relating to instances wherein the employer was established in another Member State.  
357 Nadin, 2005 E.C.R. I-11203, para. 39. 
358 Id. at para. 36.  
359 Id. at para. 37.  
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self-employed or employed capacity, without discrimination based on nationality.”360  In 
Commission v. France, national measures restricting the number of insemination centers 
was held to “hamper the access of other operators, including those from other Member 
States, to the insemination market.”361 
 
In Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, the national legislation362 deterring a 
migrant national from leaving the home state was held to constitute an obstacle to the 
free movement363 where it affects “access of workers to the labor market.”364  So too, 
under the law at issue in Commission v. Denmark, cross-border workers resident in 
Denmark were prevented from using company vehicles registered where the undertaking 
of the employer was established; that national law was held “liable to affect access to that 
activity.”365  Furthermore, the requirement that private security guards swear an oath of 
allegiance to the Italian Republic was held to constitute, for the operator not established in 
Italy, “an impediment to the pursuit of its activities in that Member State, which impairs its 
access to the market.”366 
 
                                                 
360 Case C-586/08, Angelo Rubino v. Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca, 2009 ECR I-12013, para. 34 (“In 
particular, that, in the context of a selection procedure such as that leading to registrat ion as a holder of the NAQ, 
qualifications obtained in other Member States are accorded their proper value and are duly taken into 
account.”) (emphasis added).  
361 In the context of the free movement of services and establishment, see Case C-389/05, Comm’n v. France, 
2008 E.C.R. I-5337, para. 53 (emphasis added).  
362 This concerns Austrian provisions relating to compensation on termination of employment upon moving to 
commence employment in another Member State.  The operation of the principle is noted in the  recent judgment 
of Krzysztof Peśla v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to underpin the rationale for the direct entry of 
the migrant to the legal profession of the host state.  See Case C-345/08, Krzysztof Peśla v. Justizministerium 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2009 E.C.R. I-11677, para. 53 (holding that “[i]f such an obligation did not exist, the 
fact of not having the diploma normally required by nationals of the host Member State could of itself constitute 
a decisive obstacle to access to the legal professions in that Member State” (emphasis added)). 
363 See also Bosman Case where Belgian transfer rules, effective to prevent a migrant worker moving to play for a 
French club, constituted an obstacle to that freedom.  Bosman Case, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 96.  See also Case C-
10/90, Maria Masgio v. Bundesknappschaft, E.C.R. I -1119, para. 18; Case C-228/88, Giovanni Bronzino v. 
Kindergeldkasse, 1990 E.C.R. I-531; Case C-12/89, Gatto v. Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit, 1990 E.C.R. I-557, para. 2.  
364 Case C-190/98 2000 E.C.R. I-00493, para. 23 (emphasis added).  “Provisions which, even if they are applicable 
without distinction, preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to 
exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom [providing they] 
‘affect access of workers to the labour market.’”  Id. (emphasis added). 
365 Case C-464/02, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2005 E.C.R. I-07929, para. 37 (“Legislation which relates to the conditions 
in which an economic activity is pursued may constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement.”  (emphasis 
added)). 
366 Case C-465/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2007 E.C.R. I-11091, para. 46 (emphasis added). 
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So too, in the context of the freedom of establishment,367 Fidium Finanz AG v. 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht held that German rules relating to the 
granting of credit by migrant companies 368 without branch or central administration in 
Germany impeded “access to the German financial market for companies established in 
non-member countries.”369  In CaixaBank France v. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances 
et de l'Industrie370 held that:  
 
[A] national prohibition on the remuneration of sight 
accounts constitutes, for companies from Member 
States other than the French Republic, a serious 
obstacle to the pursuit of their activities via a subsidiary 
in the latter Member State, affecting their access to the 
market . . . .  Access to the market by those 
establishments is thus made more difficult by such a 
prohibition.371  
 
In Européenne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v. Directeur général des 
impôts and Ministère public, the Court held that “it is clear from the case-law of the Court 
that freedom of establishment, which is conferred . . . on Community nationals  . . . entails 
for them access to, and pursuit of, activities as self-employed persons.”372  In addition, 
national laws imposing minimum distances between service stations in Italy was a 
restriction which “by being more advantageous to operators who are already present on 
the Italian market, is l iable to deter, or even prevent, access to the Italian market by 
operators from other Member States.”373  Note also that, in Valentina Neri v. European 
School of Economics (ESE Insight World Education System Ltd), national legislation under 
which certain degrees awarded in other member states were not recognised in Italy was 
                                                 
367 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
368 Where Germany granted credit on a commercial basis, on national territory, by a migrant company, subject to 
prior authorization that was refused where the company does not have its central administration or a branch in 
that territory.  
369 Case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 2006 E.C.R. I-09521, para. 
49 (emphasis added).  
370 CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961. 
371 Id. at paras. 12, 14 (emphasis added).  “That prohibition is therefore to be regarded as a restriction within the 
meaning of Article 43 EC.”  Id. at paras. 11, 12.  See also C-518/06, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-3491, para. 64. 
372 Case C-451/05, Européenne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v. Directeur général des impôts 
and Ministère public, 2007 E.C.R. I-08251, para. 62 (emphasis added).   
373 In relation to the right of establishment, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49; Case C-384/08, Attanasio Group Srl 
v. Comune di Carbognan, judgment of 11 March 2010, para. 45 (emphasis added).  
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held to restrict the right of establishment, because such recognition would 
“facilitat[e] . . . access to the employment market.”374   
 
The language of “market access” was also evident in  Corporación Dermoestética SA v. To 
Me Group Advertising Media, where the prohibition of TV advertising with respect to 
surgical treatments provided by healthcare establishments was held by the Court of Justice 
to be “liable to make it more difficult for such economic operators to gain access to the 
Italian market.”375 
 
With respect to the Treaty right to supply services,376 it was held recently that a Dutch 
measure377 constituted “an impediment to market access for persons” other than the 
nationals of the host state.378  In Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas 
SA, Multichoice Hellas SA, v. QC Leisure,379 UK legislation prohibiting foreign decoding 
devices which gave access to satell ite broadcasting services from another Member State 
was held to prevent access to those services from being received by persons outside the 
UK.380   
 
                                                 
374 Case C-153/02, Valentina Neri v. European School of Economics (ESE Insight World Education System Ltd), 
2003 E.C.R. I-13555, para. 42 (“The recognition of those degrees by the authorities of a Member State is of 
considerable importance.” (emphasis added)). 
375 Case C-500/06 2008 E.C.R. I-5785, para. 34 (emphasis added).  Such was a  restriction and a “serious obstacle” 
to the exercise of the free movement of establishment and services, id. at para. 33.  Reference in the judgment 
was made to the national measure which is liable to impede or render less attractive the exercise of the basic 
freedoms guaranteed by TFEU art. 49 and 56, id. at para 32.   
376 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
377 Relating to a payment of remuneration. 
378 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-1989, para. 14.  Also, there has been recent 
confirmation that the freedom of establishment “entails for [Community nationals] access  to, and pursuit of, 
activities as self-employed persons and the forming and management of undertakings .”  See Case C-471/04, 
Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v. Keller Holding GmbH, 2006 E.C.R. I-2107, para. 29; see also Case C-451/05, 
Européenne et Luxembourgeoise d'investissements SA (ELISA) v. Directeur général des impôts and Ministère 
public, 2007 E.C.R. I-8251, para. 62; Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München 
für Körperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203 para. 17; Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung 
Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, para. 34; C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. 
David Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. I-10837, para. 30.  
379 Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd, NetMed Hellas SA, Multichoice 
Hellas SA, v. QC Leisure, judgment of 4 October 2011. 
380 Id. at para. 88.  The obstacle providing a restriction on the right to provide services.  See also TFEU, supra note 
1, at art. 56.  
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With respect to the Treaty right to supply services,381 other judgments applying the same 
rationale include Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën ,382 in which the 
prohibition of cold call ing383 was held “[to] directly affect . . . access to the market 
in services in the other Member States and is thus capable of hindering intra -Community 
trade in services.”384  In Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. Giuseppe Calafiori, the 
right to pursue tax advice only at centers formed under the authorization of the Spanish 
Ministry was held “completely [to] prevent . . . access to the market for the services in 
question by economic operators established in other Member States.”385  Similarly, 
Federico Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese and Stefano Macrino and Claudia 
Capoparte v. Roberto Melon et al held that the Italian fee scale was “liable to render access 
to the Italian legal services market more difficult for lawyers established in [another] 
Member State.”386   
 
In Commission v. Italy, Italian legislation imposed a requirement to provide third-party 
l iabil ity motor insurance.  The Court held tha t “such a measure affects the relevant 
operators' access to the market” and “renders access to the Italian market less attractive 
and, if they obtain access to that market, reduces the ability of the undertakings concerned 
to compete effectively.”387  The restriction imposed by Italy was held to “affect access to 
the market for undertakings from other Member States and thereby hinder intra-
Community trade.”388  
  
The test of “market access” has also operated within the jurisprudence of the free 
movement of capital.389  In Commission v. Spain, for example, Spanish restrictions on 
investment operations 390 were held to “affect the position of a person acquiring a 
                                                 
381 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
382 In the context of the application of the provisions of TFEU art. 56.  
383 “Cold calling” refers to the practice of telephoning potential clients in another Member State without prior 
consent. 
384 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financië, 1995 E.C.R. I-1141, para. 38 (emphasis added). 
385 Case C-451/03, Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti Srl v. Giuseppe Calafiori, 2006 E.C.R. I-294, para. 33 
(emphasis added).  
386  Joined Cases C-94/04 & C-202/04, Federico Cipolla v. Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese and Stefano Macrino and 
Claudia Capoparte v. Roberto Melon et al., 2006 E.C.R. I-11421, para. 58 (“And therefore is likely to restrict the 
exercise of their activities providing services in that Member State.”).  
387 Case C-518/06, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-3491, para. 70.  
388 Id. at paras. 67, 70 (emphasis added). 
389 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
390 The restrictions apply without distinction to both residents and non-residents. 
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shareholding as such and are thus l iable to deter investors from other Member States from 
making such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market.”391  Further, the 
United Kingdom’s provisions l imiting the acquisition of voting shares in BAA and PLC, and 
imposing consent requirements for the disposal of the company's assets, were held in 
Commission v. UK to be “liable to deter investors from other Member States from making 
such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market.”392   
 
Further examples of recent judgments concerned with the application of the test of 
“market access” include Krzysztof Pela v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,393 
which held in the context of the application of Article 45 TFEU394 that “the fact of not 
having the diploma normally required by nationals of the host Member State could of itself 
constitute a decisive obstacle to access to the legal professions in that Member State.”395  
In Vicoplus SC PUH,396 the right to impose work permits on Polish nationals at the time of 
Poland’s accession to the EU was held a “measure regulating access of Polish nationals to 
the labour market of that State.”397  Attanasio Group Srl v. Comune di Carbognano 
Italian398 held that “[t]he construction of roadside service stations by the legal persons 
referred to in Article 48 EC (now Article 54 TFEU) necessarily implies that they have access 
to the territory of the host Member State.”399  Finally, in relation to the free movement of 
capital, the influence of the principle of market access is found in the recent judgment of 
Commission v. Portugal.  In that case, the creation of so-called “golden” shares in Portugal 
                                                 
391 Case C-463/00, Comm’n v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. I-4581, para. 61 (emphasis added).  
392 Case C-98/01, Comm’n v. U.K., 2003 E.C.R. I-4641, para. 47 (emphasis added).  
393 Case C-345/08, Krzysztof Pela v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2009 E.C.R. I-11677 (emphasis 
added). 
394 Formerly Article 39 EC. 
395 Case C-345/08, Krzysztof Pela v. Justizministerium Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2009 E.C.R. I-11677, para. 53.  
396 Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09, Vicoplus SC PUH, BAM Vermeer Contracting sp. zoo and Olbek Industrial 
Services sp. zoo v. Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, judgment of 10 February 2011. 
397 Id. at para. 32 (emphasis added); see also C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa, 1990 E.C.R. I-141, paras 20 & 21. 
398 Case C-96/08, CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central and Eastern Europe Szolgáltató, Tanácsadó és Keresdedelmi 
kft v. Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenrzési Hivatal (APEH) Hatósági Fosztály, judgment of 15 April 2010, para. 44 
[hereinafter CIBA Case].  The case concerns regional legislation laying down mandatory minimum distances 
between roadside service stations.  The rule, a restriction on the right of establishment, “makes access to the 
activity of fuel distribution subject to conditions and, by being more advantageous to operators who are already 
present on the Italian market, is liable to deter, or even prevent, access to the Italian market by operators from 
other Member States.”  Id. at para. 45.  Note the use of the term “deter.”  
399 C-384/08, Attanasio Group Srl v. Comune di Carbognano, judgment of 11 March 2010, para. 39.  
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Telecom SGPS SA to be held by Portugal were held unlawful,400 as such preferential stock 
treatment was “liable to deter investors from other Member States from making such 
investments and, consequently, affect access to the market.”401  
 
IV.  Market Access:  Relationship with Nondiscrimination? 
 
The foregoing analysis concerned the recourse in free movement jurisprudence to the 
principle of “market access” in the location of the obstacle or restriction to the free 
movement right.  In other jurisprudence locating the restriction or obstacle to the free 
movement right, the principle of nondiscrimination has either occupied the premier 
position in this process or has been allowed to coalesce alongside the principle of market 
access in the processes scrutinizing national measures.  The importance of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in this context was recently confirmed in  Commission v. Greece, where 
the Court explained that “the principle of nondiscrimination, whether it has its basis in 
Article 12 EC402 or Articles 39 EC403 or 43 EC,404 requires that comparable situations must 
not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same 
way.”405  This is verification that the principle of nondiscrimination remains inherent within 
the Treaties.406  In the context of positioning the principle of market access within the 
jurisprudence of free movement,407 such a reminder of the status principle of 
                                                 
400 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63 (providing that “[a]ll restrictions on the movement of capital between Member 
States . . . shall be prohibited”).   
401 Case C-171/08, Comm’n v. Portugal, judgment of 8 July 2010, (emphasis added).  See also the language 
used recently in the CIBA Case, judgment of 15 April 2010, para. 44. 
402 The general charging provision in relation to nondiscrimination is now found under TFEU art. 18.  
403 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45. 
404 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
405 Case C-155/09, Comm’n v. Greece, judgment of 20 January 2011 , para. 68.  The principle was expressed 
recently in Commission v. Hungary as arising “only through the application of different rules to comparable 
situations or the application of the same rule to different situations .”  Case C-253/09, Comm’n v. Hungary, 
judgment of 1 December 2011, para. 50.  See also C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker 
1995 E.C.R. I-225, para. 30; Case C-383/05 Raffaele Talotta v. Belgian State, 2007 E.C.R. I-2555, para. 18; Case C-
182/06, État du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v. Hans Ulrich Lakebrink and Katrin Peters -Lakebrink, 2007 E.C.R. I-
6705, para. 27. 
406 Articles 7, 48, 59 have in common the prohibition, in their respective spheres of application, of any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality.  See Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, para. 16.  It is clear too from Comm’n v. 
Italy that the jurisprudence of goods reflects not only “the principle of ensuri ng the free access of Community 
products to national markets’ but also of nondiscrimination.”  Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, 
para. 34. 
407 For provisions relating to the worker, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, see TFEU supra note 
1, at art. 49; see for services, TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56; and for capital, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.  
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nondiscrimination may be apposite.  Arguably it is a signal that the Court will  conti nue to 
rely on the principle of nondiscrimination in its jurisprudence.  In the recent case of 
Commission v. Greece, for example, a national provision reserving entitlement to a tax 
exemption solely to permanent residents in Greece was held to disadvantage persons not 
residing in Greece.408  
 
The Court has previously held that  
 
Article 48 . . . give[s] effect to the principle of 
nondiscrimination laid down in Article 7 of the EEC 
Treaty and are thus intended to give workers 
established in the different countries of the Community 
free access to employment available in countries of the 
Community other than the one in which they are 
established, without regard to their nationality, by 
prohibiting any restriction on their movement within 
the Community, whether in the form of restrictions on 
access to the national territory or restrictions on free 
movement within a national territory, which would 
prevent them from effectively exercising that right.409 
 
Michael Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Grieskirche410 reaffirms that the 
principle of nondiscrimination remains fundamental to the operation of the Treaty free 
movement provisions.411  In Neukirchinger, decided 25 January 2011, the Court held: 
 
                                                 
408 Case C-155/09, Comm’n v. Greece, judgment of 20 January 2011, para. 48. 
409 Case 298/84, Paolo Iorio v. Azienda autonoma delle ferrovie dello Stato, 1986 E.C.R. 247, para. 13 (emphasis 
added).  TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 18 (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to 
any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”).  It 
was held in Cathy Schulz-Delzers, Pascal Schulz v. Finanzamt Stuttgart III that TFEU art. 18 “lays down a general 
prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by 
European Union law for which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of nondiscrimination.”  Case C-240/10, Cathy 
Schulz-Delzers, judgment of 15 September 2011, para. 29.  See also Case C-269/07, Comm’n v. Germany 2009 
E.C.R. I-7811, paras. 98–99. 
410 The Court of Justice held that “in order to provide the referring court with a useful answer, the questions 
referred must be examined from the perspective of Article 12 EC, which enshrines the general principle of non -
discrimination on grounds of nationality.”  See Case C-382/08, Michael Neukirchinger v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft 
Grieskirche, judgment of 25 January 2011, para. 30; see also Case C-40/05 Kaj Lyyski v. Umeå universitet, 2007 
E.C.R. I-99, para. 33; Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comercia les Asociadas (UTECA) v. Administración 
General del Estad, 2009 E.C.R. I-1407, para. 37. 
411 See supra note 407. 
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It is settled case-law that the rules regarding equality of 
treatment between nationals and non-nationals forbid 
not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality 
or, in the case of a company, its seat, but also all  covert 
forms of discrimination which, by the application of 
other distinguishing criteria, lead to the same result.412 
 
More recently, in Commission v. Portugal, restrictions on the free movement of capital 
imposed by Portugal were held to  
 
apply without distinction to both residents and non-
residents, it must none the less be held that they affect 
the position of a person acquiring a shareholding as 
such and are thus l iable to deter investors from other 
Member States from making such investments and, 
consequently, affect access to the market.413  
 
In this judgment, the Court of Justice acknowledged that access to the Portuguese market 
had been restricted on the basis that the national law had indirectly discriminated against 
non-residents.  
 
Not only has recent jurisprudence relied on the principle of nondiscrimination, but where it 
has been required, it has also been a principle inextricably mixed with the principle of 
market access.  In Commission v. Italy, for example, the Court of Justice held that  
 
the general principle prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, which is laid down by Articles 
48, 52 and 59 of the Treaty in the particular spheres 
which they govern, means that freedom of movement 
for workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to 
supply services include access to activities of employed 
or self-employed persons on conditions defined by the 
legislation of the host Member State for its own 
nationals.414  
                                                 
412 Case C-382/08, Neukirchinger, judgment of 25 January 2011, para. 32.  National measures in connection with 
the requirement to apply for an operating license to operate balloon flights in Austria were held discriminatory on 
the grounds of nationality.  See C-115/08, Land Oberösterreich v. EZ as, 2009 E.C.R. I-10265, para. 92. 
413 Case C-212/09, Comm’n v. Portugal, Case C-212/09: judgment of 10 November 2011, para. 65. 
414 Case C-58/90, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-4193, para. 9.  In this context, the judgment made 
reference to Case 167/73, Comm’n v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, para. 45; Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, 
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The general prohibition in relation to nondiscrimination415 was described by the Court in 
Commission v. France as “absolute.”416  Other examples exist evidencing the same fusion 
between the principle of market access and non-discrimination.417  With respect to the 
worker, for example, Article 45(2) TFEU418 has been held to have “the effect of allowing in 
each state, equal access to employment to the nationals of other Member States.”419  
Finally, in the recent case of Donat Cornelius Ebert v. Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara ,420 the 
Hungarian court was instructed to ascertain whether the Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara had 
applied national rules affecting access to the profession of lawyer in a non-discriminatory 
manner.421 
 
                                                                                                                             
1974 E.C.R. 631; and Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging 
voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299. 
415 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 18. 
416 Case 167/73, Comm’n v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, para. 45.  
417 In Commission v. Spain, it was held that the Treaty free movement provisions “require the elimination of any 
discrimination against Community nationals on grounds of nationality with regard to access to employment, 
establishment and the provision of services.”  Case C-375/92, Comm’n v. Spain, 1994 E.C.R. I-923, para. 9 
(emphasis added).  
418 In this context it has operated, for example, to ensure migrant nationals’ access to permanent employment in 
French public hospitals.  Case 307/84, Comm’n v. France, 2006 E.C.R. 1725.  Commission v. Greece concerned 
access to employment and the prohibiting or restriction of access for non-Greek nationals already employed in 
Greece to posts of director or teacher in “frontistiria” and in private music and dancing schools .  Case 147/86 
Comm’n v. Greece, 1988 E.C.R. 1637.  The prohibition of discrimination extends to a context wider than the mere 
exercise of the Treaty right of free movement with respect to the worker.  “It thus follows from the general 
character of the prohibition on discrimination in TFEU art. 45 and the objective pursued by the abolition of 
discrimination that discrimination is prohibited even if it constitutes only 
an obstacle of secondary importance as regards the equality of access to employment.”  Case 167/73, Comm’n v. 
France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, para. 46 (emphasis added).  
419 Case 167/73, Comm’n v. France 1974 E.C.R. 359, para. 45 (emphasis added).  This finds expression in 
discrimination noted by the Court as raising “obstacles to access to the profession” that resulted in rendering 
unlawful a national law requiring de-registration of doctors in the home state as a precondition to registration in 
France.  Case 96/85 Comm’n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1475, para. 11.  Similar sentiments were expressed as 
“discrimination on grounds of nationality, which hinders or restricts engagement in paid employment, is contrary 
to Article 48 of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers.”  Case 147/86, Comm’n v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 
1637, para. 19. 
420 Case C-359/09, Donat Cornelius Ebert v. Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara, judgment of 3 February 2011.  
421 Id. at para. 41.  In the context of the right of establishment, the Court in Criminal proceedings against Vítor 
Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others confirmed that “Article 56 TFEU requires . . . the elimination of all 
discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member 
State.”  Case C-515/08, Criminal proceedings against Vítor Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others, judgment of 7 
October 2010, para. 29.  See also Joined Cases C-372/09 & C-373/09, Josep Peñarroja Fa, judgment of 17 March 
2011, para. 83; Case C-458/08 Comm’n v. Portugal, judgment of 18 November 2010, para. 82.        
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It appears that whatever the future positioning of the market access test within free 
movement jurisprudence,422 the language of recent judgments such as Neukirchinger423 
and Commission v. Greece424 would suggest that the role of the nondiscrimination pr inciple 
in the available methods of inquiry as to the legality of national measures is not to be 
diminished and is set to continue.  Rather, the language of Neukirchinger425 and 
Commission v. Greece426 suggests a strengthening of the role of the nondiscrimination 
principle within the applicable jurisprudence.  These are cases that exhibit a subtle l inkage 
between the tools of “market access” and nondiscrimination.  This claim may be supported 
by jurisprudence such as Donat Cornelius Ebert.427  A particular reading of the recent 
jurisprudence is that these are judgments which evidence that the Court is maneuvering 
towards implanting a number of conduits into in the process of enforcement of Treaty free 
movement rights with respect to national measures.  
 
E.  Comment  
 
It is evident that there is one purpose motivating the jurisprudence relating to the 
worker,428 services,429 establishment,430 and capital 431 in the application of free movement 
provisions in EU treaties to national laws:  To hold unlawful national measures th at are 
restrictive of or have proven to be an obstacle to the exercise by the migrant EU national of 
Treaty free movement rights.  Emphatically retaining that purpose, the language of 
restrictions or obstacles432 properly reflects the focus of Treaty free movement 
provisions.433  It is a language that disregards the plethora of descriptions ascribed to 
                                                 
422 See supra note 407. 
423 Case C-382/08, Neukirchinger, judgment of 25 January 2011, para. 32.   
424 Case C-155/09, Comm’n v. Greece, judgment of 20 January 2011, para. 45.  
425 Neukirchinger, judgment of 25 January 2011, para. 32.   
426 Case C-155/09, Comm’n v. Greece, judgment of 20 January 2011, para. 45.  
427 Case C-359/09, Donat Cornelius Ebert v. Budapesti Ügyvédi Kamara , judgment of 3 February 2011. 
428 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45. 
429 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
430 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49.  See also Maatschapij, 1999 E.C.R. I-2329, para. 107.  
431 TFEU supra note 1, at art. 63 .  
432 THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1973) (defining “restriction” as “a limitation imposed upon a person” 
and “obstacle” as “a hindrance, impediment, obstruction.” ). 
433 With respect to the right of establishment, TFEU art. 49 provides:  “Within the framework of the provisions set 
out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be prohibited” (emphasis added).  The right to supply services provides:  “Within the 
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national measures, such as those measures found to “hamper or to render less attractive,” 
“prohibit or otherwise impede,” “impede or render less attractive,” or “hinder or make less 
attractive.”  In this context, the latter descriptions by the Court of Justice with respect to 
national measures arguably may be regarded as superfluous, adding nothing further of 
substance to the scrutiny process which is applied to the national measure.  Impressive as 
such eclectic descriptive terminology is, its existence arguably serves only to camouflage 
the critical essence of the inquiry.  The removal of the assigned descriptive terminology 
with respect to national measures may i n reality serve to refocus the free movement 
jurisprudence434 on the removal of the obstacle or restriction to the free movement right.  
Arguably, it is a removal that would result in a transparent appraisal of Treaty exhortations 
within free movement jurisprudence.435  Support for such proposition may be had from a 
“reorientation” of earlier jurisprudence as exemplars.  The judgment of Commission v. 
Netherlands,436 for example, records obstacles or restrictions,437 unlawful Dutch residence 
requirements as being “liable to hamper or to render less attractive”438 the exercise of 
rights of establishment.439  So too, specialist patent renewal services in Säger440 that were 
deemed liable to “prohibit or otherwise impede” the freedom to provide services 441 were 
nonetheless restrictions on the right to provide services.442   
 
Examination of other free movement jurisprudence readily uncovers a similar approach.  
Dutch rules,443 for example, held restrictions444 in relation to the payment of tariffs for sea 
                                                                                                                             
framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be 
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the 
person for whom the services are intended” (emphasis added).  See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  With respect 
to the free movement of capital, TFEU art. 63 provides that “[a]ll restrictions on the movement of capital between 
Member States and between Member States and third countr ies shall be prohibited” (emphasis added).  
434 See supra note 407. 
435 Note the considerations made earlier with the concept of restrictions and the wording used in TFEU art. 56; 
TFEU art. 49.  See, e.g., Case T-266/97, Vlaamse Televisie Maatschapij NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-2329, para. 
107; TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
436 Case C-299/02, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2004 E.C.R. I-9761. 
437 Id. at paras. 20–21.  
438 Id. at para. 15. 
439 Id. 
440 Säger, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, para. 14. 
441 Id. at para 12. 
442 Id. at para 17. 
443 Douane, 2002 E.C.R. I-5235. 
444 Id. at para. 38.  
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going vessels were designated as l iable to “prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
right to provide services.”445  So too Belgian rules that were found to be restrictions on the 
right to provide services in relation to the posting of workers were described as  l iable to 
prohibit, impede, or render less attractive that Treaty right.446  Jurisprudence such as this 
bears the overtones of the influence of the market access principle.  The national measures 
in issue are in reality restrictions on the respective free movement rights. It is perfectly 
permissible to measure the legality of the national measure by reference to the principle of 
market access, but this should always be placed in the context of the availabil ity of a 
number of principles 447 which exist for the that same purpose and any of which may be 
used where appropriate.  A mere passing reference to the market access principle by 
referencing the national measure to phrases such as “liable to hamper or to render less 
attractive” is arguably insufficient.  In use, the market access principle is one that ought to 
be founded on an economic basis; not merely one founded on passing reference and 
intuition.448   
 
F.  Particular Considerations  
 
This paper has been concerned with the locating the position occupied by the market 
access principle in the process of the application to national measures of Treaty free 
movement rights relating to goods,449 persons,450 services,451 and capital.452  The 
perception from recent jurisprudence across all  such freedoms appears to be that the test 
of market access is one that is currently more readily adopted by the Court of Justice to 
facil itate the scrutiny process relating to assessing the lawfulness of national measures vis -
                                                 
445 Id. at para. 32.  
446 Case C-219/08, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2009 E.C.R. I-9213, paras. 13–14.  The same description (with respect to 
the establishment of companies) applied to Hungarian restrictions in the CIBA Case, judgment of 15 April 2010, 
paras. 19, 44.  Note also the same descriptive analogy to restrictions applied to Belgian legislation requiring a 
Portuguese company to file individual accounts in respect of Portuguese workers posted to Belgium.  See Case C-
515/08, Criminal proceedings against Vítor Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others, judgment of 7 October 2010, 
paras. 29, 40.  
447 An example is nondiscrimination and mutual recognition.  
448 For a discussion on the issue of market access and intuition, see Spaventa, supra note 136, at 914–32.  Note, 
however, a contrary view in Advocate General Bot’s Opinion that “the analysis to be carried out by the Court  
should not involve any complex economic assessment” (emphasis added).  See also Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot, Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, para. 116. 
449 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
450 For provisions relating to workers, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, see TFEU, supra note 1, 
at art. 49. 
451 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
452 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
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à-vis the strictures of European Union law.  This article has identified and sought to 
address issues raised by this perception, and now seeks to offer some observations on 
particular considerations which may properly arise if the market access test crystall ises 
further into a permanent and universal usage within the free movement jurisprudence 
across goods,453 persons,454 services,455 and capital.456  In the first instance, attention is 
given to the issue of the prospect of a convergence within the mechanics relating to the 
application of the Treaty free movement provisions 457 to national measures.  Evidence 
seems to be emerging from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice which evidences a 
positioning of the test of market access as a primary component in the equation relating to 
the assessment of the lawfulness of the national measure vis -à-vis Treaty free movement 
rights. 
  
I.  Convergence Within Jurisprudence? 
 
There is an argument to suggest that both the judgments of Commission v. Italy458 and 
Mickelsson and Roos459 have moved the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of 
goods460 towards that of persons,461 services,462 and capital.463  In deciding whether the 
respective national laws were “were measures having equivalent effect,” it is argued that 
the key issue for Commission v. Italy464 and Mickelsson465 was whether there had been a 
hindrance to access to the host market.466  This approach is reflective of that adopted by 
                                                 
453 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
454 See supra note 450. 
455 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
456 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
457 See supra note 407. 
458 Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
459 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273.  
460 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
461 See supra note 450. 
462 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
463 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
464 Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519. 
465 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273.  
466 See Snell, supra note 136, at 49. 
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the Court of Justice in jurisprudence relating to other Treaty freedoms.467  The thread of 
“access to the market” that is now winding its way ubiquitously within the jurisprudence of 
Treaty freedoms468 perhaps presents some evidence of a movement towards convergence 
in a defined route with respect to the application of Treaty free movement provisions to 
national measures.  Analysis contained in this article would in this context add some 
support for this contention.  An assumption of movement towards convergence may 
arguably have been driven to an extent by current jurisprudence relating to the 
development of Union citizenship.469  In that jurisprudence, it is arguable that recent 
judgments have propelled that concept away from the basis of a market driven 
citizenship470 and “towards a fully-fledged, meaningful, notion of Union citizenship that 
bestows upon all  Union citizens a number of basic rights.”471  Article 20(2) TFEU provides 
that “Citizens of the Union shall  enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for 
in the Treaties.”472  Importantly for the present context, the Treaty provisions have been 
used as a conduit in order to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 473   
 
In the l ight of Article 20(2) TFEU, the Treaty provisions should arguably be re-read as 
sourcing rights to which all  Union citizens are entitled.474  Were this interpretation to prove 
correct—if rights, which are economic in nature, are bestowed on all  citizens —there is 
then some sense in the Court abandoning the maintenance of the differing interpretations 
and rules relating to the application of all  Treaty free movement provisions.  Advocate 
General Maduro, for example, has taken this argument even further: 
                                                 
467 Id. at 55. 
 
468 For provisions relating to goods, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34; for workers, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 
45; for establishment, see TFEU supra note 1, at art. 49; and for services, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56.  
469 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 20 (“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and 
not replace national citizenship.”). 
470 See Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 40; Michele Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL 
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (J. Shaw & G. More eds., 1995).  
471 See Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 40 (“Such as the right to free movement and residence and the right to be 
free from discrimination on grounds of nationality with regards to matters that fall within the material scope of 
EC law.”).  
472 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 20(2) (“Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties 
provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States.”). 
473 See, e.g., Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R I-2691, paras. 55, 62, 64; C-148/02, 
Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, 2003 E.C.R. I-11613, para. 29. 
474 There is authority for this proposition within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, see  C-138/02, Brian 
Francis Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 2004 E.C.R. I-2703, para. 63; Joined Cases C-22/08 and 
C-23/08, Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900, 2009 E.C.R. I -
4585, para. 37; C-258/04, Office national de l'emploi v. Ioannis Ioannidis,  2005 E.C.R. I-8275, para. 22. 
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[S]uch a harmonisation of the systems of free 
movement seems . . . to be essential in the light of the 
requirements of genuine Union citizenship.  It would be 
desirable for the same system to be applied to all  the 
citizens of the Union wishing to use their freedom of 
movement or freedom to move services, goods or 
capital as well as their freedom to reside or to set up 
the seat of their activities in the Community.475 
 
Tryfonidou supports such reasoning in that the arguments expressed by Advocate General 
Maduro could lead to the proposition that, as a consequence of translating the economic 
freedoms into citizenship rights, the Court of Justice has placed the market freedoms on 
the road that leads to convergence.476   
 
Any assumption relating to an adoption of a pure market access test with respect to the 
issue of the application of (all) Treaty free movement rights to national measures is an 
intriguing prospect.  Nevertheless, elevating the market access test to a central, dominant 
position within the process used to assess the legality of the national measure would raise 
some concerns.  Some of those concerns are addressed below.   
 
II.  Reviewing the Reviewers  
 
There has been a long history of the use of the market access test within the jurisprudence 
of goods,477 persons,478 services,479 and capital.480  The market access test is referenced in 
                                                 
475 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Poiares Maduro, Joined Cases C-158 & 159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE, formerly 
Trofo Super-Markets AE v. Greece, 2006 E.C.R. I-8135, para. 51 (emphasis added).  See also Opinion of Advocate 
Gen. Bot, Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 E.C.R. I-519, paras. 83, 118. 
476 See Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 36, 55 (suggesting it is a “novel idea” to place the argument in the context 
of the “broader developments which have taken place in the context of Union Citizenship,” even if the move to 
convergence has been an “unspoken” determination).  See also Case 205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel 
Inter BVBA, 2008 E.C.R. I-9947; Case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v. Claudia Schmidt, 2006 E.C.R. I-
2093; C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
477 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
478 See supra note 450. 
479 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
480 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63.  
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key judgments,481 opinions of Advocates General,482 and discussions in academic papers.483  
Nonetheless, despite the appearance of a tangible and increasing readiness to resort to the 
use of the market access test as a central plank in the assessment of the legality of national 
measures, the test remains without judicial definition.484  In addition, there has been 
academic argument to the effect that the market access test is one that does not readily 
open itself to particular definition485 and that there is a measure of “uncertainty which 
surrounds this  . . . concept.”486  Snell, for example, suggests that “the very ambiguity of the 
term may explain its use by and the usefulness for the Court.”487  He argues that the 
reference to market access may allow the Court to avoid difficult choices in relation to the 
reach of free movement law.488  Uncertainty in this context allows “maximum freedom of 
manoeuvre”489 and the lack of clear content gives the Court freedom “either to approve or 
to condemn measures that it happens to l ike or dislike.”490    
                                                 
481 See Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, para. 17; Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van 
Financiën, 1995 E.C.R. I-1141, para. 38; Gourmet Int’l., 2001 E.C.R. I-1795, para. 18, 20; C-110/05 Comm’n v. Italy, 
2006 E.C.R. I-2093, paras. 34, 36, 37.  See also Snell, supra note 134. 
482 See Opinion of Advocate Gen. Jacobs, Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 
Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, paras. 39–56; Opinion of Advocate Gen. Fennelly, Case C-
190/98, Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, 2000 E.C.R. I-493; Opinion of Advocate Gen. Tizzano, 
CaixaBank, 2004 E.C.R. I-8961; Opinion of Advocate Gen. Maduro, Alfa Vita, 2006 E.C.R. I-8135; Opinion of 
Advocate Gen. Kokott, Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273.  See also Snell, supra note 134. 
483 This is well documented, not only in this Article but in articles such as Catherine Barnard, 
Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?, 26 Eur. L. Rev. 35 (2001); Peter Oliver and Stefan 
Enchelmaier, Free movement of Goods: Recent Developments in the Case Law, 44 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 649, 674 
(2007); Snell, supra note 134; Eleanor Spaventa, From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic European 
Constitution, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 743 (2004); Stephen Weatherill, After Keck:  Some Thoughts on how to 
Clarify the Clarification, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 885 (1996); Spaventa, supra note 136.  See also BARNARD, supra 
note 171, at 21–24; PAUL P. CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 694–95 (4th ed. 2008) in 
the context of the free movement of goods. 
484 Adequate definitions relating to nondiscrimination have been provided.  With respect to the Treaty rights of 
establishment and the right to supply services, it has been held that “ the principle of equal 
treatment . . . prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of 
discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result.”  Case 
C-3/88, Comm’n v. Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 4035, para. 8.   
485 In the context of a discussion in relation to Keck and Mithouard, the concept has been identified as “inherently 
nebulous.”  See Oliver and Enchelmaier, supra note 483. 
486 BARNARD, supra note 171, at 21 (emphasis added). 
487 Snell, supra note 134, at 468. 
488  See id. at 469. 
489 Id. 
490 Id. 
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1.  Definition:  Advocates General and Commentators   
 
An increasing use of the market access test by the Court of Justice lends support to an 
argument for the provision of judicial definition.491  Definitions of the test have been 
suggested by academic writers; Spaventa, for example, presents an economic 
interpretation of the notion of “barrier to market access.”492  At one extreme in this 
interpretation exists a barrier to entry created through either circumstances or 
legislation;493 in contrast, the other economic extreme presents a potential barrier 
imposed by any regulation.494  In the context of European Union law, Spaventa argues that 
the concept of market access has  adopted an intuitive495 rather than an economic 
approach.496  The intuitive approach is located somewhere between the two identified 
economic extremes.497  It is an approach that attempts “to provide a test which would 
allow . . . [distinction] between rules which should subjected to judicial scrutiny and rules 
considered neutral as regards intra Community trade.”498  The latter rules would fall  
                                                 
491 See, e.g., id. 
492 See Spaventa, From Gebhard, supra note 483, at 757.   
493 See id. (making a comparative assessment about “[t]he ability for an economic actor to gain access to a market 
on an equal footing with other economic operators” (emphasis added)).  Spaventa adds that “[t]his definition 
seems entirely consistent with the Court’s view taken in Keck, but for the fact that the Court makes it clear that a 
rule preventing market access (i.e., a total barrier) falls within the definition, regardless of discrimination.”   Id. 
494 See id. at 757 (noting that “any regulation imposes and implies compliance costs”  (emphasis added)).  
495 See Snell, supra note 134, at 468–69 (noting that, in the context of a lack of clear content in the test of market 
access, “[m]arket access may simply provide a sophisticated-sounding garb that conceals decisions based on 
intuition”).   
496 See Spaventa, From Gebhard, supra note 483, at 758.  A later article expresses the same view that “[i]n the 
context of the free movement provisions, little effort has been devolved to defining the concept of market access; 
thus, so far, the concept has been used in an intuitive way rather than resting on accurate economic analysis.”  
Spaventa, supra note 136, at 923.  See also Opinion of Advocate Gen. Bot, Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 
E.C.R. I-2093, para. 116 (“As regards, . . . other categories of measures, it is necessary to examine their specific 
impact on patterns of trade, but the analysis to be carried out by the Court should not involve any complex 
economic assessment.” (emphasis added)). 
497 See Spaventa, From Gebhard, supra note 483, at 757.   
498 Id. at 758.  Spaventa observes that those who would support the “market access” test would reject “a purely 
discriminatory assessment.”  Id.  There is, however, “an attempt to provide a test which would allow us to 
distinguish between rules which should be subjected to judicial scrutiny, and rules considered neutral as regards 
intra-Community trade which should fall altogether outside the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions.”  
Id.  Note in this content the view of Advocate General Lenz that there should exist “a distinction between rules 
which regulate access to an occupational activity (which should be scrutinized), and rules which regulate the 
exercise of that activity (which should not be scrutinised).”  Id. at 758 n.48. 
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outside the scope of the Treaty free movement provisions.499  Spaventa warns that the 
adoption of a default intuitive approach and the failure of the Court to use economic 
analysis “carries with it the risk of an overbroad interpretation of the notion of a barrier 
caught by the Treaty.”500  It is for this reason it is argued that the use of the market access 
test has always been qualified by the proponents of that test; such qualification has been 
through the route of “de minimis or notions such as a substantial hindrance to market 
access.”501  It is in the latter context that both Commission v. Italy502 and Mickelsson503 are 
arguably significant judgments, because both employ the market access test without such 
qualification.  The reality of these judgments is that “[t]he Court makes no such attempt 
[to qualify the application of the market access test]; rather, any (other) measure which 
hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member 
State is to be considered a measure having equivalent effect in need of justification.”504  
 
Given the manner in which the market access test was relied upon in both Commission v. 
Italy505 and Mickelsson506 without qualification, together with the previous record of the 
adoption by the Court of Justice of an intuitive approach to that test, it is arguable at least 
that it becomes a more compelling reason for the Court of Justice to provide a workable 
definition507 of the concept.  The problem at present appears to be a seeming inability to 
establish accurately which national rules are to be covered by the concept and which are 
not.  It is in the present context that market access  could be seen as a blunt instrument, 
covering national measures that impose a barrier to entry to the host market as well as 
those measures that impose restrictions on the product or migrant after entry.    
 
                                                 
499 See id. at 758.    
500 Spaventa, supra note 136, at 923.  Hence “it becomes difficult to identify which, if any, national rules fall 
outside the scope of the Treaty and therefore need not be justified.”   Id. 
501 Id. at 923 (“Below which national rules would not need to be justified”) (emphasis added). 
502 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
503 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
504 Spaventa, supra note 136, at 924 (emphasis added). 
505 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
506 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
507 Spaventa, supra note 136, at 924:  “But once we apply an effet utile approach to market access, so that any 
rule which not only directly limits access to a given market is caught by Art. 28 EC but also that which discourages 
an importer from accessing that market, then it is difficult to identify which rules, if any, would actually fall 
outside the market access test.  In this respect, Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos seem to have 
brought the case law on goods in line with the case law on persons.”   Id. 
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There have been other elaborations of the s ubstance of market access.  Weatheril l , while 
addressing but not confined to the issue of the “sell ing arrangement,” proposed a test of 
“direct or substantial hindrance” to “market access.”508  He writes, 
 
Measures introduced by authorities in a Member State 
which apply equally in law and in fact to all  goods or 
services without reference to origin and which impose 
no direct or substantial hindrance to the access of 
imported goods or services to the market of that 
Member State escape the scope of the application of 
Articles 30 and 59.509   
 
It would follow that measures “which either apply unequally in law . . . or fact to goods and 
services with reference to origin or which impose a direct and substantial hindrance to the 
access of imported goods or services”510 to the host market will  fall within the scope of the 
application of the provisions relating to goods 511 and to services.512  
 
In the context of Keck, Weatheril l ’s observation addresses the need to place national rules, 
which do not threaten the internal market, outside the scope of EU law.  It is an 
observation that could, however, apply to free movement jurisprudence in general.513  The 
problematic identification of a national measure being of direct or substantial hindrance to 
access was i l lustrated in the foll owing terms:  “Complete bans on the sale of goods and 
services through the national territory may apply equally in law and in fact to all  goods and 
services, but the ban impedes market access and accordingly must be justified.”514  There 
                                                 
508 Weatherill, supra note 483, at 896–97.  See also Spaventa, From Gebhard, supra note 483, at 758.  See also 
Barnard supra note 483, at 52–53 (discussing the possibility of a general test for market access based on the 
“prevention or direct and substantial hindrance of access to the market” (emphasis added)).  
509 Weatherill, supra note 483, at 896–97 (emphasis added).  See also TFEU, supra note 1, at arts. 34, 56. 
510 Weatherill, supra note 483, at 897.  
511 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
512 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
513 See Weatherill, supra note 483, at 897.  The effect of the “formula” places the onus then on the issue of 
justification.  Id.  “Non-discriminatory national measures that cross the threshold of a sufficient restriction on 
market access are compatible with EC law only provided: they are justified by mandatory requirements in the 
general interest; that they are apt to achieve the objective which they pursue ; and that they do not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it.”  Id.  See also Dieter Kraus, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663; Case C-55/94, Reinhard 
Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,  1995 E.C.R. I-4165; Rewe-Zentral, 1979 
E.C.R. 649.  
514 Weatherill, supra note 483, at 896–97, 899.  See Her Majesty's Customs, 1994 E.C.R. I-1039; Case C-34/79, 
Regina v. Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795.  
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will  be other instances wherein the national measure will  not be deemed to be a direct or 
substantial hindrance.515  
 
Advocate General Jacobs has proposed that in the instant context “the appropriate 
test . . . is whether there is a substantial restriction on . . . access.”516  He argued that “a 
test based on the extent to which a measure hinders trade between Member States by 
restricting market access seems the most obvious solution.”517  The Advocate General 
noted that, in the instances wherein measures are applicable without distinction, it “would 
it be necessary to introduce a requirement that the restriction, actual or potential, on 
access to the market must be substantial.”518  Such argument would broach consideration 
of what the imposition of substantial restriction in this context actually requires.  Is it, for 
example, an issue of an assessment of how many goods are affected, or a qualitative 
question relating to the type of measure under scrutiny?519  It may be noted that the 
judgments of Commission v. Italy520 and Mickelsson and Roos,521 in relation to the free 
movement of goods,522 arguably seem to have embraced the idea of substantial hindrance 
as proposed by Advocate General Jacobs.  Commission v. Italy523 decided that there had 
                                                 
515 See Case C-379/92, Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta, 1994 E.C.R. I-3453, para. 24 (stating that the 
effect of Italian rules on the freedom to provide services was too uncertain and indirect as to hinder trade 
between Member States).  See also Weatherill, supra note 483, at 896–97, 899 (arguing that such amounts to “a 
statement of no direct restriction on market access.”).  
516 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 
Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 42 (“That would of course amount to introducing a de 
minimis test into Article 30”) (emphasis added).  The Opinion was delivered in the context of TEC art. 30 (now 34 
TFEU) vis-à-vis the application of the concept of the “selling arrangement.”  The Advocate General was of the 
opinion that Article 30 (now 34 TFEU) be regarded as applying to non-discriminatory measures which are liable 
substantially to restrict access to the market.  Id. at para. 49. 
517 Id.  See also, e.g., Opinion of Advocate Gen. Stix-Hackl, Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 
DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval,  2003 E.C.R. I-14,887, para. 78. 
518 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Jacobs, Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité 
SA and M6 Publicité SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 44.  So, for example, where there is a denial of access altogether, 
there is “a substantial barrier to market access.”  Id. (emphasis added).  By contrast, where the measure merely 
restricts the goods (as in the case of a selling arrangement), its impact will depend, for example, upon whether 
the measure applies to most goods, certain goods or to all goods.  Id. at para. 45.   
519 See, e.g., Tryfonidou, supra note 466, at 51 (explaining that the first category would broach the adoption of a 
de minimis test, whereas a qualitative identification of the measure on the other hand relates for example to the 
type of measure scrutinised and whether it is harmful to interstate trade).  
520 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
521 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
522 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
523 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
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been a restriction524 because the national rules l imited the use of trailers in Italy and 
consequently reduced the opportunities for trade.525  
 
2.  Market Access:  Notion 
 
Given that there is an absence of a definitive jurisprudential definition of “market access,” 
and that an economic basis for the test is appea ling because it at least offers some 
certainty, it might be appropriate to give some consideration to the conceptual basis which 
underpins the test of market access. 
 
With respect to the notion of market access 526 within EU free movement jurisprudence 
relating to persons,527 the Court has distinguished between access and exercise relating to 
the free movement right.  This division, as noted by Snell, translates to “the take-up and 
pursuit of an activity, or an entry to and operation in the market.”528  Advocates General 
have produced different opinions on such a division.  Advocate General Lenz in Bosman 
expressed some support in favour of this distinction.  He was of the opinion 529 that the 
football  transfer rules “do not concern the possibil ity of access for foreign players as such, 
but the exercise of the occupation.”530  Support for this view is also found in Advocate 
General Fennelly’s opinion in Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH: 
 
The imposition of conditions regarding entry to the 
market or the taking up of economic activity is itself 
sufficient to establish the existence of a restriction . . . .  
                                                 
524 See id. at para. 64 (justifying the measure in that instance by reasons of road safety).  
525 Id. at para. 58.  It was stated that Article 34 TFEU reflects the obligation to respect the principle of ensuring 
free access of Union products to national markets.   See id. at summary. 
526 See Snell, supra note 134, at 443.  The notion of “market access” is an autonomous one.  It appears within 
competition and WTO law but Snell notes that “[t]he way the concepts of barriers to entry and market access 
have developed in these contexts are fundamentally different from EU free movement law and as a result, any 
borrowing would be counterproductive.”  Id. 
527 For provisions relating to the worker, see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, see TFEU, supra 
note 1, at art. 49; for services , see TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
528 Snell, supra note 134, at 443 (reflecting the right in TFEU art. 45 “(a) to accept offers of employment actually 
made; . . . (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions 
governing the employment of nationals of that State.”).  Snell notes that (a) relates to access to employment and 
seems to be “absolute.”  On the other hand (c) relates to rights after such access, “when the actual occupation 
has been exercised.”  Id. at 444.  
529 See Bosman Case, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921 (arguing that the evenhanded nature of the rules was of no relevance, 
since they affected access to the labour market). 
530  Id. at para. 210 (emphasis added).  
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The same, broadly speaking, can probably also be said 
of formal conditions imposed regarding matters which 
are intimately connected with successful access to the 
market, such as those governing recognition of a 
qualification which is necessary or beneficial to the 
exercise of many professional activities.531 
 
In contrast to the Opinions of Advocates General Lenz and Fennelly, however, Advocate 
General Alber has argued that “[r]ules on the exercise of a profession . . . must . . . be 
complied with directly by a citizen of the Union who wishes to assert the fundamental 
freedom under Article 48 of the EC Treaty.”532  
 
Snell  labels the distinction between access and exercise a “superficial appeal” because “the 
impact of a measure on cross-border situations is a function of its restrictiveness, and does 
not depend on the stage at which it operates.”533   
 
3.  Nondiscrimination  
 
One of the important features of the judgments  of Commission v. Italy534 and Mickelsson535 
is the adoption of a “market access” test, which was free of any reference to 
discrimination.536  Tryfonidou has observed that, in the context of the market freedoms 
other than those related to goods ; the Court “appears to be moving towards convergence 
through the adoption of a pure market access approach and has dispensed with the need 
                                                 
531 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Case C-190/98, Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, 2000 
E.C.R. I-493, para. 30.  
532 Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL 
v. Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), 2000 E.C.R. I-2681, para. 48.  See also TFEU, 
supra note 1, at art. 45. 
533 Snell, supra note 134, at 445 (noting that the distinction is  not accepted by the Court of Justice).  The Court 
held in Commission v. Denmark that “[t]he manner in which an activity is pursued is liable also to affect access to 
that activity.  Consequently, legislation which relates to the conditions in which an economic activity is pursued 
may constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement within the meaning of that case-law.”  Case C-464/02, 
Comm’n v. Denmark, 2005 E.C.R. I-7929, para. 37. 
534 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
535 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
536 See Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 48.  However, it should be noted that, in the context of TFEU art. 34 (ex TEC 
art. 28 ), Keck and Mithouard was imbued with a respect for the principle of nondiscrimination “because it only 
refers to, and, apparently, solely brings within the scope of art.28 EC, measures that either totally prevent access 
to the market (which are inherently discriminatory in nature) or discriminate against imported products as 
regards access to the market.”  Id. 
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of proving discrimination in law or in fact.”537  Such observation may indeed prove correct, 
but at present there remains a strong argument for a continued use of the principle of 
nondiscrimination in the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods.538  In 
Commission v. Italy, for example, the Court substituted reference to the “sell ing 
arrangement” by declaring “[c]onsequently, measures adopted by a Member State the 
object or effect of which is to treat products coming from other Member States less 
favourably are to be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions on imports.”539  Such statement arguably would appear to be an explicit 
acknowledgement by the Court that the principle of nondiscrimination is an essential 
element in the application of Article 34 TFEU.540  A recent judgment with respect to the 
free movement of goods 541 has been more unequivocal.  Asociación para la Calidad de los 
Forjados (Ascafor), Asociación de Importadores y Distribuidores de Acero para la 
Construcción (Asidac) v. Administración del Estado, et al held that “Article 34 TFEU reflects 
the obligation to comply with the principles of non-discrimination.”542  With respect to 
jurisprudence relating to freedoms other than those applicable to goods,543 one 
commentator has recently written that 
  
It is an anomaly in the sense that the Court, in the 
context of the other market freedoms, appears to be 
moving towards convergence through the adoption of a 
pure market access approach and has dispensed with 
the need of proving discrimination in law or in fact 
before a measure can be caught by the market 
freedoms.544 
 
                                                 
537 Id. at 54. 
538 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
539 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 37 (emphasis added).  
540 See Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA, 2008 E.C.R. I-9947, paras. 40–44 (holding 
that the scope of Article 35 TFEU with respect to the free movement of exports was defined by the principle of 
nondiscrimination); Wenneras & Moen, supra note 136, at 393; Anthony Dawes, A Freedom Reborn?  The New Yet 
Unclear Scope of Article 29 EC, 34 EUR. L. REV. 639, 641–43 (2009). 
541 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
542 Case C-484/10, Asociación para la Calidad de los Forjados (Ascafor), Asociación de Importadores y 
Distribuidores de Acero para la Construcción (Asidac) v. Administración del Estado, et al, judgment of 1 March 
2012.  
543 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
544 See Tryfonidou, supra note 466, at 54.  
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Yet there is also, for example, reliance on the concept of nondiscrimination within the 
jurisprudence relating to citizenship.  The concept of citizenship545 itself has been argued 
to form the genesis of the convergence in free movement law, which focuses on market 
access.546  Citizenship judgments such as María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern 547 and 
Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State548 have held that the principle of nondiscrimination on 
the grounds of nationality applies as equally to the citizen of the Union as well as to the 
other free movement provisions.549  
  
There are, however, general issues arising from the operation of the principle of 
nondiscrimination within free movement jurisprudence vis -à-vis its relationship with the 
other principles.  Snell  observes, for example, that “the relati onship between the term [of 
market access] and other concepts such as ‘discrimination’ . . . is by no means clear.”550  
Advocate General Jacobs’s Opinion in Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 
Publicité SA and M6 Publicité SA551 classified the reality of Keck552 “as concerning 
discrimination.”553  However, the Advocate General in that opinion was of the view that, in 
the context of establishing a single market, nondiscrimination was “not a helpful 
criterion.”554  He also observed that “the application of the discrimination test would lead 
to the fragmentation of the Community market,”555 since the concept set up the prevailing 
“local conditions” as the benchmark for the application of Article 34 TFEU.  In conclusion, 
the Advocate General was of the opini on that “[a] discrimination test is therefore 
inconsistent as a matter of princi ple with the aims of the Treaty”;556 the measurement, he 
                                                 
545 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 20 (“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”).  
546 See Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 36, 55.  
547 Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R I-2691, paras. 55, 62, 64.   
548 C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, 2003 E.C.R. I-11613, para. 29. 
549 See supra note 407. 
550 Snell, supra note 134, at 437. 
551 Leclerc-Siplec, 1995 E.C.R. I-179. 
552 Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097.  
553 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Jacobs in Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité 
SA and M6 Publicité SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, paras. 39–40.  
554 Id. at para. 40.  
555 Id.  
556 Id.  
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argued, ought instead to be one of “access to the entire [EU] market.”557  The standard 
measurement should not be established relative to prevail ing local conditions.558  
 
G.  Conclusion 
 
There is abundant evidence from perusal of free movement jurisprudence that the 
principle of “market access” occupies a prominent position in the equation applied in the 
assessment of the legal ity of the national measure by the Court of Justice in the context of 
the free movement provisions 559 of European Union law.  The “market access” test has 
been used beyond goods,560 Prechal comments that free movement jurisprudence has 
indicated that “market access has become the main criterion for adjudicating national 
measures under the prohibitive rules on free movement, which entails that national rules 
preventing or hindering market access are unlawful, irrespective of whether they 
discriminate against other persons, services or capital.”561  There appears to be abundant 
evidence that the claim by Prechal is either correct or is at least currently proving to be a 
fair representation which will  reflect the future composition of free movement 
jurisprudence. 
 
This article has shown that the language and ethos of “market access” is firmly embedded 
in free movement jurisprudence and that the principle is enjoying resurgent influence 
across all such jurisprudence in the process of application of Treaty rights to national law.  
In the realm of persons 562 and services,563 for example, judgments holding certain 
measures “liable to hamper or to render less attractive,” “l iable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede,” or “prohibit, impede or render less attractive” the exercise of free movement are 
infused with the principle of market access.564  There appears to be no weakening of the 
Court’s desire to make use of the test of market access as an integral element in the 
process of the assessment of the legality of the national measure.565  The continued use of 
                                                 
557 Id.  Although the opinion was set in the context of the application of TFEU art. 34, the rationale of the 
Advocate General’s argument could be applied equally across other Treaty free movement rights .  
558 See id.  
559 See supra note 407. 
560 See Sacha Prechal & Sybe A. de Vries, Seamless Web of Judicial Protection in the Internal Market?, 34 EUR. L. 
REV. 5, 8 n.15 (2009). 
561 See id.; BARNARD, supra note 171, at 21.  
562 See supra note 450. 
563 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
564 See BARNARD, supra note 171, at 19.    
565 The recent discussion on citizenship would appear to confirm this. 
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the market access test in free movement jurisprudence has distinct advantages.  Based 
upon the articulation in Cassis de Dijon that goods lawfully produced in one Member State 
should enjoy free and unrestricted access to the market of the host state, the use of the 
market access principle arguably contributes towards achieving a single market.566  The 
effect of pegging the enquiry to the issue of market access is that restrictions 567 on the 
imported good or migrant EU national can be removed.568  The advantage of the market 
access approach is that it allows the adoption of strategies to control the marketplace on a 
pan-European basis, protecting that wider marketplace from the sectionalised interests of 
Member States.  In the pan-European marketplace, the producer of goods benefits from 
economies of scale, and the consumer benefits from greater choice.  In the realm of the 
free movement of persons569 and services,570 the migrant EU national can engage in a trade 
or profession and is able to receive services in all  Member States across the EU market.  
Assessing market access is not a narrow prescription.  On the contrary, it encourages both 
macro- and micro-economic activity within an internal market of 500 mill ion people.571  
The benefits of encouraging market access accrue both to the individual producer/exporter 
and to the migrant EU national, and to the European Union market as a whole.  
 
There are, however, disadvantages to the use of the market access principle within the 
jurisprudence of the free movement of goods,572 persons,573 services,574 and capital.575  It is 
a principle that permits more intrusion into national competences, because national 
measures held unlawful will  be struck down unless justified by the Member State.576  One 
                                                 
566 See Rewe-Zentral, 1979 E.C.R. 649, para. 14 (“There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have 
been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, [goods] should not be introduced into any 
other Member State.”).  
567 Or obstacles.  
568 It would be rendered unlawful.  The onus is then placed on the Member State to justify the restriction or 
obstacle to the free movement right. 
569 See supra note 450. 
570 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
571 The “provisional value” for the EU’s population in 2011 is 502476606 people.  See Eurostate News Release, 
EUROPEAN UNION (July 28, 2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache /ITY_PUBLIC/3-28072011-AP/EN/3-
28072011-AP-EN.PDF (last visited May. 23, 2012). 
572 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
573 See supra note 450. 
574 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
575 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 63. 
576 See Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837.  Note that, in the context of the free movement of goods, the problem arising 
in relation to the application of TFEU art. 34 arose from the presentation of an extremely wide definition of the 
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concern relates to how particular national measures are to be targeted for the scrutiny of 
European Union law.  There is a certain unpredictability of usage; virtually all national 
measures arguably affect trade between Member States in some way, even if the effect on 
that trade is extremely slight.  In this respect, there may be some cause for apprehension:  
the Court’s use of the test without l imiting principles (such as de minimis or remoteness) in 
the context of goods in Commission v. Italy577 and Mickelsson578 alerts to the possible 
danger of blunt usage of the market access principle.  In extreme circumstances, the use of 
the market access principle may lead to an unrestrained intrusion into the national 
markets of Member States.  In the absence of any inherent l imiting principles, nothing 
prevents the market access test from being applied as an unrefined instrument, the 
purpose of which would be to scythe down national measures deemed intuitively by the 
Court of Justice to have hindered trade between Member States.  That the principle of 
market access appears practically to be based on the Court’s intuition may prove to be an 
issue that has to be addressed within forthcoming jurisprudence.  Replacing intuition as 
the basis of the assessment of market access with an economic a ssessment related to the 
specific instances of scrutiny of national measures would build in some degree of certainty 
in the application of Treaty free movement jurisprudence to national measures.   
 
Although it would be welcomed by some, the establishment of a tangible economic basis 
to underpin the principle of market access does not represent an absolutely failsafe 
solution.  The adoption of an economic basis to the assessment of market access in free 
movement jurisprudence raises other issues.  One disadvantage of embracing an economic 
basis in such circumstances is that the l itigant would presumably have the difficult task of 
producing qualitative data relating to alleged hindrance to the free movement right.  The 
advantage in the particular instances wherein such data could be produced would result 
from the element of objectivity579 that would be thereby introduced into the equation 
used to apply Treaty free movement law to national measures.  
 
A further observation in the context of positioning the place of the market access test 
across free movement jurisprudence is that the market access test of Commission v. Italy580 
                                                                                                                             
concept of the “measure having equivalent effect” through Dassonville.  The link between TFEU art. 34 and the 
internal market had thereby been pushed too far in favour of general review of national market regulation.  The 
jurisprudence in consequence was dissociated from a need to show a hindrance to trading activities aimed at the 
realization of the internal market.  See Weatherill, supra note 483, at 896–97, 905. 
577 C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
578 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
579 By contrast, an intuitive assessment of whether the national law has hindered “market access” is, on the other 
hand, open to the charge that the resulting assessment may be tainted with an element of subjectivity.  
580 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 56. 
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and Mickelsson581 arguably gives the importer/migrant EU national not only a right of 
access to the market, but also a right not to be restricted within the market of the host 
state.  If this analysis is correct, then arguably the jurisprudence of goods has moved closer 
to reflect that of persons,582 which has evidenced a movement towards placing the onus on 
Member States being required to justify any restriction on individual.583   
 
It has been observed that the recent use of the market access test presents “a fine 
contribution to the process towards convergence among the market freedoms.”584  There 
is much merit in such an observation.  However, it remains far from clear at the present 
time that adoption of the market access test, either as the key or sole element in the 
assessment determining the legality of national measures, would represent the most 
propitious way forward for free movement jurisprudence.  The use of the test across all  
four freedoms seems to represent the Court’s current thinking as it seeks to develop EU 
free-movement jurisprudence as “fit for purpose” in the market place of the twenty-first 
century. 
 
However, this article raises doubts about the concept that the market access test should 
be regarded as a nirvana which would deliver a uniform application of Treaty free 
movement rights across the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union.  In any 
headlong dash towards the creation of an internal market for the EU, it is arguable that the 
role of principles aside from that of market access within the process of applying the 
Treaty free movement provisions to national measures ought not to be overlooked.  
Indeed, at least when pertaining to goods, the old familiar workhorses of justification and 
proportionality were evident within the process of enquiry as to the legality of the national 
measures in Commission v. Italy585 and Mickelsson.586  The reliance in these judgments on 
the traditional constituent principles that have been integral parts of the framework for 
the Court’s enquiry into the legality of national measures properly raises the issue of 
whether free movement jurisprudence can be either sustained or be as effective when the 
market access principle is the sole focus in the assessment of the legality of the national 
measure. 
                                                 
581 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
582 See Spaventa, supra note 136, at 924–25.  Jurisprudence which, Spaventa has argued, concerns not only access 
to the market but probably—and more importantly—rules which restrict activities within the market place.  These 
are described as national rules which discourage the importer’s market penetration in that the consumer base is 
reduced or the costs of the migrant are increased.  
583 The application of the “market access” test must in principle then be justified in the particular circumstances 
along with the benchmark requisites of necessity and proportionality.  See id. at 925. 
584 Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 55. 
585 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
586 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
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The methodology of current jurisprudence appears to represent a precursor to the 
establishment of some degree of convergence in the translations of Trea ty free movement 
rights through the principle of market access with respect to national measures.  It has 
been argued elsewhere that it would be more genuine for the Court of Justice to maintain 
an “openness” in its reliance on the principles used as tools  in its jurisprudence.  It may be 
instructive at this juncture, for example, to recall  that both the judgments of Commission v. 
Italy587 and Mickelsson588 were structured around restriction, justification, and 
proportionality, as well as the notation589 in Commission v. Italy590 that, in addition to 
respecting free access to Community markets, the provision relating to the free movement 
of goods respected the principles of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition.591  Support 
for such proposition arguably is found in Wenneras’s observation that “[i]t is at the outset 
striking how the Court has been at pains to show that the ruling amounts to an application 
and consolidation of existing principles rather than marking a new twist in the case law.”592  
 
“Back to the future” may well be the appropriate metaphor in the context of identifying 
the process of the judicial application of these various principles to national measures.  In 
the future, free movement jurisprudence may clarify the restriction to the free movement 
right through the old chestnut principles of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition, as 
well as, that of market access in situations where this test will  add value to the resulting 
mix.  Clarification of these issues by the Court of Justice might indeed represent the pot of 
gold at the end of the jurisprudential rainbow in the context of assessing the application of 
Treaty free movement law to national measures.  In the instant context, it might also be 
useful to dispense with the diverse nomenclature ascribed to the national measures, such 
as “liable to hamper or to render less attractive,” “liable to prohibit or otherwise impede,” 
“prohibit, impede or render less attractive,” and “hinder or make less attractive.”  
                                                 
587 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
588 Mickelsson, 2009 E.C.R. I-4273. 
589 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
590 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093. 
591 Case C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 34 (explaining that TFEU art. 34 “reflects the 
obligation to respect the principles of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully 
manufactured and marketed in other Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of 
Community products to national markets”). 
592 Wenneras & Moen, supra note 136, at 392 (“This follows from the structure and wording of the reasoning, in 
which the Court emphasizes that art. 34 TFEU reflects the principles of non -discrimination and of mutual 
recognition; ‘hence,’ product requirements are caught by art. 34 TFEU, whereas ‘in contrast ’ selling arrangements 
may be caught only if proven discriminatory.”).  This reasoning is reminiscent of that set out in Keck. There is also 
in this context nothing jurisprudentially mischievous in the maintenance of the focus of enquiry upon the national 
restriction to the free movement right.  See infra Part D.II.3. 
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Although such adjectives are redolent of the principle of market access, it would be a more 
honest reflection of the exhortations of Treaty free movement rights if these descriptions 
were omitted in deference to clear focusing in each instance of the employment of the 
applicable principle[s] of European Union law.  In appropriate instances, this may well be 
the principle of market access, but in the instances in which that particular test arises, it 
ought to be incumbent on the Court to articulate how the specific national measure in 
issue has restricted the access of the import or migrant national to the host market.  
 
The virtue of positioning judicial focus in the first instance on the restriction to free 
movement rights is not only reflective of Treaty exhortations; it also allows the 
employment and development of a  range of principles to ensure that free movement 
rights are upheld.  The principles of nondiscrimination, mutual recognition, and —
importantly, in the context in which its use is appropriate—market access593 are all  tools 
which form the available arsenal to employ against the national measure alleged to be 
restrictive of free movement rights.  The existence and potential deployment of each one 
of those tools in particular instances allows for a flexible approach to the process of 
judging the legal status of the national measure vis -à-vis the application of Treaty free 
movement rights.  The availabil ity of such tools of analysis common to all  freedoms thus 
allows for a certain symbiosis to attach to their development by the Court of Justice.  By 
contrast, to allow ubiquitous homogeneity in such matters would arguably not be a mature 
and rational response to the issues within the process of the scrutiny of national measures 
by the Court. 
 
Finally, in the context of the free movement of services,594 a recent judgment may prove to 
be a significant pointer with respect to the future use of the market access principle across 
all free market jurisprudence,595 and in particular to the use of that principle in the context 
of the free movement of persons.  The judgment in question was given in relation to the 
provision of services;596 its language was “borrowed” from that used previously in the 
jurisprudence of goods.597  Zeturf Ltd v. Premier ministre,598 a judgment delivered 30 June 
2011, appears to adopt both the language and rationale of the free movement of goods,599 
                                                 
593 Together with the ubiquitously available justification process. 
594 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
595 For provisions relating to workers, TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45; for establishment, TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 
49 (particularly in this context in relation to persons). 
596 TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
597 Ker-Optika, judgment of 2 December 2010. 
598 Case C-212/08, Zeturf Ltd v. Premier minister, judgment of 30 June 2011 . 
599 Ker-Optika, judgment of 2 December 2010.    
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with specific reference to the judgment of KerOptika600 to identify the restriction601 on the 
free movement right to provide services.  Zeturf held 
 
any restriction concerning the supply of games of 
chance over the internet is more of an obstacle to 
operators established outside the Member State 
concerned, in which the recipients benefit from the 
services; those operators, as compared with operators 
established in that Member State, would thus be 
denied a means of marketing that is particularly 
effective for directly accessing that market.602  
 
The language employed in Zeturf603 represents a cross-fertil isation of ideas poached from 
the arena of goods.604  It is language clearly representative of an extending i nfluence of the 
market access principle across Treaty freedoms.  If Zeturf605 represents a move towards 
establishing homogeneity as well as the use of the market access principle across all  free 
movement jurisprudence, the Court of Justice should first reflect on the importance of 
other principles such as those of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition.  For all  their 
imperfections, the existence of these principles ought not to be overlooked.  The strength 
of this sentiment is all  the more appropriate, not least because the Treaty free movement 
provisions are not themselves homogenized; they display significant differences.  The 
respect for human rights, for example, plays a more significant role within the freedoms 
relating to persons606 and services607 than it does in relation to that of the free movement 
of goods.608  With respect to regulation in relation to the freedoms for the movement of 
                                                 
600 See id. para. 54.  See also Case C-322/01, Deutscher ApothekerverbandeV v. 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques 
Waterval, 2003 E.C.R. I-14887, para. 74. 
601 See Zeturf, judgment of 30 June 2011 , para. 74. 
602 Id. (emphasis added). 
603 Id. 
604 See Ker-Optika, judgment of 2 December 2010, para. 54 (“It is clear that the prohibition on selling contact 
lenses by mail order deprives traders from other Member States of a particularly effective means of selling  those 
products and thus significantly impedes access of those traders to the market of the Member State concerned.” 
(emphasis added)). 
605 See Zeturf, judgment of 30 June 2011 , para. 74. 
606 See supra note 450. 
607 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
608 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
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goods609 and services,610 the home state is the principal regulator, but it is by contrast the 
host state with respect to a migrant EU national who exercises the freedom of movement 
as a worker611 or the right of establishment as a migrant.612  It may be that, with respect to 
the jurisprudence of goods, that an unfettered access to the market is the guiding 
principle.  That it is a “guide” and not the sole measure may, however, be its rightful 
place.613  Such argument further adds support for resisting any proposition that advocates 
that the principle of market access ought to take an automatic precedence to the 
detriment of the principles of nondiscrimination and mutual recognition where an attack 
on national measures restrictive of free movement rights is in issue.614 
 
If the composition of the jurisprudence is now truly reflective of a headlong surge towards 
establishing an internal market within the European Union, it may be appropriate to 
remember that “all  that glitters is not gold.”615  It may be short-sighted not to accord 
proper prominence to the availabil ity of the plethora of other principles and routes to free 
movement other than mere market access.  Nondiscrimination, mutual recognition, and 
the process of justification616 remain available to achieve the same ends.  There must be 
some acknowledgment that if the market access principle is now to become the sole 
modus operandi for scrutinizing these matters, then in the cause of completing the internal 
market there may be a danger of a triumph of form over substance.  The most effective 
way of achieving an internal market is to have strong, effective, and workable Treaty free 
movement principles.  It is an equation in which a variety of principles ought to remain 
available to the Court.  These available principles should include market access where 
appropriate, though its use ought not to be at the expense of the other principles available 
to the Court for this purpose. 
                                                 
609 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
610 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 56. 
611 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 45.  
612 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 49; BARNARD, supra note 171, at 25; Peter Oliver, Of Trailers and Jet Skis:  Is the 
Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a New Direction?, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1423 (2011). 
613 Note, however, that, in the context of the application of TFEU art. 34, Advocate General Jacobs has expressed 
the view that “it would be more appropriate to measure restrictions against a single test formulated in the light of 
the purpose of art. 30.”  See Case C-412/93, Société d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and 
M6 Publicité SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-179, para. 38.  
614 Note in this context that Commission v. Italy held “[i]t is . . . apparent from settled case-law that Article 28 EC 
(now 34 TFEU) reflects the obligation to respect the principle . . . of ensuring free access of Community products 
to national markets.”  C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 34. 
615 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 7. 
616 The process importantly allowing for the operation of the principle of proportionality specifically directing the 
focus of the application of Treaty free movement law in particular instances.  
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On the other hand, as Tryfonidou has observed, if there is to be a permanent move 
towards convergence following the employment of a pure market access test across the 
freedoms, “this appears to be the right time for the Court to provide a clear explanation as 
to what, exactly, falls within the scope of the market freedoms.”617  There is some evidence 
in recent jurisprudence, however, that the Court of Justice may support the view that a 
multifaceted and varied armoury should be available to the Court in the application of the 
free movement provisions of EU law to national measures.  In Asociación para la Calidad 
de los Forjados (Ascafor), Asociación de Importadores y Distribuidores de Acero para la 
Construcción (Asidac) v. Administración del Estado, et al,618 it was held with respect to the 
free movement of goods 619 that “Article 34 TFEU reflects the obligation to comply with the 
principles of nondiscrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully 
manufactured and marketed in other Member States, as well as, the principle of ensuring 
free access of European Union products to national markets.”620  In a judgment 
comparable for its similar reinforcement of the applicability of these principles, Marcello 
Costa, Ugo Cifone621 l ikewise provided a recent support for the proposition that other 
Treaty free movement provisions also reflect the principles of “non-discrimination on the 
ground of nationality” together with the principle of equal treatment.  Asociación para la 
Calidad de los Forjados (Ascafor)622 and Marcello Costa623 appear to indicate a recognition 
by the Court of Justice of the existence of a weaponry potpourri.  It is a potpourri of 
principles that appears by design to stretch beyond the single rule of market access.  The 
availabil ity to the Court of all  such principles arguably would reinforce the ability to 
scrutinize national measures suspected of hindering the exercise of Treaty free movement 
rights.  
                                                 
617 Tryfonidou, supra note 136, at 56.  
618 Case C-484/10, Asociación para la Calidad de los Forjados (Ascafor), Asociación de Importadores y 
Distribuidores de Acero para la Construcción (Asidac) v. Administración del Estado, et,  [hereinafter Asociación 
para la Calidad], judgment of 1 March 2012. 
619 See TFEU, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
620 Case C-484/10, Asociación para la Calidad, judgment of 1 March 2012, para. 53.  See C-110/05, Comm’n 
v. Italy, 2006 E.C.R. I-2093, para. 34.  
621 See Joined Cases C-72/10 & C-77/10, Marcello Costa, Ugo Cifone, judgment of 16 February 2012, para. 54.  
622 Case C-484/10, Asociación para la Calidad , judgment of 1 March 2012. 
623  See Joined Cases C-72/10 & C-77/10, Marcello Costa, Ugo Cifone, judgment of 16 February 2012, para 54.  
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(&LQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRILWVDSSOLFDWLRQ,QDGGLWLRQWKHSURFHVVRIMXVWLIL
FDWLRQ LQVRPHRIWKHSUH.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG MXGJPHQWVZDVQRWVWUDLJKW
IRUZDUGIRU WKHQDWLRQDOFRXUW7KHIDLOXUH IRUH[DPSOH LQ7RUIDHQ RI WKH
&RXUWRI-XVWLFHWRHOXFLGDWHXSRQWKHFRQFHSWVRI¶VRFLRFXOWXUDOFKDUDFWHULV
WLFV· WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH LVVXH RI SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ OHG WR VRPH GLIILFXOW\ DQG
LQFRQVLVWHQF\ RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DW WKH QDWLRQDO OHYHO )RU H[DPSOH LQ
:HOOLQJERURXJK %RURXJK &RXQFLO Y 3D\OHVV ',< /LPLWHG DQG $QRWKHU
1RUWKDPSWRQ&URZQ&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKHREMHFWLYHRI6HFWLRQRIWKH6KRSV
$FWZDVWRSUHVHUYHWKHWUDGLWLRQDO(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK6XQGD\DVDQRQWUDG
LQJGD\LWZDVSURSRUWLRQDWHLQDFKLHYLQJWKDWREMHFWLYH%\FRQWUDVWDGLIIHU
HQW FRQFOXVLRQ ZDV UHDFKHG E\ 6KUHZVEXU\ &URZQ &RXUW LQ%	 4 /WG Y
6KUHZVEXU\	$WFKDP%RURXJK&RXQFLO ,WIRXQGWKDWWKHREMHFWLYHRIWKH
>6KRSV@$FWFRXOG¶EHDFKLHYHGE\RWKHUPHDQVOHVVUHVWULFWLYHRILQWHU6WDWH
WUDGH·>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ ,QPDQ\UHVSHFWV7RUIDHQ KLJKOLJKWV WKHLVVXH
WKDWLWLVSUHIHUDEOHIRUWKHVHLVVXHVWREHUHPRYHGHQWLUHO\IURPWKHDPELWRI
$UWLFOHQRZ(&
,WZRXOGVHHPIURPWKHIRUHJRLQJWKDWLWZDVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHUHZDVDQHHG
IRUVRPHFHUWDLQW\RIDSSURDFKLQLQVWDQFHVZKHUHQDWLRQDOUXOHKDGEHHQQRQ
GLVFULPLQDWRU\LQQDWXUHDQGWKHUHKDGEHHQPLQLPDOKLQGUDQFHWRWUDGH7KH
LPSHWXVIRUDFKDQJHFUHDWHGE\MXGJPHQWVVXFKDV7RUIDHQ DQG 2EHO
ZDVWROLHEHKLQGWKHLPSRUWDQWVKLIWLQDSSURDFKWRGHDOLQJZLWKVXFKVLWXD
WLRQVVLJQDOOHGE\WKH&RXUWLQ.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG
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DV WR IRUP RU WR FRQWHQW 7KH QHEXORXV WHUPLQRORJ\ XVHG E\ WKH &RXUW RI
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-XVWLFHWRVXUURXQGWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHGHYLFHRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
JDYH ULVH WR VRPHXQFHUWDLQW\ DV WR LWV DSSOLFDWLRQ ,Q DQ2SLQLRQGHOLYHUHG
H[DFWO\ RQH \HDU DIWHU WKH MXGJPHQW RI .HFN DQG 0LWKRXDUG$GYRFDWH
*HQHUDO -DFREV WRRN WKH YLHZ WKDW ¶WKH HIIHFW RI WKH.HFN MXGJPHQW LV VWLOO
XQFHUWDLQ·
7RWKHSUHVHQWWLPHWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHKDVZUHVWOHG
ZLWK WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW LW EROGO\
LQWURGXFHGLQ.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG ,WLVDMRXUQH\ZKLFKWRDODUJHH[WHQW
KDVVRXJKWWRFODULI\ERWKWKHVXEVWDQFHDQGWKHIRUPRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJH
PHQWWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRILWVDSSOLFDWLRQ,WLVWRDQH[DPLQDWLRQ
RIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWWKDWZHQRZWXUQ7KLVDUWLFOHVHHNVWRKLJKOLJKWLWV
SRVLWLYHHOHPHQWVLWVKRZVWKDWWKHFRQFHSWLVFDSDEOHRIEHLQJPRXOGHGE\WKH
&RXUWRI-XVWLFHLQWRDWRROZKLFKLVVHQVLWLYHWRWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHEDODQFH
EHWZHHQ&RPPXQLW\IUHHWUDGHDQGQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHIUHH
PRYHPHQWRIJRRGV
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JRRGVDOLNHPD\EHUHVWULFWHG LWLVDUHVWULFWLRQWKDWRILWVHOIZRXOGQRWFKDU
DFWHUL]HWKHQDWLRQDOODZDVD¶PHDVXUHKDYLQJHTXLYDOHQWHIIHFW·
,WVKRXOGEHUHHPSKDVL]HGWKDWDQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHPD\GLVSOD\WKHFKDU
DFWHULVWLFVRIDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW\HWZKHUHWKHLPSRUWKDVQRWUHFHLYHGHYHQ
KDQGHGWUHDWPHQWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFW$UWLFOHH[(&
ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRDSSO\
$SSOLFDELOLW\ZLWKRXWGLVWLQFWLRQ
7KHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHPXVWDSSO\HTXDOO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPDUNHWLQJRIWKH
GRPHVWLFSURGXFWDQG WKDWRISURGXFWV IURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV :KHUH
WKHUHLVDQLQHTXDOLW\RIWUHDWPHQWWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHFDQQRWEHUHJDUGHGDV
D VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW ,Q /XFLHQ 2UWVFKHLW *PE+ Y (XULP3KDUP
$U]HQHLPLWWHO*PE+ IRUH[DPSOHWKH*HUPDQODZ KDGQRWEHHQHYHQ
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PHDVXUH WKRXJK LQ WKHQDWXUHRI D VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW GLGQRWKDYH WKH
VDPH HIIHFW RQ WKHPDUNHWLQJ RI GRPHVWLFPHGLFLQDO SURGXFWV ,Q FRQVH
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WRVHOOHUV HVWDEOLVKHGLQWKHORFDOLW\ 7KHQDWLRQDOODZUHODWHGWRVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWV IRU FHUWDLQ JRRGV ¶,W OD\V GRZQ WKH JHRJUDSKLFDO DUHDV LQ
ZKLFKHDFKRIWKHRSHUDWRUVFRQFHUQHGPD\VHOOKLVJRRGVE\WKDWPHWKRG·
+RZHYHUWKH$XVWULDQODZGLG¶QRWDIIHFWLQWKHVDPHPDQQHUWKHPDUNHWLQJ
RIGRPHVWLFSURGXFWVDQGWKDWRISURGXFWVIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV·>HPSKD
VLVDGGHG@ *RRGVIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVFRXOGQRWEHVROGRQURXQGVLQ
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DUUDQJHPHQW H[WHQGV QRWPHUHO\ WR EXVLQHVV RSHQLQJ KRXUV EXW WR LQWHUQDO
PHDVXUHVUHODWLQJWRWKHFRQGXFWRIEXVLQHVV7KLVDVSHFWZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHG
ODWHU
:KHUHWKHPHDVXUHFRQFHUQVWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV RIWKHSURGXFWVRWRRLWLV
SUHFOXGHGIURPFRQVLGHUDWLRQDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
3URGXFWFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
,Q 9HUHLQLJWH)DPLOLDSUHVV=HLWXQJVYHUODJVXQGYHUWULHEV*PE+Y+HLQULFK
%DXHU9HUODJ DQ$XVWULDQ ODZUHTXLUHG WKH*HUPDQSXEOLVKHU WR UHPRYH
SUL]H FURVVZRUG SX]]OHV IURP SHULRGLFDOV ,W ZDV D ODZ GLUHFWHG DJDLQVW D
¶PHWKRG RI VDOHV SURPRWLRQ· \HW WKH IDFWV GLFWDWHG WKDW WKH FRPSHWLWLRQV
IRUPHG¶DQ LQWHJUDOSDUW RI WKHPDJD]LQH LQZKLFK WKH\DSSHDU>HG@    WKH
DFWXDOFRQWHQW RIWKHSURGXFWV·ZDVDIIHFWHG>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ 7KHUHTXLUH
PHQW¶WRDOWHUWKHFRQWHQWLPSDLUVDFFHVVRIWKHSURGXFWFRQFHUQHG· WR
WKH GRPHVWLF PDUNHW LQ FRQVHTXHQFH WKH IUHH PRYHPHQW RI JRRGV ZDV
KLQGHUHG/LNHZLVHLQ&ULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJVDJDLQVW'LWOHY%OXKPH D'XWFK
ODZ LQYROYHG¶DJHQHUDOSURKLELWLRQRQWKHLPSRUWDWLRQRQWR/VRDQGQHLJK
ERXULQJLVODQGVRIOLYLQJEHHVDQGUHSURGXFWLYHPDWHULDOIRUGRPHVWLFEHHV·
7KH 'XWFK ODZ ZDV KHOG WR FRQFHUQ WKH ¶LQWULQVLF FKDUDFWHULVWLFV· RI WKH
EHHV ,QFRQVHTXHQFHWKHQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQ¶FDQQRWEHDPDWWHURIDVHOO
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D¶&KDUDFWHULVWLFV·LGHQWLILHG
:KHUH WKH QDWLRQDO ODZ LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ¶SURGXFW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV· WKH
PHDVXUHFDQQRWEHUHJDUGHGDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW$UWLFOHH[(&
VFUXWLQ\ZLOOWKHQDULVH7KRXJKWKLVDSSHDUVWREHDQDEVROXWHFULWHULRQLWLV
DUJXDEOHWKDWVRPHFODULW\LVQHHGHGLQWKLVFRQWH[WZLWKUHVSHFWWRZKDWLVWR
EHUHJDUGHGDVDFKDUDFWHULVWLF RIWKHSURGXFW,WLVDQDVVHVVPHQWLQZKLFKWKH
&RXUWKDVQRWXVHGFRQVLVWHQWWHUPLQRORJ\,Q %DQFKHUR WKHQDWLRQDOOHJLV
ODWLRQ GLG QRW UHODWH WR WKH ¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV· RI WKH SURGXFW ,Q 'LWOHY
%OXKPH WKH&RXUWPDGH UHIHUHQFH WR WKH ¶LQWULQVLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFV·RI WKH
EHHV ,Q )DPLOLDSUHVV WKHUHIHUHQFHZDVWRWKH¶DFWXDOFRQWHQWV·RIWKH
SURGXFWV7KHPHDQLQJRI¶LQWULQVLF·LVPXFKPRUHVSHFLILFIRUH[DPSOHWKDQ
¶FRQWHQWV· WKDW RI ¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFV· GLIIHUHQW DJDLQ IURP WKH ODWWHU ,Q DOO
SUREDELOLW\ WKHVH WHUPV DV XVHG LQ WKH LQVWDQW FRQWH[W DUH SUREDEO\ LQWHU
FKDQJHDEOH7KHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRULQDQ\DVVHVVPHQWLVWKDWWKH¶PHDVXUH·KDV
UHTXLUHG WKDW WKHFRQWHQWRI WKHJRRGV LQVRPHZD\ EHDOWHUHG ,QFRQVH
TXHQFHWKHPDUNHWDFFHVVRIWKHLPSRUWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHW
ZRXOGEHPDGHPRUHGLIILFXOW1HYHUWKHOHVVLWZRXOGEHXVHIXOLIWKLVPDWWHU
ZHUHWREHFODULILHGE\WKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHVRWKDWDQ\GRXEWVWKDWPD\OXUN
DVWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVHPDQWLFGLIIHUHQFHVZRXOGHYDSRUDWH7KHPHFKDQLFV
RI LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI SURGXFW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH LPSRUWDQW WKH\ VWULNH DW WKH
ERXQGDU\EHWZHHQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOHH[(&DQGRIWKHVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQW
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FRQFHUQHGVROHO\DUUDQJHPHQWVIRUUHWDLOVDOH1DWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQSHQDOL]HGWKHXQODZIXOSRVVHV
VLRQRIPDQXIDFWXUHGWREDFFRSURGXFWVIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVRQZKLFKH[FLVHGXW\LQDFFRU
GDQFHZLWK&RPPXQLW\ODZKDGQRWEHHQSDLGZKHUHWKHUHWDLOVDOHRIWKRVHSURGXFWVZDVUHVHUYHG
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UHPRYHRQO\RQHRIWKHFURVVZRUGVWKHFRQWHQW RIWKHSURGXFWZRXOGKDYH
EHHQ DIIHFWHG<HW FDQ DQ DOWHUDWLRQ LQ FRQWHQW EH UHJDUGHG DV V\QRQ\PRXV
ZLWKHLWKHUDQDOWHUDWLRQLQWKHLQWULQVLFFRQWHQWVRULQGHHGWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
RI WKHPDJD]LQH"7KHFRQWHQWRI WKH LPSRUWZRXOGKDYHEHHQDOWHUHGZKHUH
WKHUHZDVUHPRYDORIDQ\LWHPQRPDWWHUKRZVPDOOLQUHODWLRQWRWKHZKROH
SURGXFW$PLQRU DGMXVWPHQWZKLFKE\ LWV QDWXUHZRXOG DIIHFW WKH FRQWHQW
ZRXOG QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LQWULQVLFDOO\ DIIHFW WKH SURGXFW ,Q DOO SUREDELOLW\
ZKLFKHYHUWHUPLQRORJ\LVXVHGDQ\ HQIRUFHGDOWHUDWLRQDIIHFWLQJDFFHVVWRWKH
PDUNHWRIWKHLPSRUWZRXOGKDYHEHHQVXIILFLHQWWRUHPRYHWKHPHDVXUHIURP
FRQVLGHUDWLRQ DV D VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW&ODULW\RI FRQVLVWHQW WHUPLQRORJ\ LQ
WKLV UHVSHFWZRXOG KRZHYHU EH XVHIXO )LQDOO\ KDG WKH QDWLRQDO ODZPHUHO\
UHTXLUHG WKHPDJD]LQH WR FRQWDLQ D QRWLFH WKDW WKH SUL]HV RIIHUHG ZHUH QRW
FODLPDEOHLQ$XVWULDSUHVXPDEO\LWZRXOGEHDUJXDEOHWKDWWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKH
PDJD]LQHZHUHQRWVXEMHFWWRDOWHUDWLRQDOO SULQWHGFRSLHVZRXOGFRQWDLQWKH
VDPHPDWHULDO 7KH QRWLFH FRXOG EH LQFOXGHG LQ WKH LQLWLDO SULQW UXQ RI WKH
PDJD]LQH,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHPHDVXUHFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHDVHOO
LQJDUUDQJHPHQW$QRWKHUYLHZZRXOGEHWKDWDQ\QRWLFHHYHQLILQVHUWHGDW
WKH WLPHRI SULQWLQJ RULJLQDWLQJ IURPD UHTXLUHPHQW LQ WKH LPSRUWLQJ6WDWH
ZRXOG IDOO LQWR WKHFDWHJRU\RI ¶UHTXLUHPHQWV WREHPHW·E\ WKHJRRGVZLWK
UHVSHFW WR ODEHOOLQJDQGSDFNDJLQJ $VVXFK WKHPHDVXUHZRXOG WKHQIDOO
ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&LWZRXOGWKHQEHVXEMHFWRIMXVWL
ILFDWLRQE\WKH0HPEHU6WDWH
E7UHVSDVVLQWRQDWLRQDOODZ
2QHILQDOREVHUYDWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHDVVHVVPHQWE\WKH&RXUWRIWKHSURGXFW
FKDUDFWHULVWLFLVUHTXLUHG,QERWK )DPLOLDSUHVV DQGLQ'LWOHY%OXKPH WKH
&RXUWPDGHUHIHUHQFHWRWKHUHVSHFWLYHQDWLRQDOODZUHODWLQJWRWKHFRQWHQWVRI
WKHSURGXFW,QWKLVUHVSHFWERWKMXGJPHQWVDSSHDUWRKDYHWUHVSDVVHGLQWRD
SURKLELWHGDUHD%RWKFDVHVUHVXOWHGIURPUHIHUHQFHVIURPWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWV
$UWLFOH  (& UHIHUHQFHV LQ SULQFLSOH PDLQWDLQ D VWULFW GLYLGLQJ OLQH
EHWZHHQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGDSSOLFDWLRQRI&RPPXQLW\ODZ,Q )DPLOLDSUHVV
IRUH[DPSOH WKH&RXUWKHOG ¶7KHQDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ   DVDSSOLHG WR WKH
IDFWVRIWKHFDVHLVQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWKDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWZLWKLQWKHPHDQ
LQJRIWKHMXGJPHQWLQ.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG· >HPSKDVLVDGGHG@7KHMXGJ
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 7KHSKUDVHXVHGLQ&DVH&9HUHLQLJWH)DPLOLDSUHVV=HLWXQJVYHUODJVXQGYHUWULHEV
*PE+Y+HLQULFK%DXHU9HUODJ>@(&5,SDUD
 :LWKLQ WKH WHUPV LPSRVHG E\ &ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW %HUQDUG .HFN DQG 'DQLHO
0LWKRXDUG &DVH&DQG&>@(&5,SDUD
 (LWKHUXQGHU$UWH[(&RUE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKH¶PDQGDWRU\UHTXLUHPHQW·
 &DVH&>@(&5,
 &DVH&>@(&5,
 )RUPHUO\$UW(&7KHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHUHODWHVWR¶DWKHLQWHUSUHWD
WLRQ RI >WKH (&@ 7UHDW\ E 7KH YDOLGLW\ DQG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI DFWV RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV RI WKH
&RPPXQLW\«F7KHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHVWDWXWHVRIERGLHVHVWDEOLVKHGE\DQDFWRIWKH&RXQFLO·
 &DVH&>@(&5,
 &DVH&>@(&5,SDUD6LPLODUO\LQ&DVH&&ULPLQDOSURFHHG
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PHQWV UHSUHVHQW D UDWKHU EODWDQW WUDQVJUHVVLRQ LQWR QDWLRQDO WHUULWRU\ LQ WKLV
PDWWHU ,W LVPRUH LPSRUWDQW WR HVWDEOLVK WKH SDUDPHWHUVZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHSURGXFWWKDQLWLVWRLGHQWLI\VSHFLILFQDWLRQDOODZVZKLFK
DUH FRQFHUQHGZLWK WKH VDPH ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW WKH MXGJPHQWV GR QRWKLQJ IRU
FHUWDLQW\LQWKHFRQWLQXHGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
,QWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWZDVVXFFHVVIXOO\DSSOLHGLQWKH
FRQWH[WRI WKH DGYHUWLVHPHQW+RZHYHU WKH IOH[LELOLW\RI WKH FRQFHSWRI WKH
VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWKDVDOORZHGLWWRHQFRPSDVVPHDVXUHVUHODWLQJWREXVLQHVV
DFWLYLW\,QDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHUHODWLQJWRWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJH
PHQWLWLVWRWKHDGYHUWLVHPHQWWKDWZHQRZWXUQ
7KHDGYHUWLVHPHQW
,W LV D UHWURVSHFWLYH DVVHVVPHQWZKLFK FRQILUPV WKDW DGYHUWLVLQJ LV WKHPRVW
REYLRXVRIFDQGLGDWHVIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW 7KHIDFW
WKDWWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWH[WHQGHGWRWKHDGYHUWZDVQRWUHDGLO\DSSDUHQW
$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO-DFREVLQDQ2SLQLRQGHOLYHUHGH[DFWO\RQH\HDUDIWHUWKH
LQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWLQ .HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG UHFRUGHG
¶:HUHLWQRWIRUWKHMXGJPHQWLQ+QHUPXQG LWZRXOGSHUKDSVQRWKDYHEHHQ
FOHDUWKDWWKHSKUDVH´QDWLRQDOSURYLVLRQVUHVWULFWLQJRUSURKLELWLQJFHUWDLQVHOO
LQJDUUDQJHPHQWVµLQ.HFN FRYHUHGUXOHVRQDGYHUWLVLQJ·
7KDWWKHQDWLRQDOUXOHFRQFHUQLQJDGYHUWLVLQJFDQQRWSHUVHEHUHJDUGHGDV
DVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWZDVFRQILUPHGLQ.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ.2Y'H
$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$%
D7RWDOSURKLELWLRQ
,Q'H$JRVWLQL WKH EDQRQ DGYHUWLVLQJZDV WRWDO$GYHUWLVLQJGLUHFWHG DW
FKLOGUHQOHVVWKDQ\HDUVRIDJHZDVSURKLELWHGE\6ZHGHQ ¶7HOHYLVLRQ
DGYHUWLVLQJZDVWKHRQO\HIIHFWLYHIRUPRISURPRWLRQHQDEOLQJLWWRSHQHWUDWH
WKH6ZHGLVKPDUNHW· 7KDWODZZRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
XQOHVV¶LWLVVKRZQWKDWWKHEDQGRHVQRWDIIHFWLQWKHVDPHZD\LQIDFWDQGLQ
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
LQJVDJDLQVW 'LWOHY%OXKPH >@(&5,SDUDWKH&RXUWKHOG¶>L@QWKRVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
LWVDSSOLFDWLRQWRWKHIDFWVRIWKHFDVHFDQQRWEHDPDWWHURIDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW·
 $ WUXLVP QRW UHDGLO\ DSSDUHQW IURP&DVH & DQG &&ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV
DJDLQVW%HUQDUG.HFNDQG'DQLHO0LWKRXDUG&DVH&DQG&>@(&5,
 &DQG&>@(&5,SDUD
 &DVH&6RFLHWpG·,PSRUWDWLRQ(GRXDUG/HFOHUF6LSOHFY7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG0
3XEOLFLWp6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 -RLQHG&DVHV&>@(&5,
 -RLQHG &DVHV & .RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ .2 Y 'H $JRVWLQL 6YHQVND
)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,
 7KH QDWLRQDO ODZ DOVR FRQFHUQHG PLVOHDGLQJ DGYHUWLVLQJ -RLQHG &DVHV &
.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ.2Y'H$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$%
>@(&5,SDUD
 3OHDGHG LQ HYLGHQFH E\ 'H $JRVWLQL -RLQHG &DVHV & .RQVXPHQWRPEXGV
PDQQHQ.2Y'H$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,
SDUD
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ODZWKHPDUNHWLQJRIQDWLRQDOSURGXFWVDQGRISURGXFWVIURPRWKHU0HPEHU
6WDWHV· :KHUHWKHPDUNHWLQJRIWKHGRPHVWLFDQGWKHLPSRUWHGSURGXFWLV
QRWDIIHFWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\WKHQDWLRQDOODZZLOOEHIDOOZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI
$UWLFOHQRZ(&D¶PHDVXUHKDYLQJHTXLYDOHQWHIIHFW· ,WZDVVLJQLI
LFDQWWKDWLWZDVKHOGWKDW¶>L@WFDQQRWEHH[FOXGHGWKDWDQRXWULJKWEDQDSSO\
LQJ LQ RQH 0HPEHU 6WDWH RI D W\SH RI SURPRWLRQ IRU D SURGXFW ZKLFK LV
ODZIXOO\ VROG WKHUH PLJKW KDYH D JUHDWHU LPSDFW RQ SURGXFWV IURP RWKHU
0HPEHU6WDWHV·>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ $WRWDOEDQRQDGYHUWLVLQJZRXOGQDWX
UDOO\EHHYHQKDQGHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHLPSRUWDQGWRWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFW
\HWWKHHPSKDVLVLVRQWKHHTXDOLW\RIWUHDWPHQWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPDUNHWLQJ
RIDOOSURGXFWV:KLOVWKRZHYHUDQHTXDOLW\RI WUHDWPHQWLQ ODZ LV UHODWLYHO\
HDV\ WRDVVHVV WKDW WKHGRPHVWLFDQG WKH LPSRUWHGSURGXFWKDYH UHFHLYHG LQ
IDFW WKHVDPH WUHDWPHQW IURP WKHQDWLRQDO ODZ LVPRUHGLIILFXOW WRDVFHUWDLQ
7KLV FRXOG EH SDUWLFXODUO\ UHOHYDQW IRU WKH LPSRUWHUZKR RSHUDWLQJ DW DUPV
OHQJWKLQWKDWRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHLVOLNHO\WRKDYHOLPLWHGDFFHVVWRUHOHYDQW
PDUNHWVWDWLVWLFV7KHUHLVDGDQJHURIDQLQEXLOWELDVDJDLQVWWKHLPSRUWHUZKR
VHHNV WR SURYH WKH UHDOLW\ RI DQ LQHTXDOLW\ RI WUHDWPHQW DW WKH KDQGV RI WKH
QDWLRQDO ODZ1HYHUWKHOHVV LWZRXOG EH SUXGHQW IRU WKH SRWHQWLDO OLWLJDQW WR
XQGHUWDNH D PDUNHW DQDO\VLV RI WKH HIIHFW RI WKH QDWLRQDO PHDVXUH RQ ERWK
LPSRUWHGDQGGRPHVWLFSURGXFWVEHIRUHHPEDUNLQJRQOLWLJDWLRQ,WLVDQDVVHVV
PHQWZKLFK LQ DOO SUREDELOLW\ZLOO QRW EH HDV\ IRU WKH LPSRUWHU WKRXJK WKH
&RXUW RI -XVWLFH QRWHG IURP WKH SOHDGLQJV RI'H$JRVWLQL WKDW ¶>W@HOHYLVLRQ
DGYHUWLVLQJZDVWKHRQO\HIIHFWLYHIRUPRISURPRWLRQHQDEOLQJLWWRSHQHWUDWH
WKH6ZHGLVKPDUNHW· 7KLVLVDVWURQJLQGLFDWLRQWKDWWKHUHIHUULQJFRXUWLQ
WKLV LQVWDQFH RXJKW WRFRQVLGHU WKH¶WRWDOEDQ·DVEHLQJVXEMHFW WR$UWLFOH
QRZ(&VFUXWLQ\ ,WLVDUJXDEOHKRZHYHUWKDW&RXUWRI-XVWLFHLVJHQWO\
SXVKLQJWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWLQWRVHULRXVUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHGHIDFWRHIIHFWVRIWKH
QDWLRQDOPHDVXUHUDWKHUWKDQDPHUHSDVVLYHDFFHSWDQFHWKDWDWRWDOEDQZLOO
DSSO\HTXDOO\WRDOOSURGXFWVWRZKLFKLWLVGLUHFWHG$FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHGH
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 7KDWLVIRUWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWVWRGHWHUPLQHE\IXUWKHUHQTXLU\¶7KHHIILFDF\RIWKHYDULRXV
W\SHV RI SURPRWLRQ LV D TXHVWLRQ RI IDFW WR EH GHWHUPLQHG LQ SULQFLSOH E\ WKH UHIHUULQJ FRXUW·
-RLQHG&DVHV&.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ.2Y'H$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%
DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,SDUD
 7KHQVXEMHFWWR¶MXVWLILFDWLRQ·3URYLGHGWKDWWKHSURYLVLRQV¶DUHQHFHVVDU\IRUPHHWLQJRYHU
ULGLQJUHTXLUHPHQWVRIJHQHUDOSXEOLFLPSRUWDQFHRURQHRIWKHDLPVODLGGRZQLQ$UWLFOH>QRZ
@RIWKH7UHDW\DUHSURSRUWLRQDWHIRUWKDWSXUSRVHDQGWKRVHDLPVRURYHUULGLQJUHTXLUHPHQWV
FRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQPHWE\PHDVXUHVOHVVUHVWULFWLYHRILQWUD&RPPXQLW\WUDGH·-RLQHG&DVHV&
.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ.2Y'H$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,
6YHULJH$% >@(&5,SDUD
 -RLQHG &DVHV & .RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ .2 Y 'H $JRVWLQL 6YHQVND
)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,SDUD
 ¶6LQFHLWKDGQRRWKHUDGYHUWLVLQJPHWKRGVIRUUHDFKLQJFKLOGUHQDQGWKHLUSDUHQWV·-RLQHG
&DVHV&.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ .2Y'H$JRVWLQL 6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG
796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,SDUD
 7KLV LV WR EH DVVHVVHG DW WKH QDWLRQDO OHYHO -RLQHG &DVHV &
.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ.2Y'H$JRVWLQL6YHQVND)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$%
>@(&5,SDUD
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IDFWRHIIHFWVRI WKHQDWLRQDO ODZ LV VHOI HYLGHQW EXW WKH LQVLVWHQFHE\ WKH
&RXUW WKDW VXFK HIIHFWV DUH H[DPLQHGZKHUH WKH EDQ LV RXWULJKW LQ QDWXUH LV
VLJQLILFDQW3URYLGHGWKDWWKHLPSRUWHUFDQFXOO WKHUHOHYDQWPDUNHWLQIRUPD
WLRQEHIRUHHPEDUNLQJRQOLWLJDWLRQWKHURXWHRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&PD\
VWLOOUHPDLQRSHQHYHQZKHUHWKHDGYHUWLVLQJEDQLVWRWDO
E3DUWLDOSURKLELWLRQ
7KH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW KDV DULVHQ LQ WKH
FRQWH[WRIWKHDGYHUWLQVXEVHTXHQWMXGJPHQWVRIWKH&RXUW7KHVWDWXVRIWKH
DGYHUW LQ UHODWLRQ WR$UWLFOH  QRZ  (&ZDV DJDLQ DW LVVXH LQ6RFLHWp
G·,PSRUWDWLRQ(GRXDUG/HFOHUF6LSOHFY7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG03XEOLFLWp
6$ 7KLVWLPHWKHSURKLELWLRQZDVSDUWLDO )UHQFKODZ SURKLELWHGWKH
EURDGFDVWLQJRIWHOHYLVHGDGYHUWVLQWHUDOLDUHODWLQJWRWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIJRRGV
7HOHYLVLRQFRPSDQLHVLQ)UDQFHUHIXVHGWREURDGFDVWDGYHUWLVHPHQWVIRUSHWURO
VWDWLRQVRZHGE\/HFOHUF6LSOHF7KH&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKHQDWLRQDOODZZDVD
VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW LW ZDV QRW D PHDVXUH KDYLQJ HTXLYDOHQW HIIHFW ,W
SURKLELWHG¶DSDUWLFXODUIRUPRISURPRWLRQWHOHYLVHGDGYHUWLVLQJRIDSDUWLF
XODUPHWKRGRIPDUNHWLQJSURGXFWV GLVWULEXWLRQ· >HPSKDVLV DGGHG@ 7KH
)UHQFK ODZ ZDV QRW GHVLJQHG WR UHJXODWH WUDGH LQ JRRGV EHWZHHQ0HPEHU
6WDWHV ,WZDVHYHQKDQGHGLWDSSOLHG
UHJDUGOHVVRIWKHW\SHRISURGXFWWRDOOWUDGHUVLQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQVHFWRUHYHQLI
WKH\DUHERWKSURGXFHUVDQGGLVWULEXWRUV>DQG@DIIHFW>HG@WKHPDUNHWLQJRISURG
XFWV IURP RWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV DQG WKDW RI GRPHVWLF SURGXFWV LQ WKH VDPH
PDQQHU
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
 7KLV DVSHFW LV DQ LQH[WULFDEOH SDUW RI WKH.HFN DQG0LWKRXDUG IRUPXOD HVWDEOLVKHG ZLWK
UHVSHFW WR WKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW&DVH&DQG&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6LSOHFY7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG03XEOLFLWp6$ >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3XEOLFLWp6$>@(&5,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 ¶:LWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRI'DVVRQYLOOH WRDOOUHOHYDQWWUDGHUVRSHUDWLQJZLWKLQWKHQDWLRQDO
WHUULWRU\«DIIHFW>LQJ@LQWKHVDPHPDQQHULQODZDQGLQIDFWWKHPDUNHWLQJRIGRPHVWLFSURGXFWV
DQGRIWKRVHIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV7KHDSSOLFDWLRQRIVXFKUXOHVWRWKHVDOHRISURGXFWV
IURPDQRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHPHHWLQJWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVODLGGRZQE\WKDW6WDWHLVQRWE\QDWXUHVXFK
DVWRSUHYHQWWKHLUDFFHVVWRWKHPDUNHWRUWRLPSHGHDFFHVVDQ\PRUHWKDQLWLPSHGHVWKHDFFHVV
RI GRPHVWLF SURGXFWV· &DVH &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6RWRRWKHSDUWLDO SURKLELWLRQLQ+HUEHUW.DUQHU,QGXVWULH$XNWLRQHQ*PEK
Y 7URRVWZLMN*PE+ ZDV HYHQKDQGHG 7KH QDWLRQDO SURYLVLRQ SURKLELWHG
UHIHUHQFH WR RULJLQ ZKHUH JRRGV ZHUH RIIHUHG IRU VDOH E\ DQ LQVROYHQW
FRPSDQ\ ,WZDVKHOGWKDWWKH$XVWULDQODZGLG¶QRWDIIHFWWKHPDUNHWLQJRI
SURGXFWV RULJLQDWLQJ IURP RWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV PRUH WKDQ LW DIIHFWV WKH
PDUNHWLQJRISURGXFWVIURPWKH>KRVW@0HPEHU6WDWH·
:LWKUHVSHFWWRDGYHUWLVLQJWKHHIIHFWRIWKHPHDVXUHLQ5XWK+QHUPXQG
DQG2WKHUVY/DQGHVDSRWKHNHUNDPPHU%DGHQ:XUWWHPEHUJ KDGEHHQUHOD
WLYHO\LQVLJQLILFDQWLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHPDUNHWIRUTXDVLSKDUPDFHXWLFDOSURG
XFWV 7KH SURKLELWLRQ KDG QRW DIIHFWHG WKH ULJKW RI WUDGHUV RWKHU WKDQ
SKDUPDFLVWV WR DGYHUWLVH WKRVHSURGXFWV 6R WRR LQ /HFOHUF6LSOHF WKH
UHIXVDOWREURDGFDVWDQDGYHUWLVHPHQWFRQFHUQLQJWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIIXHOZDV
RI OLPLWHG HIIHFW WKH GLVWULEXWRUV GHSULYHG RQO\ RI RQH SDUWLFXODU IRUP RI
DGYHUWLVLQJ +RZHYHU LQ RWKHU FLUFXPVWDQFHV DGYHUWLVLQJ SURKLELWLRQV
FRXOGKDYHPRUHVHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHV LQ WKHFRQWH[WRIPDUNHW LQWHJUDWLRQ
:KLOVWWKHUHVWULFWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWRERWKSKDUPDFHXWLFDOSURGXFWVDQGWHOHYL
VLRQDGYHUWLVLQJKDGEHHQSDUWLDOO\GHWULPHQWDODVPHWKRGVRIVDOHVSURPRWLRQ
KDGEHHQORVWLQRWKHUUHVSHFWVWKRVHPDUNHWVDVDZKROHKDGEHHQOHIWIUHHWR
RSHUDWH XQGHU QRUPDO PDUNHW IRUFHV &LUFXPVWDQFHV KRZHYHU PLJKW KDYH
GLFWDWHGRWKHUZLVH7KH HIIHFW RQ WUDGHEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHVPLJKW KDYH
EHHQYHU\VLJQLILFDQWLQGHHGDODUJHUSURSRUWLRQRIWKHPDUNHWLQSDUDSKDUPD
FHXWLFDOSURGXFWVPLJKWKDYHEHHQDIIHFWHGWKHEDQRQWKHDGYHUWLVLQJRISHWURO
IRU H[DPSOH PLJKW KDYH EHHQ WRWDO ,Q VXFK LQVWDQFHV ZRXOG WKH VHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQW SHU VH SURWHFW WKH DGYHUWLVHPHQW IURP $UWLFOH  QRZ 
VFUXWLQ\"
F$GYHUWLVLQJSURIHVVLRQDOFRQGXFWUXOHV
7KH MXGJPHQW RI+QHUPXQG ZDV WKH ILUVW DSSOLFDWLRQ E\ WKH (XURSHDQ
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 7KHPHDVXUHUHODWHGRQO\WRWKHLQWHUQHWDGYHUWLVHPHQWRIDXFWLRQRIJRRGVIURPLQVROYHQW
FRPSDQLHV
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 ¶)RU H[DPSOH OHJLVODWLRQ XQGHUZKLFK SDUDSKDUPDFHXWLFDO SURGXFWVPD\ EH VROG RQO\ LQ
SKDUPDFLHV· RU ¶XQGHU ZKLFK DOFRKROLF EHYHUDJHV PD\ EH VROG RQO\ LQ OLFHQVHG VWRUHV IRU
FRQVXPSWLRQRIISUHPLVHV·7KHVHWZRH[DPSOHVZHUHXVHGE\$*-DFREV&DVH&6RFLHWp
G·,PSRUWDWLRQ(GRXDUG/HFOHUF6LSOHFY7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG03XEOLFLWp6$ >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&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVDIWHULWVLQWURGXF
WLRQLQ.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG ,Q+QHUPXQG KDGQRWWKHFRQFHSWH[LVWHG
WKH SURIHVVLRQDO UXOHV RI FRQGXFW LQ LVVXH ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ VXEMHFW WR WKH
VFUXWLQ\RI$UWLFOHQRZ(& +QHUPXQG FRQFHUQHGWKHSURKLEL
WLRQRIDGYHUWLVLQJE\SKDUPDFLVWVRITXDVLSKDUPDFHXWLFDOSURGXFWVRXWVLGH
SKDUPDFLHV 7KHUXOHDSSOLHGZLWKRXWGLVWLQFWLRQDV WRRULJLQ DOOSKDU
PDFLVWV RSHUDWLQJ ZLWKLQ WKDW UHJLRQ ZHUH ERXQG 7KH PDUNHWLQJ RI WKH
LPSRUWZDVQRWDIIHFWHGDQ\GLIIHUHQWO\ IURP WKHPDUNHWLQJRI WKHGRPHVWLF
SURGXFW $PHWKRGRIVHOOLQJWKHSURGXFWVKDGEHHQUHVWULFWHGKRZHYHUWKLV
ZDV QRW VXIILFLHQW WR FKDUDFWHUL]H WKH UXOH DV D PHDVXUH KDYLQJ HTXLYDOHQW
HIIHFW
7KH UDLVRQ G·rWUH IRU H[LVWHQFH RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW KDG EHHQ WKH
LQFUHDVLQJ WHQGHQF\RI WUDGHUV WR XVH$UWLFOH  QRZ(& IRU LPSURSHU
SXUSRVHV ,WLVSHUKDSVLURQLFWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOWRWKH
SKDUPDFLVWV· UXOH LQ+QHUPXQG UHSUHVHQWHGDEODWDQWDWWHPSW WRFLUFXP
YHQWUXOHVRIFRQGXFWLPSRVHGWRHQVXUHDSURSHUVXSSO\RIPHGLFDOSURGXFWV
7KH SXUSRVH RI WKRVH UXOHV ZDV ¶FOHDUO\ WR SUHYHQW H[FHVVLYH FRPSHWLWLRQ
EHWZHHQSKDUPDFLVWV· LW¶LVQRWGHVLJQHGWRUHJXODWHWUDGHLQJRRGVEHWZHHQ
0HPEHU6WDWHV· 7KHFRQGXLWRIUHFRXUVH WR$UWLFOHH[(&DV WKH
EDWWHULQJUDPDQGSRWHQWLDOSDQDFHDIRUDJJULHYHGWUDGHUVUHDFWLQJDJDLQVWWKH
XQSRSXODUUXOHRISURIHVVLRQDOFRQGXFWKDGEHHQQHXWHUHGSXUHO\E\WKHDSSOL
FDWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
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RIWKH3URIHVVLRQDO$VVRFLDWLRQIRUWKH/DQG
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>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 &DVH &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 DQG & &ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW %HUQDUG .HFN DQG 'DQLHO
0LWKRXDUG >@(&5,SDUD
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6RFLHWpG·,PSRUWDWLRQ(GRXDUG/HFOHUF6LSOHFY
7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG03XEOLFLWp6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 LELGSDUD$V$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO7HVDXURUHIOHFWHGLQ&DVH&5XWK+QHUPXQG
DQG 2WKHUV Y /DQGHVDSRWKHNHUNDPPHU %DGHQ:XUWWHPEHUJ >@ (&5 , SDUD  WKH
SXUSRVHRI$UWQRZ(&LV¶WRHQVXUHWKHIUHHPRYHPHQWRIJRRGVLQRUGHUWRHVWDEOLVKD
VLQJOHLQWHJUDWHGPDUNHWQRWWRVWULNHGRZQWKHPRVWZLGHO\GLIIHULQJPHDVXUHVWRHQVXUH
WKHJUHDWHVWSRVVLEOHH[SDQVLRQRIWUDGH>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@·
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7UDGLWLRQDOVRFLDOSUDFWLFHV
7KHDSSURDFK WR WKH ¶VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW· LQ WKHFRQWH[WRIDGYHUWLVLQJZDV
IXUWKHUUHILQHGLQ.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVQDQQHQ.2DQG*RXUPHW,QWHUQDWLRQDO
3URGXFWV$%*,3 +\EULGLQHVVHQFHWKH6ZHGLVKODZKDGHVWDEOLVKHGD
WZRWLHU DSSURDFK FRQFHUQLQJ WKH DGYHUWLVLQJ RI DOFRKRO LQ WKH SUHVV
$GYHUWLVLQJGLUHFWHGDW WKHFRQVXPHUZDVSURKLELWHGDGYHUWLVLQJGLUHFWHGDW
WKH OLFHQVLQJ WUDGH ZDV ODZIXO :LWK UHVSHFW WR WKH FRQVXPHU WKH WRWDO
SURKLELWLRQ RQ DGYHUWLVLQJZDV KHOG WR EH QRW QHFHVVDULO\ HYHQKDQGHG WKH
QDWLRQDO ODZ ¶PLJKW KDYH D JUHDWHU LPSDFW RQ SURGXFWV IURPRWKHU0HPEHU
6WDWHV· 7KLV LV D UHLWHUDWLRQ RI WKH DSSURDFK DGRSWHG LQ 'H $JRVWLQL
:KDWZDVSHUKDSVQRYHOLQ*RXUPHW ZHUHWKHDGGLWLRQDOGHWDLOHGREVHUYD
WLRQVSURYLGHGE\WKH&RXUWDVJXLGDQFHIRUDVVHVVPHQWDW WKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH GH IDFWR HIIHFWV RI WKH QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ 7KH &RXUW
FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKHUH ZDV QR QHHG IRU ¶D SUHFLVH DQDO\VLV RI WKH IDFWV·
5DWKHULQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKLVPDUNHWSODFHLWKHOGWKDW
LQ WKH FDVHRI SURGXFWV OLNH DOFRKROLF EHYHUDJHV WKH FRQVXPSWLRQRIZKLFK LV
OLQNHGWRWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGWRORFDOKDELWVDQGFXVWRPVDSURKLEL
WLRQ RI DOO DGYHUWLVLQJ GLUHFWHG DW FRQVXPHUV LQ WKH IRUPRI DGYHUWLVLQJ LQ WKH
SUHVV    LV OLDEOH WR LPSHGH DFFHVV WR WKHPDUNHW E\ SURGXFWV IURP RWKHU
0HPEHU6WDWHVPRUH WKDQ LW LPSHGHVDFFHVVE\GRPHVWLFSURGXFWVZLWKZKLFK
FRQVXPHUVDUHLQVWDQWO\PRUHIDPLOLDU >HPSKDVLVDGGHG@
7KHUHIHUHQFHVWRVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVKDELWVDQGFXVWRPV LQWURGXFHVDQREMHF
WLYHHOHPHQW7KHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHHIIHFWRIWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHLQUHODWLRQ
WRPDUNHWDFFHVVRIWKHLPSRUWYLVjYLVWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFWLVWKHUHE\PDGH
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.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVQDQQHQ .2 DQG*RXUPHW
,QWHUQDWLRQDO3URGXFWV$%*,3 >@(&5,SDUD
 &DVH &.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVQDQQHQ .2 DQG*RXUPHW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3URGXFWV $%
*,3 >@(&5,SDUD
 6LPLODUUHIHUHQFHVWR¶QDWLRQDORUUHJLRQDOVRFLRFXOWXUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV·ZHUHPDGHE\WKH
&RXUWLQ&DVH7RUIDHQ%RURXJK&RXQFLOY%	4SOF >@(&5SDUDWRMXVWLI\8.
6XQGD\WUDGLQJUXOHVDERYH
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Oct 2012 IP address: 143.53.238.227
HDVLHU7KHLPSRUWHUPD\EHUHOLHYHGIURPDUHTXLUHPHQWWRSURGXFHDVWDWLVWL
FDODQDO\VLVRIWKDWSDUWLFXODUSURGXFWPDUNHWRUWRHVWDEOLVKWKHSUHFLVHHIIHFW
RQSURGXFWVDOHVRIWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUH7KHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIFDXVHDQGHIIHFW
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRSHUFHLYHGSUREOHPVRIPDUNHWDFFHVVPD\EHFLUFXPYHQWHGE\
UHFRXUVHWRREMHFWLYHIDFWRUVUDWKHUWKDQWKHSRWHQWLDODVVHVVPHQWRIDP\ULDG
RIPLQXWLDHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHGHWDLORIWKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHW
7KDW WKH DGYHUWLVLQJ UXOH LQ +QHUPXQG ZDV UHJDUGHG DV D VHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWZDVQRWVXUSULVLQJLWPHWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVLPSRVHGLQWKHDSSOL
FDWLRQRI WKDWFRQFHSW 7KH MXULVSUXGHQFHZLWKUHVSHFW WRDGYHUWKDVEHHQ
FRQVLGHUDEO\UHILQHGVLQFHWKDWWLPH,WLVDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHDGYHUWLVHPHQWSHU
VH ZLOO QRW EH UHJDUGHG DV D VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW ,W LV D PDWWHU RI VXEWOH
HQTXLU\(YHQWKHWRWDOEDQRQDGYHUWLVLQJWKHPRVWREYLRXVSRWHQWLDOFDQGL
GDWH IRU WKHHYHQKDQGHGUXOHZLOOEHVXEMHFW WRVFUXWLQ\7KHUH LVQRDXWR
PDWLFDFFHSWDQFHWKDWDQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHDIIHFWVLQWKHVDPHZD\LQODZDQG
LQIDFWWKHPDUNHWLQJRIWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFWDQGWKHLPSRUW 7KHDQVZHU
LV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ REYLRXV:KDW IRU H[DPSOH LI WKHUH DUH QR RWKHU PHDQV
DYDLODEOHWRWKHLPSRUWHUWRDGYHUWLVH" 7KHUHLVULJKWO\DKHDY\UHOLDQFHRQ
GHIDFWRHYLGHQFHDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO6WLULQWRWKHSRWIDFWRUVVXFKDV¶WUDGL
WLRQDO VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV    ORFDO KDELWV DQG FXVWRPV· DQG WKH IRFXV RI
HQTXLU\LVFOHDUO\ODLGDWWKHGRRURIWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUW$OOWKHVHIDFWRUVPXVW
EHDFFRXQWHGIRULQWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHHIIHFWRIWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHRQWKH
DFFHVVWRWKHPDUNHWRIWKHLPSRUWHGSURGXFW
,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHDGYHUWLVHPHQWLWLVFUXFLDOWRWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
WKDW WKH LPSRUWHU KDV PDLQWDLQHG DELOLW\ WR SURPRWH WKH LPSRUWHG SURGXFW
:KHUHKRZHYHUWKHLQWULQVLFTXDOLWLHVRIWKHSURGXFWDUHDWLVVXH$UWLFOH
H[(&ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRRSHUDWH UHJDUGOHVVRI WKHQDWXUHRI WKHQDWLRQDO
PHDVXUH7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSURPRWLRQRIWKHSURGXFWDQGFRQWHQWH[DP
LQHG VR IDU GRHV QRW KRZHYHU UHSUHVHQW WKH IXOO VSHFWUH RI DSSOLFDWLRQZLWK
UHVSHFWWRWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW7KHFRQGLWLRQVRIDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWHVWDEOLVKHGLQ .HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG PDNHWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJH
PHQW D WRRO RI XELTXLWRXV DSSOLFDWLRQ ZLGHU LQ DSSOLFDWLRQ WKDQ WKH PHUH
DGYHUWLVHPHQW,WLVWKDWDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKHZLGHUFRQWH[WWKDWLVQRZWKHVXEMHFW
RIH[DPLQDWLRQ
7KH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWPD\ HQFRPSDVV ORVW VDOHV RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU WKH
LPSRUWHUWKHGHSULYDWLRQRIDPHDQVRIDGYHUWLVHPHQWZKLFKPD\UHVXOWLQD
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
 &DVH & 5XWK +QHUPXQG DQG 2WKHUV Y /DQGHVDSRWKHNHUNDPPHU %DGHQ
:XUWWHPEHUJ>@(&5,
 &DVH & DQG & &ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW %HUQDUG .HFN DQG 'DQLHO
0LWKRXDUG >@(&5,SDUD
 -RLQHG &DVHV & .RQVXPHQWRPEXGVPDQQHQ .2 Y 'H $JRVWLQL 6YHQVND
)RUODJ$%DQG796KRS,6YHULJH$% >@(&5,SDUD
 LELG
 &DVH &.RQVXPHQWRPEXGVQDQQHQ .2 DQG*RXUPHW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3URGXFWV $%
*,3 >@(&5,SDUD
 &DQG&>@(&5,SDUD
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 15 Oct 2012 IP address: 143.53.238.227
ORVVRIWXUQRYHUWRWKHEXVLQHVV7KHDGYHUWLVLQJIXQFWLRQDVIDUDVEXVLQHVVLV
FRQFHUQHGLVE\QRPHDQVHSKHPHUDOLWLVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHFRPPHUFLDO
SURFHVV$WRQHOHYHODSSOLFDWLRQRI WKHFRQFHSWRI WKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
ZLWKWKHDWWHQGDQWRSHUDWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHPD\FDXVHDUHGLUHFWLRQ
DQGUHDOORFDWLRQRIWKHDGYHUWLVLQJEXGJHWDWDQRWKHUOHYHOWKHFRQFHSWLVFDSD
EOH RI JUHDWHU LQWUXVLRQ LQWR WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ DQG EXVLQHVV SUDFWLFH RI WKH
FRPPHUFLDOFRQFHUQ
%XVLQHVVDFWLYLW\
7KHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWFDQH[WHQGWRPHDVXUHVZKLFKFRYHUWKHFRQGXFWRI
EXVLQHVV LQ DPRUH GLUHFWPDQQHU1DWLRQDO ODZV UHODWLQJ WR ¶WKH WLPHV DQG
SODFHVDWZKLFKWKHJRRGVPD\EHVROG· IDOOIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQZLWKLQWKLV
FRQWH[W1DWLRQDOUXOHVFRQFHUQLQJVKRSFORVLQJWLPHVKDYHEHHQUHJDUGHGDV
VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV,Q&ULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJVDJDLQVW7DQNVWDWLRQ·W+HXNVNH
YRI DQG -%( %RHUPDQV VKRS RSHQLQJ KRXUV ZHUH UHVWULFWHG E\ 'XWFK
ODZ ([HPSWLRQV KDGEHHQJUDQWHGWRWKHGHIHQGDQW·VSHWUROVWDWLRQVRQ
FRQGLWLRQWKDWJRRGVVROGUHODWHGRQO\WRURDGWUDYHO 7KHGHIHQGDQWVRSHQHG
WKHLU SHWURO VWDWLRQV LQ FRQWUDYHQWLRQ RI WKHVH UHVWULFWLRQV /LNHZLVH LQ
6HPHUDUR&DVD8QR6UO DQGRWKHUV Y 6LQGDFRGHO&RPXQHGL(UEXVFRDQG
2WKHUV QDWLRQDO UXOHVZKLFK FRQFHUQHG WKH FORVLQJ WLPHV RI VKRSVZHUH
UHJDUGHGDVVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV
+RZHYHULWLVDUJXDEOHWKDWWKHUHJXODWLRQRIVKRSRSHQLQJKRXUVLVPRUH
LQWUXVLYHRIEXVLQHVVDFWLYLW\WKDQLVWKHDGYHUWLVLQJUHVWULFWLRQ:KLOVWDGYHU
WLVLQJ UHVWULFWLRQVPD\ OLPLW VDOH RSSRUWXQLWLHV VKRS RSHQLQJ KRXUV LPSRVH
UHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHWLPHDQGWKHSODFHLQZKLFKJRRGVDUHVROG7KHUHVWULFWLRQ
RQDGYHUWLVHPHQWVPD\FORVHDVDOHVRSSRUWXQLW\UHJXODWLRQRIRSHQLQJKRXUV
VWULNHVDW WKHDELOLW\ WR VHOO WKHSURGXFW LWVHOI'XULQJ WKLVSHULRG WKH VHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQW DSSOLHV ZKHUH FLUFXPVWDQFHV RI VDOH ZHUH DIIHFWHG ¶ZLWKRXW
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQWKHRULJLQRIWKHSURGXFWVDQG>GRHV@QRWDIIHFWWKH
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 -RLQHG FDVHV&&ULPLQDO SURFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW 7DQNVWDWLRQ·W+HXNVNH YRI DQG
-%(%RHUPDQV >@(&5,SDUD
 LELG
 %\ $UW  :LQNHOVOXLWLQJVZHW 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 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
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SDUD
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
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 :LWKRXWLQGLFDWLQJRSHQLQJKRXUVDQGRIIHUHGIRUVDOHDQXPEHURIDUWLFOHVQRWOLQNHGWRURDG
WUDYHOLQFRQWUDYHQWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQDOODZ
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@(&5,
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PDUNHWLQJ RI WKH SURGXFWV IURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV LQ DPDQQHUGLIIHUHQW
IURP WKDW LQZKLFK WKH\DIIHFWGRPHVWLFSURGXFWV· 'XULQJ WKHDSSOLFDEOH
SHULRGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRVHOODOOSURGXFWVLPSRUWVDQGH[SRUWVDOLNHZLOOEH
ORVWKRZHYHUWKHFUXFLDOIDFWRULVWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQDQHTXDOLW\RIWUHDWPHQW
DVEHWZHHQ WKH LPSRUWDQG WKHH[SRUWDV UHJDUGVDFFHVV WR WKHPDUNHW ,Q
UHODWLRQ WR VKRS RSHQLQJ KRXUV WKH TXHVWLRQ RI HYHQKDQGHGQHVV EHWZHHQ
LPSRUWDQGGRPHVWLFSURGXFWUHPDLQVRQHRIIDFW 7KHUHVXOWLVQRWDOZD\V
FHUWDLQ ,QDQRWKHUFRQWH[WLWZDVQRWHGWKDWWKH79DGYHUWLVLQJLQLVVXHZDV
WKHRQO\PHWKRGRIDGYHUWLVLQJRSHQWRWKHSODLQWLIIWKHFOHDULQGLFDWLRQIURP
WKH&RXUWZDVWKDWWKHPHDVXUHVKRXOGIDOOIRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQXQGHU$UWLFOH
QRZ(& 6RWRRWKHUHJXODWLRQRIVKRSRSHQLQJKRXUVPXVWEHKDQGOHG
ZLWK FDUH WKH HYHQKDQGHGQHVV RI WKH QDWLRQDO PHDVXUH LV QRW D IRUJRQH
FRQFOXVLRQ:KHUHIRUH[DPSOHWKHWUDGHLVLQSHULVKDEOHVZRXOGWKHUHVWULF
WLRQRIEXVLQHVVKRXUVEH HYHQKDQGHGZLWK UHVSHFW WRPDUNHW DFFHVV LQ WKH
FRQWH[WRIWKHLPSRUW"7KHLVVXHLVSUREDEO\RQHRIGHJUHHEXWDWWKHPDUJLQV
WKHUHDUHFOHDULQVWDQFHVZKHUHVXFKDUHVWULFWLRQPD\HYLGHQWO\PDNHLWPRUH
GLIILFXOW IRU WKH LPSRUW WR UHDFK WKHSRLQWRI VDOHDW WKHDSSURSULDWH WLPH
$GGLQJ WKLV VRUWRI ILQHVVH WR WKHDVVHVVPHQWRI WKHDIIHFWRIPDUNHW DFFHVV
GRHVOLWWOHIRUFHUWDLQW\EXWZRXOGUHSUHVHQWDWUXHUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWRI
WKHQDWLRQDOODZ7KH&RXUWLVSUHSDUHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHHIIHFWRIDWRWDOEDQLQ
WKHFRQWH[WRIDGYHUWLVLQJ WKHVDPHUDWLRQDOHFRXOGHTXDOO\EHDSSOLHGLQ
UHODWLRQWRQDWLRQDOODZVUHJXODWLQJWKHWLPHVDQGSODFHVLQZKLFKJRRGVDUHWR
EHVROG
0DUNHWDFFHVVDQGUHPRWHQHVV
7KHLPSDFWRIDPHDVXUHWKDWDSSOLHVHTXDOO\WRWKHLPSRUWDQGWRWKHGRPHVWLF
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 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-%(%RHUPDQV >@(&5,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6HPHUDUR
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SDUD
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FHUWDLQFKRLFHVUHODWLQJWRSDUWLFXODUQDWLRQDORUUHJLRQDOVRFLRFXOWXUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV,WLVIRU
WKH0HPEHU6WDWHVWRPDNHWKRVHFKRLFHVLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI&RPPXQLW\
ODZ·-RLQHG&DVHV&²²DQG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²²²DQG6HPHUDUR
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SDUD
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SURGXFW WKDW LV LQ WKH QDWXUH RI D VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW ZLOO GHSHQG RQ
ZKHWKHUWKHPHDVXUHLV¶GLUHFWLQGLUHFWRUSXUHO\VSHFXODWLYH·
D0DUNHWDFFHVV
,Q WKHFRQWH[WRI WKHEDUULHU WR WUDGH WKHUHVWULFWLRQRQDFFHVV WR WKHPDUNHW
PD\GH IDFWRYDU\ZLOGO\ IURP¶WKH LQVLJQLILFDQW WRDTXDVLSURKLELWLRQ·
7KHMXULVSUXGHQFHVLQFH'DVVRQYLOOH WKURXJK&DVVLVGH'LMRQ DQG.HFN
DQG0LWKRXDUG KDVSURFHHGHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWXQGHUWDNLQJVHQJDJHGLQ
ODZIXOHFRQRPLFDFWLYLWLHVLQ0HPEHU6WDWHVVKRXOGKDYHXQIHWWHUHGDFFHVV
WRWKHZKROHRIWKH&RPPXQLW\PDUNHWSODFH ,Q.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG IRU
H[DPSOHWKHQDWLRQDOUXOHVLQLVVXHZHUHKHOG¶QRWE\QDWXUHVXFKDVWRSUHYHQW
DFFHVV>RIWKHLPSRUW@WRWKHPDUNHWRUWRLPSHGHDFFHVVDQ\PRUHWKDWLW
LPSHGHV WKH DFFHVV RI GRPHVWLF SURGXFWV·$ ODZ UHVWULFWLQJ WKH UHVDOH RI
JRRGV DW OHVV WKDQ FRVW SULFH LV XQOLNHO\ WR KDYH VLJQLILFDQW LPSDFW RQ WKH
PDUNHWLQJ DV IDU DV WKH LPSRUW LV FRQFHUQHG +DGPDUNHW DFFHVV LQ WKDW
LQVWDQFHEHHQ UHVWULFWHG WKHFRQFHSWRI WKH VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWZRXOGKDYH
EHHQXQDYDLODEOHDQG WKH)UHQFK ODZZRXOGKDYHEHHQVXEMHFW WR$UWLFOH
QRZ(&VFUXWLQ\%\FRQWUDVWIRUH[DPSOHLQ*RXUPHW WKHSURKLEL
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 :KHUH WKH UXOHV OD\GRZQ UHTXLUHPHQWV WREHPHWE\ WKHJRRGV IRU H[DPSOH UHODWLQJ WR
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WLRQRIDOO DGYHUWLVLQJZDVKHOGOLDEOHWRLPSHGHWKHDFFHVVWRWKHPDUNHWRI
WKH LPSRUWPRUH WKDQ WKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFW DQG LQ'LWOHY%OXKPH WKH
'DQLVKODZZDVKHOGWRKDYH¶DGLUHFWDQGLPPHGLDWHLPSDFWRQWUDGH· 2Q
WKH EDVLV RI WKH LPSRUW·V UHVWULFWHGPDUNHW DFFHVV LQ ERWK *RXUPHW DQG
'LWOHY%OXKPH WKH QDWLRQDO ODZZDV VXEMHFW WR$UWLFOH  QRZ(&
VFUXWLQ\
E5HPRWHQHVV
7KHLVVXHRIPDUNHWDFFHVVPD\DOVREHGHWHUPLQHGRQZKHWKHUWKHHIIHFWRI
WKH QDWLRQDOPHDVXUH LV FRQVLGHUHG WRR UHPRWH ,I WKH KLQGUDQFH WR WUDGH LV
FRQVLGHUHG ¶WRR XQFHUWDLQ DQG LQGLUHFW· WKH QDWLRQDO UXOHV ZLOO EH KHOG
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK$UWLFOHQRZ(&7KHLVVXHRIUHPRWHQHVVKDVDULVHQ
LQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW)RUH[DPSOHDQ,WDOLDQODZUHTXLUHG
VKRSVWRREWDLQDOLFHQFHDVDSUHFRQGLWLRQWRRSHQLQJ WKHVXSSO\RISHWUR
OHXPSURGXFWVZDVUHJXODWHGE\WKH6WDWH ,WDOLDQYHVVHOVZHUHUHTXLUHGWR
FDUU\ FRVWO\ HTXLSPHQW LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ RI FKHPLFDO
VXEVWDQFHV ,Q DOO WKHVH LQVWDQFHV WKH HIIHFW RI WKH PHDVXUH RQ WUDGH
EHWZHHQ0HPEHU 6WDWHVZDV FRQVLGHUHG WRR UHPRWH ,Q FRQVHTXHQFH WKH
QDWLRQDOUXOHVZHUHKHOGFRPSDWLEOHZLWK$UWLFOHQRZ(&
:KHWKHU LQVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHV WKHPHDVXUH LVFRQVLGHUHG WREHDVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWRUWKHFRQFHSWRIUHPRWHQHVVLVDSSOLHGLVLQPDQ\ZD\VLVLUUHO
HYDQWWRWKHILQDORXWFRPHRIWKHMXGJPHQWWKHPHDVXUHZLOOIDOORXWZLWKWKH
VFRSHRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&,QWKLVFRQWH[W WKHDFWXDOVWUXFWXUHRI WKH
MXGJPHQWDSSHDUVWREHRQHRIIRUPQRWVXEVWDQFHWKHHQGUHVXOWLVUHPRYDO
IURP$UWLFOHQRZ(&VFUXWLQ\+RZHYHUVXFKDQDVVHVVPHQWZRXOGEH
VXSHUILFLDO5HFRXUVHWRWKHWRRORIUHPRWHQHVV DVDIDFWRUWROLPLWWKHDSSOLFD
WLRQ RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW LV QRW HQWLUHO\ ZLWKRXW LWV SUREOHPV 7KH
DSSHDUDQFHRIWKHFRQFHSWLQWKLVFRQWH[WFDQEHOLNHQHGWRWKDWRIWKHLQWUR
GXFWLRQRID¶ZLOGFDUG· LQDJDPHRISRNHU7KHUH LVVRPHGLIILFXOW\ LQ WKH
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
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DVVHVVPHQW RI ZKHQ WKH &RXUW ZLOO FKRRVH WR SOD\ WKDW FDUG 7KH FDXVH RI
FHUWDLQW\ LQ WKH DSSOLFDWLRQRI WKH FRQFHSWRI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW LV QRW
KHOSHG)RUH[DPSOHLQ',36S$Y&RPXQHGL%DVVDQRGHO*UDSSDHWDO
WKHHIIHFWRIWKHSUHFRQGLWLRQRIDOLFHQVHWRWUDGHZDVKHOGWREH¶WRRXQFHU
WDLQDQGLQGLUHFW· LQWKHFRQWH[WRIKLQGUDQFHWRWUDGH¶%XWIRU·WKHLVVXHRI
UHPRWHQHVVWKH,WDOLDQODZFRXOGKDYHIDOOHQZLWKLQWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQW7KHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHLVVXHRIUHPRWHQHVVLVLPSRUWDQWLQWKH
FRQWH[W RI WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH  H[  (& DV HYLGHQFHG E\',3
6S$ KRZHYHU LW UHPDLQVXQFOHDU DV WRH[DFWO\ZKHUHLQ OLHV WKHERXQGDU\
EH\RQGZKLFK$UWLFOH H[(&VKDOOQRWSHQHWUDWH7KH ODFNRI WUDQV
SDUHQF\DQGREMHFWLYLW\LQWKHMXGJPHQWVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
FRQFHSW RI UHPRWHQHVV KDV PDGH LW H[WUHPHO\ GLIILFXOW WR SUHGLFW ZLWK DQ\
SUHFLVLRQWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKUHPRWHQHVVZLOOIHDWXUHDVDQLVVXHLQWKH
IXWXUH 7KHHIIHFWVRQLQWUD&RPPXQLW\WUDGHPD\EHLQGHHGEH¶WRRXQFHU
WDLQDQG LQGLUHFW·EXW LQ',36S$ ZKHUH WKHRSHQLQJRIDQHZVKRSZDV
FRQGLWLRQDOXSRQWKHSRVVHVVLRQRIDOLFHQVHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUWUDGHZLOOKDYH
EHHQ ORVW FRPSOHWHO\ ZKHUH WKDW OLFHQVH ZDV QRW KHOG /LNHZLVH LQ (VVR
(VSDQROD6$Y&RPXQLGDG$XWRQRPDGH&DQDULDV WKHREOLJDWLRQRQZKROH
VDOHUVWRVXSSO\DFHUWDLQQXPEHURILVODQGVIRUPLQJSDUWRIWKHWHUULWRU\RID
0HPEHU 6WDWH ZDV KHOG WR EH ¶WRR XQFHUWDLQ DQG LQGLUHFW· WR DIIHFW WUDGH
EHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV $JDLQQRH[SODQDWLRQZDVRIIHUHGE\WKH&RXUWLQ
UHVSHFWRIWKLVFRQFOXVLRQ
%\FRQWUDVWWR',36S$ DQG(VVR(VSDQROD LQ'LWOHY%OXKPHD'XWFK
ODZ D QDWLRQDOPHDVXUH SURKLELWLQJ WKH LPSRUW RI EHHV IURPRWKHU0HPEHU
6WDWHVRQWRSDUWRID'XWFKWHUULWRU\ZDVKHOGWRKDYHD¶GLUHFWDQGLPPHGLDWH
LPSDFW RQ WUDGH· 7KH GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ IHDWXUH KHUH PD\ EH WKDW WKH ODWWHU
REOLJDWLRQLVDQHJDWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWZKHUHDVWKHREOLJDWLRQWRVXSSO\SHWUR
OHXPLQ(VVR(VSDQROD ZDVSRVLWLYHLQQDWXUH1HYHUWKHOHVVGLVWLQFWIDFWXDO
VLPLODULWLHVH[LVWEHWZHHQWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHVLGHQWLILHG,WUHPDLQVQRWDWDOO
REYLRXVZK\ WKH WZR VLWXDWLRQVKDYHEHHQ WUHDWHGGLIIHUHQWO\7KH UHDOLW\ LV
WKDW$UWLFOHQRZ(&ZRXOGQRWKDYHDSSOLHGZKLFKHYHUDSSURDFKWRWKH
FODVVLILFDWLRQ RI WKH QDWLRQDO PHDVXUH KDG EHHQ DGRSWHG E\ WKH &RXUW WKDW
KRZHYHULVQRW WKHLVVXH5DWKHUZKDW LVDW LVVXHLV WKDW WKHILQGLQJWKDW WKH
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PHDVXUHKDV¶WRRXQFHUWDLQDQGLQGLUHFW·DQHIIHFWRQWUDGH ZLOOVWXOWLI\DQ\
IXUWKHUHQTXLU\HLWKHULQWRWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI$UWLFOHQRZ(&RUWKH
DYDLODELOLW\RIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW,WLVSRVVLEOHWRDUJXH
WKDW WKH FXUWDLOPHQW RI GHWDLOHG H[DPLQDWLRQ E\ WKH &RXUW LQ WKLV FRQWH[W
UHSUHVHQWVDORVWRSSRUWXQLW\IRUH[SODQDWLRQGHYHORSPHQWDQGUHILQHPHQW
RI WKHFRQFHSWRI WKH VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW ,W LV LQFXPEHQWRQ WKH&RXUW WR
H[SODLQ LWV ILQGLQJV LQ WKHVH LQVWDQFHV UDWKHU WKDQ PHUHO\ WR GHHP WKH
PHDVXUH WR KDYH WRR UHPRWH DQ HIIHFW RQ LQWUD&RPPXQLW\ WUDGH ,Q WKH
FRQWH[WRIORVWRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUH[SODLQLQJIXUWKHUWKHFRQFHSWRIWKH¶VHOO
LQJ DUUDQJHPHQW· LW LV SDUWLFXODUO\ LUULWDWLQJ ZKHUH WKH SUHVHQFH RI QRYHO
FLUFXPVWDQFHV ZRXOG KDYH RWKHUZLVH GLFWDWHG DQ HOXFLGDWLRQ DQG DQ
HQOLJKWHQPHQWUHODWLQJ WR WKHERXQGDULHVRI WKH¶VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW· ,W LV
QRWHGIRUH[DPSOHWKDW$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO)HQQHOO\LQ',36S$O ZDVRIWKH
RSLQLRQ WKDW LI WKHPHDVXUH LQ WKDW MXGJPHQWZDV WREH ¶UHJDUGHGDVEHLQJ
VXEMHFWWRVFUXWLQ\XQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH7UHDW\DWDOO>LW@RXJKWWREHFODV
VLILHGDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW·
7KHHTXDWLRQRIPDUNHWDFFHVVRIEDUULHUVWRWUDGHLVFUXFLDOLQERWKWKH
RSHUDWLRQRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&DQGRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW7KHVWLU
ULQJLQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIUHPRWHQHVVZLWKLWVFRQVHTXHQWDELOLW\WRVWXOWLI\
HQTXLU\DQGH[SODQDWLRQZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJH
PHQWLVQRWDZHOFRPHDGGLWLRQWRWKHPL[7KHUHZLOOEHRFFDVLRQVZKHUH
UHPRWHQHVVPD\WUXO\EHDIDFWRULQWKHHTXDWLRQRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRURWKHU
ZLVHRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW,WZRXOGEHKHOSIXOIRUFOHDUHUJXLGDQFHWR
EHRIIHUHGE\WKH&RXUWDVWRWKHERXQGDULHVRIWKHXVHRIWKLVFRQFHSWWKH
XVH RI ZKLFK DORQH FDQ QHJDWH DQ\ DWWHPSW DW DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI PDUNHW
DFFHVV 8QOHVV WKLV RFFXUV D VXVSLFLRQ PD\ OLQJHU WKDW RSSRUWXQLWLHV DUH
EHLQJORVWIRUH[SODQDWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHFRQFHSW
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
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@(&5SDUD
WKH&RXUWKHOGWKDW$UWQRZ(&DSSOLHVZKHUHWKHPHDVXUHLV¶FDSDEOH RIKLQGHULQJWUDGH·
>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@7KLVKDVDEHDULQJRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIUHPRWHQHVV+RZHYHULQWKHFRQWH[WRI
WKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW¶>L@WFDQQRORQJHUEHSUHVXPHGWKDWHYHU\QDWLRQDOSURYLVLRQFDSDEOHRI
KLQGHULQJGLUHFWO\RU LQGLUHFWO\ DFWXDOO\RUSRWHQWLDOO\ LQWUD&RPPXQLW\ WUDGH IDOOVZLWKLQ WKH
VFRSHRI$UWLFOH(&·$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO*HUYHQ-RLQHGFDVHV&&ULPLQDOSURFHHG
LQJVDJDLQVW7DQNVWDWLRQ·W+HXNVNHYRIDQG-%(%RHUPDQV >@(&5,SDUD
 (J WKH UHTXLUHPHQW WR REWDLQ D OLFHQVH EHIRUH D QHZ VKRS FRXOG EH RSHQHG 6HH&
',36S$Y&RPXQHGL%DVVDQRGHO*UDSSDHWDO >@(&5,SDUD
 &',3 6S$ Y &RPXQH GL %DVVDQR GHO *UDSSD HW DO >@ (&5 , DW
²
 LELGSDUD,WLVQRWHGWKDWRWKHUDWWULEXWHVRIWKH¶VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW·ZHUHSUHVHQW7KH
&RXUWKHOG¶7KH,WDOLDQ/DZPDNHVQRGLVWLQFWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHRULJLQRIWKHJRRGVWKDW
WKHLUSXUSRVHLVQRWWRUHJXODWHWUDGHLQJRRGVZLWKRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV·&²',36S$
Y&RPXQHGL%DVVDQRGHO*UDSSDHWDO >@(&5,SDUD
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$0DUNHWDFFHVVDQGWKH¶VLPLODU·SURGXFW
$QHTXDOLW\RIWUHDWPHQWZLWKUHVSHFWWRPDUNHWDFFHVVRIWKHLPSRUWDQGWKH
GRPHVWLF SURGXFW LV FUXFLDO WR WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW ,W LV DQ DVVHVVPHQW
KRZHYHUWKDWPD\QRWEHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG,QWRVXFKDQH[DPLQDWLRQKDVEHHQ
VWLUUHG WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH ¶VLPLODU SURGXFW· ,Q6HPHUDUR&DVD WKH&RXUW
KHOG
WKDWQDWLRQDOUXOHVZKRVHHIIHFWLVWROLPLWWKHPDUNHWLQJRIDSURGXFWJHQHUDOO\
DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ LWV LPSRUWDWLRQ FDQQRW RQ WKDW JURXQG DORQH EH UHJDUGHG DV
OLPLWLQJDFFHVVWRWKHPDUNHWIRUWKRVHLPSRUWHGSURGXFWVWRDJUHDWHUH[WHQWWKDQ
IRUVLPLODU QDWLRQDOSURGXFWV>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@
,WLVXQFOHDUZKDWLVPHDQWE\WKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVLPLODUSURGXFWLQWKLVFRQWH[W
WKRXJKLWLVHYLGHQWWKDWHQTXLU\LQWRWKHSURGXFWPDUNHWDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
LVWREHPRUHVXEWOHWKDQD¶OLNHIRUOLNH·EDVLV$PDUNHWDVVHVVPHQWLQUHOD
WLRQWRGLVFULPLQDWRU\WD[DWLRQ IRUH[DPSOHLQFOXGHVDFRQFHSWRIWKHVLPL
ODUSURGXFW ,Q WKDW FRQWH[W WKHFRQFHSWKDVEHHQH[WHQGHG WRHQTXLU\DV WR
ZKHWKHU WKHSURGXFWV ¶KDYH VLPLODU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQGPHHW WKH VDPHQHHGV
IURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIFRQVXPHUV   QRWDFFRUGLQJ WRZKHWKHU WKH\DUH
VWULFWO\ LGHQWLFDO EXW ZKHWKHU WKHUH XVH LV VLPLODU RU FRPSDUDEOH· 7KLV
QHFHVVDULO\ LQYROYHVDQLQGHSWKDQDO\VLVRI WKHPDUNHWSODFH7KHHQTXLU\LV
VXEWOH DQ DWWHPSW WR UHIOHFW DFFXUDWHO\ WKH H[WHQW RI WKH PDUNHWSODFH ZLWK
UHVSHFWWRWKDWSDUWLFXODUSURGXFW7KRXJKLQWKLVUHVSHFWDQ\DWWHPSWWRPDNH
DPHDQLQJIXO FRPSDULVRQ EHWZHHQ WKH LPSRUW DQG GRPHVWLF SURGXFW LQ WKLV
FRQWH[W LV WR EHZHOFRPHG WKH WDVN RI DVVHVVPHQWPD\ EH LQKHUHQWO\PRUH
GLIILFXOWIRUWKHLPSRUWHUWKDQLWLVIRUWKHSURGXFHURIWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFW$V
DFRQVHTXHQFHLWLVPRUHGLIILFXOWWKHLPSRUWHUWRMXGJHZKHWKHUWKHDSSOLFD
WLRQRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&LVDSSURSULDWHLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH
,W LVXQFOHDUDWWKHWLPHRIZULWLQJZKHWKHURUQRWWKHWHUP¶VLPLODUSURG
XFW· LVWRKDYHDPHDQLQJUHIOHFWLYHRIWKDWXVHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI$UWLFOH
H[(& $QDSSURDFKDNLQWRWKDWWDNHQLQ&RPPLVVLRQY'HQPDUN
ZRXOGEHHPLQHQWO\DSSURSULDWHLQWKHSUHVHQWFRQWH[W,QDQDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 -RLQHG&DVHV&²²DQG&²²²DQG6HPHUDUR
&DVD8QR6UODQGRWKHUVY6LQGDFRGHO&RPXQHGL(UEXVFRDQG2WKHUV>@(&5,
 LELGSDUD
 ¶1R0HPEHU6WDWHVVKDOO LPSRVHGLUHFWO\RU LQGLUHFWO\RQ WKHSURGXFWVRIRWKHU0HPEHU
6WDWHVDQ\LQWHUQDOWD[DWLRQRIDQ\NLQGLQH[FHVVRIWKDWLPSRVHGGLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\RQVLPLODU
GRPHVWLFSURGXFWV·>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@$UWH[(&
 &DVH&RPPLVVLRQY'HQPDUN >@(&5SDUD1RWHDOVRWKHFRQFHSWRIWKH
¶UHOHYDQW SURGXFW PDUNHW· IRU SXUSRVHV RI $UW  H[  (& LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI (XURSHDQ
&RPPXQLW\&RPSHWLWLRQODZ
 ,Q WKHFRQWH[WRI WKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW WKHFRQFHSWRI WKH ¶VLPLODUSURGXFW·ZDV LQWUR
GXFHGLQFDVH&5H0LON,PSRUWV(&&RPPLVVLRQY*UHHFH >@(&5,SDUD
 $ERYH  &DVH&RPPLVVLRQY'HQPDUN >@(&5
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PDUNHWSODFHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHVLPLODUSURGXFWLVLPSRU
WDQWLWKDVZLGHQHGWKHEHQFKPDUNLQMHFWHGDQHOHPHQWRIREMHFWLYLW\LQWRWKH
SURFHVVRIFRPSDULVRQ7KDWWKHSURGXFWPDUNHWLVQRWFRQILQHGWRDOLNHIRU
OLNH EDVLV LV DQ DWWHPSW WR UHIOHFW UHDOLW\ $PDUNHWSODFH UDUHO\ RSHUDWHV LQ
SURGXFWLVRODWLRQLWZRXOGEHXQXVXDOIRUDPDUNHWWREHFRPSRVHGRIVLQJOH
SURGXFWLWHPVIRUZKLFKWKHUHLVDKLJKLQHODVWLFLW\RIGHPDQG
%*HQHUDOY6SHFLILFREOLJDWLRQ
,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHSDFNDJLQJRISURGXFWVDGLVWLQFWLRQLQWUHDWPHQWLQUHOD
WLRQ WR WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW KDV EHHQ IRUJHG GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ WKH W\SH RI
REOLJDWLRQDULVLQJIURPWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUH7KHPHDVXUHLPSRVLQJDJHQHUDO
REOLJDWLRQZLOOEHFDSDEOHRIWUHDWPHQWDVDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW WKRVHWKDW
LPSRVHDVSHFLILF REOLJDWLRQZLOOFRQWLQXHWRIDOOZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI$UWLFOH
H[(&7KHGLVWLQFWLRQZDVILUVWPDGHLQ6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV
6$ 8QGHU)UHQFKODZ SURGXFHUVDQGLPSRUWHUVZHUHREOLJHGWRLGHQWLI\
SDFNDJLQJ LQ WKH FRQWH[WRIGLVSRVDO DQG UHFRYHU\RISDFNDJLQJZDVWH7KH
OHJLVODWLRQGLGQRWHVWDEOLVK¶DQREOLJDWLRQWRDSSO\DPDUNRUODEHORQO\D
JHQHUDO REOLJDWLRQWRLGHQWLI\WKHSDFNDJLQJFROOHFWHGIRUGLVSRVDO·>HPSKDVLV
DGGHG@ :KDWZDVQRYHOZDVWKHGUDZLQJRIDGLVWLQFWLRQDVWRWKHQDWXUHRI
WKH REOLJDWLRQV DULVLQJ IURP WKH QDWLRQDO PHDVXUH 7KH JHQHUDO REOLJDWLRQ
¶GRHVQRWUHODWHDVVXFKWRWKHSURGXFWRULWVSDFNDJLQJ>LW@GRHVQRWRI
LWVHOI FRQVWLWXWH D UXOH OD\LQJ GRZQ UHTXLUHPHQWV WR EH PHW E\ JRRGV·
:KLOVWWKHJHQHUDOREOLJDWLRQPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW LW
ZDVKHOGWKDWWKHPHDVXUHLPSRVLQJDVSHFLILF REOLJDWLRQZLOOIDOOIRUVFUXWLQ\
ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI$UWLFOHH[(&
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
 $QH[DPSOHRIDPDUNHWSODFHZKHUHLQGHPDQGZRXOGDUJXDEO\UHPDLQFRQVWDQWZKDWHYHUWKH
SURGXFWSULFHZRXOGEHWKDWIRU WKH0DQFKHVWHU8QLWHGIRRWEDOOVWULSDQGSUREDEO\WKH(QJODQG
IRRWEDOOVWULS6XFKKLJKLQHODVWLFLW\RIGHPDQGZRXOGKRZHYHUEHDUHODWLYHO\XQXVXDORFFXUUHQFH
(YHQ LI GHPDQG LQHODVWLFLW\ KDV EHHQ DWWDLQHG LQ D SDUWLFXODU PDUNHWSODFH VXFK VWDWXV LV QRW
DEVROXWH LW LV VXEMHFW WR IOXFWXDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHFRXOGGHPDQGIRU WKH(QJODQG IRRWEDOO VWULS
DIWHUWKHUHVXOWRI(XURSHDQ&XS&RPSHWLWLRQEHPDLQWDLQHGDWDQLQHODVWLFOHYHO>DVVXPLQJ
WKDWKDGEHHQDFKLHYHGLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH@"
 3URYLGHGRI FRXUVH WKDW WKH UHOHYDQW FRQGLWLRQV DUHPHW IRU H[HPSWLRQ IURP WKH VFRSHRI
DSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWH[(&WKDWWKHSURYLVLRQ¶DSSOLHVWRDOOUHOHYDQWWUDGHUVRSHUDWLQJZLWKLQ
WKHQDWLRQDOWHUULWRU\DQGWKDWLWDIIHFWVLQWKHVDPHPDQQHULQODZDQGLQIDFWWKHPDUNHWLQJRI
GRPHVWLFSURGXFWVDQGRIWKRVHIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV·&DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR
(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 &DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,
 $UW'HFUHH1R&DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,
SDUD
 &DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 LELGSDUD6HHDOVR &DVH&DQG&&ULPLQDO3URFHHGLQJVDJDLQVW%HUQDUG
.HFNDQG'DQLHO0LWKRXDUG >@(&5,SDUD
 ,WLVIRUWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWVWRYHULI\WKDWWKHUHOHYDQWFRQGLWLRQVXQGHU&DVH&DQG
&&ULPLQDO3URFHHGLQJVDJDLQVW%HUQDUG.HFNDQG'DQLHO0LWKRXDUG >@(&5,
SDUDDUHPHW
 7KHREOLJDWLRQFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVDEDUULHUWRWUDGHDVLWLVLPSRVHGE\D0HPEHU6WDWH&DVH
&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,SDUD
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$QDO\VLV RI WKH W\SH RI REOLJDWLRQ LPSRVHG E\ WKH QDWLRQDOPHDVXUH LV D
UHILQHPHQWZKLFKFRQFHLYDEO\PD\OLPLWWKHVFRSHRI$UWLFOHH[(&
$PHDVXUHLPSRVLQJDJHQHUDOREOLJDWLRQLVUHPRYHGIURP$UWLFOHH[
(&VFUXWLQ\ IXWXUHQDWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQPD\EHGUDIWHGVRDVWRHVFDSHWKH
VFUXWLQ\RI&RPPXQLW\IUHHPRYHPHQWRIJRRGVODZ8QGRXEWHGO\WKHMXGJ
PHQWLQ6DSRG$XGLF LVWHFKQLFDOO\FRUUHFW $UWLFOHQRZ(&
DSSOLHVRQO\WRPHDVXUHVLPSRVHGDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOWKHREOLJDWLRQWRDIIL[
WKH¶*UHHQ'RW·ORJRWRWKHSDFNDJLQJDURVHIURPDFRQWUDFWXDODJUHHPHQW,W
LV DQ DJUHHPHQW WKDW FRXOG QRW EH UHJDUGHG DV D EDUULHU WR WUDGH VLQFH D
0HPEHU6WDWHKDGQRWLPSRVHGLW <HWWKHDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKHLQGLYLG
XDOSDUWLHVZRXOGQRWKDYHH[LVWHG¶EXWIRU·WKHSURYLVLRQRIQDWLRQDOODZ ,V
6DSRG$XGLFDWULXPSKRIIRUPRYHUVXEVWDQFH",VWKHWUDQVPXWDWLRQRIWKH
VSHFLILF LQWRWKHJHQHUDOLQWHUPVRIREOLJDWLRQVXIILFLHQWWRUHQGHUQXJDWRU\
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&",WPD\EHDUJXHGWKDWWRLGHQWLI\
REOLJDWLRQVLPSRVHGDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHODVEHLQJLQQDWXUHHLWKHUVSHFLILFRU
JHQHUDOLVXQQHFHVVDU\,WLPSRVHVDOHYHORIVRSKLVWLFDWLRQLQWRWKHSURFHVVRI
HQTXLU\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHWKDWKDGKLWKHUWRQRWEHHQDSSDU
HQW $W WKH SUHVHQW WLPH LW LV XQFOHDU LI WKLV DSSURDFK WR HQTXLU\ LV WR EH
UHSHDWHGRQO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVFUXWLQ\RIWKHSDFNDJLQJPHDVXUHRUWREH
DGRSWHG LQ D FRQWH[WZLGHU WKDQ WKRVHPHDVXUHV7KHUH LV D GDQJHU WKDW WKH
ZHDSRQRI$UWLFOHH[(&XVHGLQWKHILJKWDJDLQVWQDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHV
UHVWULFWLYHRIWUDGHPD\EHUHQGHUHGOHVVHIIHFWLYH,WLVDUJXDEOHWKDWDFRQVLG
HUHGDSSURDFKZRXOGLQVWHDGVHHNWRDFKLHYHDEDODQFHEHWZHHQIUHHWUDGHDQG
WKHUHVSHFWIRUQDWLRQDOSUHIHUHQFHV,WZRXOGVHHPWKDWWKHGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQ
WKH VSHFLILF DQG WKH JHQHUDO LQ WHUPV RI REOLJDWLRQ WKDW RFFXUUHG LQ 6DSRG
$XGLF IDLOV WR DFKLHYH WKLV EDODQFH 7R DOORZ VXFK D GLVWLQFWLRQ WR H[LVW
UHQGHUVWKHVFUXWLQ\RIQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHVKDQJLQJE\WKHVOHQGHUWKUHDGUHODW
LQJWRWKHW\SHRIREOLJDWLRQLPSRVHGDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO2QDSUDFWLFDOOHYHO
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 &DVH & DQG & &ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW %HUQDUG .HFN DQG 'DQLHO
0LWKRXDUG>@(&5,SDUD¶7KRVHSURYLVLRQVDSSO\WRDOOUHOHYDQWWUDGHUVRSHUDWLQJ
ZLWKLQWKHQDWLRQDOWHUULWRU\DQGVRORQJDVWKH\DIIHFWLQWKHVDPHPDQQHULQODZDQGLQIDFWWKH
PDUNHWLQJRIGRPHVWLFSURGXFWVDQGRIWKRVHIURPRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHV·
 &DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,
 $SULYDWHFRQWUDFWLVQRWDEDUULHUWRWUDGHEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV&DVH&6DSRG
$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,
 ¶4XDQWLWDWLYH UHVWULFWLRQV RQ LPSRUWV DQG DOO PHDVXUHV KDYLQJ HTXLYDOHQW HIIHFW VKDOO EH
SURKLELWHGEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV· >HPSKDVLVDGGHG@
 6HH&DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 ,WKDGEHHQPDGHLQSXUVXDQFHRI$UW'HFUHH1R6HH&DVH&6DSRG$XGLF
Y(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 &DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV6$ >@(&5,
 ¶6LQFHWKHREOLJDWLRQWRLGHQWLI\WKHSDFNDJLQJSUHVFULEHGE\>QDWLRQDOODZ@GRHVQRWVHHP
WRLPSO\DQREOLJDWLRQWRPDUNRUODEHOWKDWSDFNDJLQJWKDWREOLJDWLRQGRHVQRWDSSHDUQHFHVVDU
LO\WRUHIHUWRWKHSURGXFWRULWVSDFNDJLQJDVVXFK·&DVH&6DSRG$XGLFY(FR(PEDOODJHV
6$ >@(&5,SDUD7KH&RXUWKRZHYHUQRWHGWKDWLWLVIRUWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWWRLQWHU
SUHWQDWLRQDOODZXQGHU$UW(&SDUD
 &DVH&>@(&5,
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WKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHJHQHUDODQGWKHVSHFLILFLQWHUPVRIWKHREOLJDWLRQ
LPSRVHGFRXOGEHUDWKHUILQHJLYLQJULVHWRXQFHUWDLQW\HYHQLQFRQVLVWHQF\LQ
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
,QWKHFDXVHRIFRQVLVWHQF\LWLVDUJXDEOHWKDWWKH&RXUWLQ6DSRG$XGLF
RXJKW WR KDYH PDLQWDLQHG WKH DSSURDFK DGRSWHG LQ &RPPLVVLRQ RI WKH
(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLWLHVY.LQJGRPRI6SDLQ ,QWKHODWWHUMXGJPHQWLQWKH
FRQWH[W RI UHTXLUHPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR ODEHOOLQJ DQG SDFNDJLQJ RI FRFRD DQG
FKRFRODWHSURGXFWV LWZDVKHOG WKDW ¶WKHQHHG WRDOWHU WKHSDFNDJLQJRU WKH
ODEHOOLQJRILPSRUWHGSURGXFWV SUHYHQWV VXFKUHTXLUHPHQWVIURPEHLQJVHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWV·>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@ ,W¶PD\FRPSHOWKHWUDGHUVFRQFHUQHGWR
DGMXVWWKHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHLUSURGXFWVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSODFHZKHUHWKH\DUH
PDUNHWHGDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WRLQFXUDGGLWLRQDOSDFNDJLQJFRVWV· $Q\DOWHU
DWLRQ WR SDFNDJLQJ DQ\ DGMXVWPHQW WR SUHVHQWDWLRQ ZRXOG KDYH WKH VDPH
HIIHFW DQ REVWUXFWLRQ WR LQWUD&RPPXQLW\ WUDGH $ VLPLODU DSSURDFK
DGRSWHGLQ6DSRG$XGLF ZRXOGKDYHWUDQVODWHGWRWKHVDPHIDWH$UWLFOH
H[(&VFUXWLQ\,QWKDWLQVWDQFHWKHVXEGLYLVLRQLQWKHW\SHRIREOLJDWLRQ
LPSRVHGLGHQWLILFDWLRQDVHLWKHUJHQHUDORUVSHFLILFZRXOGWKHQQRWKDYHEHHQ
QHFHVVDU\
5HFHQWO\ D YDULDQW RQ &RPPLVVLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPXQLWLHV Y
.LQJGRPRI6SDLQ KDVEHHQLQWURGXFHGLQZKLFKWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIDOWHU
DWLRQLQWKHSURGXFW·VSDFNDJLQJFDQEHDFFRXQWHGIRULQWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW :LWKRXW VSHFLILFDOO\ LGHQWLI\LQJ
WKDW WKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHZDV D VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW 7RPPDVR0RUHOODWR Y
&RPXQHGL3DGRYD WKH&RXUWKHOGWKDW¶WKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUSULRUSDFNDJ
LQJVLQFH LWUHODWHVRQO\ WR   PDUNHWLQJ    LV LQSULQFLSOHVXFKDV WRIDOO
RXWVLGH $UWLFOH  RI WKH 7UHDW\· >HPSKDVLV DGGHG@ ,Q0RUHOODWR WKH
SURGXFWLRQ SURFHVV WKH EDNLQJ RI WKH EUHDGZDV LQFRPSOHWH DW WKH WLPH RI
LPSRUW IURP )UDQFH ¶7KH UHOHYDQW TXHVWLRQ LVZKHWKHU WKH UHTXLUHPHQW IRU
SULRU SDFNDJLQJ    PDNHV LW QHFHVVDU\ WR DOWHU WKH SURGXFW LQ RUGHU WR
FRPSO\· 7KHPHDVXUHZDVKHOGE\WKH&RXUWWRUHODWHRQO\WRPDUNHWLQJLQ
FRQVHTXHQFHLWIHOORXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRI$UWLFOHQRZ(&
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
 LELG
 &DVH & >@ (&5 , 6HH DOVR &DVH &&ROLP 19 Y %LJJ·V &RQWLQHQW
1RRUG19>@(&5,SDUD
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SDUD  LELGSDUD
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(&5,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
 7KH&RXUWUHLWHUDWHGWKDWWKHQHHGWRDOWHU WKHSURGXFWSDFNDJLQJRUWKHODEHOOLQJSUHYHQWV
WKH QDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQW IURP FRQVWLWXWLQJ D ¶VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW· &DVH & 7RPPDVR
0RUHOODWRY&RPXQHGL3DGRYD-XGJPHQWRI6HSWQRW\HWSXEOLVKHGSDUD
 &DVH&-XGJPHQWRI6HSWQRW\HWSXEOLVKHG
 ¶3URYLGHG WKDW LW GRHV QRW LQ UHDOLW\ FRQVWLWXWH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ DJDLQVW LPSRUWHG SURGXFWV·
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:KDW LVZRUWK\RIVRPHFRPPHQW LV WKDW LQ0RUHOODWR WKHSURGXFWLRQ
SURFHVVZDVQRW\HW ILQLVKHGDW WKH WLPHRI LPSRUW³WKHEDNLQJRI WKHEUHDG
LPSRUWHGIURP)UDQFHKDG\HWWREHFRPSOHWHGEHIRUHPDUNHWLQJWKHEUHDGLQ
,WDO\7KLVLVDUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWDVORQJDVWKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHWUXO\UHODWHVWR
PDUNHWLQJ LW PDWWHUV QRW WKDW WKH SURGXFWV DUH LQ DQ XQILQLVKHG VWDWH 7KLV
¶VLPSOHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ·RIWKHJRRGVDIWHULPSRUWGRHVQRWDOWHUWKHQDWXUHRI
ZKDWKDVEHHQ LGHQWLILHGDVDPDUNHWLQJPHDVXUH7KLV VHHPV ORJLFDO LQ WKH
RYHUDOOFRQWH[WRI WKHUHTXLUHPHQW WKDWDQHHGWRDOWHU WKHSURGXFWSUHFOXGHV
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW3URGXFWVPD\ZHOOEHLPSRUWHGLQDQ
XQILQLVKHGRUXQSURFHVVHG VWDWH:KHUH WKLV LV VR WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI WKH
SURGXFWDIWHULPSRUWDWLRQVKRXOGQRWFKDQJHWKHQDWXUHRIDPDUNHWLQJUXOH
0RUHOODWRLVD VHQVLEOH UHFRJQLWLRQE\ WKH&RXUWRI -XVWLFH WKDWPDUNHWLQJ
UXOHVDSSO\DFURVVWKHVSHFWUXPWKHGHIDFWRVWDJHRISURGXFWLRQRISDUWLFXODU
SURGXFWVLVLUUHOHYDQWLQWKLVFRQWH[W
9&21&/86,216
'XULQJWKHRUVR\HDUVVLQFHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWLQ
.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG WKHUHKDVEHHQPXFKDQDO\VLVRIWKDWFRQFHSWE\DFDG
HPLFZULWHUV 6RWRRWKH2SLQLRQVRIWKH$GYRFDWHV*HQHUDOLQWKH&RXUWRI
-XVWLFH KDYH FRQWULEXWHG LQ ODUJH SDUW WR WKDW DQDO\VLV 1HLWKHU KDV WKH
MXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHEHHQVWDWLFLQWKLVUHVSHFW,QDFFHQWXDW
LQJWKHSRVLWLYHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWLWVKRXOGEHUHPHP
EHUHGWKDWLWVDWWULEXWHVWKHFULWHULDIRUDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
DV LGHQWLILHG LQ.HFN DQG0LWKRXDUG UHPDLQ XQDOWHUHG 7KRVH DWWULEXWHV
KDYH EHHQ D FRQVWDQW VXEVHTXHQW MXULVSUXGHQFH KDV H[SODLQHG DQG DSSOLHG
WKHP,QWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHIRUH[DPSOHLWZDVXQFOHDUWKDWWKHFRQFHSWZRXOG
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\
 LELG
 ,QLQVWDQFHVZKHUHLQWKHUHKDVEHHQQRGLVFULPLQDWLRQDJDLQVWWKHLPSRUWHGSURGXFW
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  (/5HY ² 1 1LF 6KXLEKQH ¶7KH )UHH
0RYHPHQWRI*RRGVDQG$UW(&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(/5HY²
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DSSO\WRWKHDGYHUWLVHPHQW )URPWKHFXUUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWYLHZVHHPV
QRZVHHPVGLIILFXOWWRFRXQWHQDQFH
%DVLF UXOHV WKDWSUHFRQGLWLRQ WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWKDYH
EHHQHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH7KHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUHPXVWDSSO\WR
WKHLPSRUWDQGWRWKHGRPHVWLFSURGXFWZLWKRXWGLVWLQFWLRQLWPXVWQRWLQYROYH
WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHSURGXFWV7KHFRQFHSWRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWKDV
HQFURDFKHGLQWRDUHDVRIEXVLQHVVDFWLYLW\QDWLRQDOSUHIHUHQFHVZLWKUHVSHFWWR
WKH FORVLQJ KRXUV RI VKRSV KDYH EHHQ UHVSHFWHG ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW WKH VHOOLQJ
DUUDQJHPHQWLVEHLQJPRXOGHGLQWRDWRROFDSDEOHRIDFKLHYLQJDILQHEDODQFH
EHWZHHQIUHHWUDGHDQGUHVSHFWIRUQDWLRQDOWUDGLWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHV,WLVQRWD
PDUNHWSODFHRIKRPRJHQHLW\WKDWLVWREHFUHDWHGEXWRQHZKHUHWKH0HPEHU
6WDWHEULQJVLWVRZQEHQHILWVDQGWUDGLWLRQVWRWKDWPDUNHW7KHFRQFHSWRIWKH
¶VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW·LVUHIOHFWLYHRIDPDWXUHYLHZRIWKHPDUNHWSODFHDQGLW
UHFRJQL]HVWKDWLWPD\HYHQEHGHWULPHQWDOWRIUHHWUDGHWRLJQRUHWUDGLWLRQDO
GLIIHUHQFHVWKDWH[LVWDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQ
ZKLFKWUDGHLVFRQGXFWHG
7KHUHKDVEHHQVRPHSHUFHSWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWE\
WKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHLQUHODWLRQIRUH[DPSOHWRDGYHUWLVLQJDQGLVVXHVUHODWLQJ
WRJHQHUDOWUDGLQJFRQGLWLRQVVXFKDVVKRSRSHQLQJKRXUV7KRVHPHDVXUHVDUH
QRWGLUHFWHGDWWKHSURGXFWLWVHOILWLVSURSHUWKDWWKH\DUHQRWWKHQVXEMHFWWR
$UWLFOHH[(&VFUXWLQ\$JUHDWHUFODULW\RIDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKHFRQFHSW
RIWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWZLWKUHVSHFW WRWKHVHPDWWHUVKDVHPHUJHGGXULQJ
WKHODVWRUVR\HDUVVLQFH WKHMXGJPHQWRI.HFNDQG0LWKRXDUG +RZHYHU
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIRWKHUDSSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJH
PHQWWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHKDVEHHQUDWKHUOHVVKHOSIXO:KHQIRUH[DPSOHZLOOWKH
KLQGUDQFHWRWUDGHEHUHJDUGHGDVEHLQJ¶WRRXQFHUWDLQDQGLQGLUHFW·"6RWRRLQ
WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI ¶PDUNHW DFFHVV· IRU H[DPSOH WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH VLPLODU
SURGXFW KDV EHHQ D UHILQHPHQW WKDWPD\ EHPRUH UHIOHFWLYH RI UHDOLW\ LW LV
KRZHYHUDQDVVHVVPHQWWKHLPSRUWHUZLOOLQDOOSUREDELOLW\ILQGPRUHGLIILFXOW
WRDWWHPSW
,W VHHPV WKDW WKH MXULVSUXGHQFH LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWKDV
PDLQWDLQHG WKH ERXQGDULHV HVWDEOLVKHG E\.HFN DQG0LWKRXDUG 7KHUH LV
DUJXDEO\ RQH H[FHSWLRQ WR WKLV ,W LV VXUSULVLQJ WKDW 6DSRG $XGLF Y (FR
(PEDOODJHV 6$ FKRVH WR PDNH D GLVWLQFWLRQ LQ WKH W\SH RI REOLJDWLRQ
LPSRVHGE\WKHQDWLRQDOPHDVXUH7KLVZRXOGDSSHDUWREHDUHWURJUDGHVWHS
ZKHUHDVOLJKWRIKDQGDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOQRZVHHPVDOOWKDWLVQHFHVVDU\WR
UHPRYHWKHPHDVXUHIURP$UWLFOHH[(&VFUXWLQ\7KHMXGJPHQWKDV
ZLGHFRQVHTXHQFHVZLGHUWKDQWKHSDFNDJLQJODZVRIWKHFDVHFRQFHUQHG,WLV
7KH¶6HOOLQJ$UUDQJHPHQW·WKHILUVW'HFDGHDQGEH\RQG 
 6HH $GYRFDWH *HQHUDO -DFREV &DVH & 6RFLHWp G·,PSRUWDWLRQ (GRXDUG /HFOHUF
6LSOHFY7),3XEOLFLWp6$DQG03XEOLFLWp6$ >@(&5,SDUD
 &DVH & DQG & &ULPLQDO 3URFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW %HUQDUG .HFN DQG 'DQLHO
0LWKRXDUG >@(&5,
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D MXGJPHQW QHHGLQJ FODULILFDWLRQ E\ WKH &RXUW RI -XVWLFH DW SUHVHQW LW KDV
VKLIWHGWKHEDODQFHWRRPXFKLQIDYRXURIWKHOHJLVODWXUHRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWH
7KH LPSRUWDQWEDODQFHEHWZHHQDFKLHYLQJIUHH WUDGHDQGUHVSHFWLQJQDWLRQDO
SUHIHUHQFHVLVRXWRINLOWHU
7KHODVW\HDUVRUVRKDVVHHQWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDGGIOHVKWRWKHVNHOH
WDOERQHV'XULQJ WKDW WLPHDSURFHVVRI IDVKLRQLQJ WKHVHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQW
LQWR DQ DFFHVVLEOH WRRO FDSDEOH RI LGHQWLI\LQJ WKH OLPLWV WR WKH VFRSH RI
&RPPXQLW\IUHHPRYHPHQWRIJRRGVODZKDVRFFXUUHGDVLIDOPRVWE\RVPR
VLV 7KH SURFHVV RI H[SRVLWLRQ DQG FRQFHSWXDO UHILQHPHQW VWDUWHG LQ
+QHUPXQG E\ WKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDV\HWDSSHDUV LQFRPSOHWH7KHPRUH
SUDFWLFDO YLHZ LV WKDW LQ WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW D OLYLQJ RUJDQLVP ZDV
FUHDWHG,WVERXQGDULHVDUHQRWIL[HG,QWKHVXEVHTXHQWMXULVSUXGHQFHWKH&RXUW
RI-XVWLFHKDVQHYHUXVHGSUHUHTXLVLWHVRWKHUWKDQWKRVHODLGGRZQLQ.HFNDQG
0LWKRXDUG 7KRXJK WKH EDVLF DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW KDV
EHFRPHFOHDUWKHUHLVDQLQKHUHQWDELOLW\WRPDQLSXODWHLWWRFKDQJLQJFLUFXP
VWDQFHV:K\ VKRXOG WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH VHOOLQJ DUUDQJHPHQW EH FDSDEOH RI
SUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQ"7KHODWWHUPD\LQGHHGEHWKHSHUWLQHQWTXHVWLRQ7KDWWKH
FRQFHSWDURVHLQWKHILUVWSODFHZDVLQUHVSRQVHWR¶>W@KHLQFUHDVLQJWHQGHQF\
RI WUDGHUV WR LQYRNH$UWLFOHRI WKH7UHDW\ DVDPHDQVRIFKDOOHQJLQJDQ\
UXOHVZKRVHHIIHFWLVWROLPLWWKHLUFRPPHUFLDOIUHHGRPHYHQZKHUHVXFKUXOHV
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iv. ‘Trade Mark Protection: Market Partitioning. Objective Test 
Imported where Trade Mark Replaced’, L.M.C.L.Q. 301 – 308 
 
 
 
TRADE MARK PROTECTION AND 
MARKET PARTITIONING 
L.M.C.L.Q 301-308  
 
1. Pharmacia & Upjohn SA, formerly Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S (Case 
C-379/97) (12 October 1999) Unreported. 
 
301 Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova 
The recent judgment of the European Court of Justice in Pharmacia & 
Upjohn v. Paranova 1 provides clarity with respect to the application of 
the concept of market 302 partitioning in Community trade mark law in 
the context of assertion of trade mark rights. Goods had been marketed 
by the trade mark holder throughout the European Community under a 
number of differing trade marks. Action was taken to prevent a parallel 
importer replacing the trade mark used in the state of purchase with the 
mark used by the holder in the state of sale. The court held that an 
objective element is to be imported in the test of artificial partitioning of 
the market between Member States. Reliance by the trade holder in such 
circumstances would contribute to partitioning of the markets between 
Member States. 
Introduction 
The specific purpose of a trade mark is to guarantee the trade mark 
proprietor “the exclusive right to use that trade mark for the purpose of 
putting the product on the market for the first time…to protect…against 
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the 
trade mark by selling products which bear it unlawfully”.2 The trade 
mark acts as a guarantee of the origin of the goods, that they have not 
been tampered with in the marketing process without the consent of the 
trade mark holder.3 
 
With respect to the free movement of goods within the European 
Community, EC, Art. 28 provides “Quantitative restrictions on imports 
and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States”.4 In circumstances of trade mark reliance, the 
prevention by the trade mark holder of the importation and sale of goods 
that have been lawfully placed on the market, by or with the trade mark 
owner’s consent would amount to a “quantitative restriction” or a 
“measure having equivalent effect” within the meaning of EC, Art. 
28.5 In Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova the ECJ was concerned with 
the application of the provisions relating to the free movement of goods 
in the context of trade mark rights. 
 
In the context the exercise of trade mark rights and the application of EC, 
Art. 306 the ECJ developed the principle of the exhaustion of 
rights.7 The court has been consistent, the right in the trade mark could 
not be invoked “in order to prevent the importation and sale of goods 
which had been placed on the market with his consent in another 
Member State”.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm (Case 102/77) [1978] ECR 1139; 
[1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (para. 15); Bristol Myers Squibb and 
Others v. Paranova (Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93) [1996] I 
ECR 3457. 
3. “In such a way as to affect the original condition of the 
product.” Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm (Case 102/77) [1978] ECR 
1139; [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (para. 16); Bristol Myers Squibb and 
Others v. Paranova (Cases C–427/93, C–429/93 and C–436/93) [1996] I 
ECR 3457 (para. 15). 
4. ex EC, Art. 30. 
5. Ibid. 
6. ex EC, Art. 36. The applicable part of EC Art. 30 is the justification 
based on the grounds of “the protection of industrial and commercial 
property”. 
7. The early cases of Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV (Case 
16/74) [1974] ECR 1183; 2 C.M.L.R. 480; and Hoffman-La 
Roche v. Centrafarm (Case 102/77)[1978] ECR 1139; [1978] 3 
C.M.L.R. 217. 
8. Judgment, para. 22. See Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV (Case 
16/74) [1974] ECR 1183, 1194–1195; 2 C.M.L.R. 480. 
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The principle of the exhaustion of trade mark rights is now enshrined in 
legislation. Directive 89/104,9 Art. 7(1) provides “1. The trade mark 
shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods 
which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade 
mark by the proprietor or with his consent. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply 
where there exists legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further 
commercialisation of the goods, especially where the condition of the 
goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market”. 
 
In circumstances wherein the parallel importer has repackaged and 
reaffixed the trade mark to products before placing the goods on the 
market in a Member State the ECJ has held in Bristol Myers Squibb and 
Others v. Paranova A/S 10 that the proprietor of the mark who seeks to 
oppose this action has recourse to the justifications provided by EC, Art. 
30.11 EC, Art. 30 provides justification on “the protection of industrial 
and commercial property”.12 
 
It is clear from Bristol Myers Squibb that EC, Art. 30 justification is 
available where reliance on the trade mark is sought in circumstances of 
repackaging and reaffixing of the trade mark. However, EC, Art. 
3013 further provides: “Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, 
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.”14 In Bristol Myers 
Squibb the ECJ held that trade mark reliance may constitute a “disguised 
restriction” under EC, Art. 3015 if the proprietor, “having regard to the 
marketing system which he has adopted, will contribute to the artificial 
partitioning of the markets between Member States”. 16 Reliance on 
trade mark rights would contribute to the partitioning of markets between 
Member States “in particular where the owner has placed an 
identical…product on the market in several Member States in various 
forms of packaging”.17 
 
In Bristol Myers Squibb the parallel importer had repackaged the 
imported product and reaffixed the original trade mark. By contrast, 
in Pharmacia & Upjohn,the parallel importer had replaced the original 
trade mark used by the proprietor in the Member State of export by the 
trade mark which the proprietor used in the Member State of import. The 
reference from the national court18 in Pharmacia & Upjohn raised two 
issues. First was the appropriate measure by which trade mark rights in 
such circumstances were to be assessed. Was that to be Directive 
89/104,19 and/or EC, Arts 28 and 30? The second issue arising 
concerned the use by the trade mark proprietor of different marks in the 
Member State in which the importer had purchased the product from that 
in which the importer sells the product. In the assessment of whether the 
markets have been artificially 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Council Directive 89/104 EEC of 21/12/88. [1989] O.J. L 040, 0001–
0007. 
10. Bristol Myers Squibb and Others v. Paranova (Cases C-427/93, C-
429/93 and C-436/93) [1996] I ECR 3457. 
11. ex EC Art. 36. 
12. EC Art. 30 (ex EC Art. 36) first sentence. 
13. ex EC, Art. 36. 
14. Ibid., second sentence. 
15. ex EC, Art. 36. 
16. Bristol Myers Squibb and Others v. Paranova (Cases C-427/93, C-
429/93 and C–436/93 [1996] I ECR 3457, 3533 (emphasis added). 
17. Ibid., 3533. 
18. The Sø-og Handelsret. 
19. Council Directive 89/104 EEC of 21/12/88 [1989] O.J.L 040, 0001–
0007. 
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partitioned by the trade mark proprietor, could account either be taken of 
objective circumstances or circumstances subjective to the proprietor? 
 
Two parallel approaches existed with respect to the assessment of market 
partitioning. In Centrafarm v. American Home Products, 20 the trade 
mark had been replaced. In a situation comparable to Pharmacia & 
Upjohn the court in Centrafarm stated that defeat for the trade mark 
owner would occur where the use of the different marks was “a practice 
to be followed…as part of a system of marketing intended to partition 
the markets artificially ”.21 This test imports a subjective element on the 
part of the trade mark holder. 
 
By contrast, in Bristol Myers Squibb, the concept of “artificially 
partitioning the markets between Member States” had imported an 
objective element.22 The court adopted “new criteria”23 in respect of 
determining the scope of the importer’s right to repackage. In Bristol 
Myers Squibb the trade mark had been reaffixed. The ECJ held that “the 
use of the words artificial partitioning of the markets does not imply that 
the importer must demonstrate that, by putting an identical product on 
the market in varying forms of packaging in different Member States, the 
trade mark owner deliberately sought to partition the markets between 
Member States. By stating that the partitioning in question must be 
artificial, the…owner of a trade mark may always rely on his rights…to 
oppose the marketing of repackaged products when such action is 
justified by the need to safeguard the essential function of the trade 
mark, in which case the resultant partitioning could not be regarded as 
artificial”.24 
 
In Bristol Myers Squibb the ECJ deliberately rejected the notion of 
intention as an element integral to the test to be applied in establishing 
whether the markets had been artificially partitioned. In that case, the 
trade mark product had been repackaged. In Pharmacia & Upjohn, the 
trade mark had been replaced. The reference from the national 
court25 in Pharmacia & Upjohn had raised the question of the scope of 
the parallel importer’s right to change the trade mark. Ought the criteria 
as adopted in Bristol Myers Squibb be extended so as to determine the 
rights of the parties in Pharmacia & Upjohn ? 26 
The facts 
The Upjohn group of companies marketed an antibiotic, clindamycin, in 
a variety of forms.27 Within the European Community, the antibiotic 
was marketed under the trade mark “Dalacin C”. However, in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain clindamycin was marketed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. (Case 3/78) [1978] ECR 1823; [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326. 
21. (Case 3/78) [1978] ECR 1823, 1841; [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 
(emphasis added). 
22. See also Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm (Case 102/77) [1978] 
ECR 1139; [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217. 
23. As described by the Advocate General: para. 35. 
24. Bristol Myers Squibb [1996] I ECR 3457, 3536 (emphasis added). 
25. The Sø-og Handelsret. 
26. That issue had arisen in Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm (Case 1/81) [1982] 
ECR 2913; [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 406. However, the ECJ did not rule on 
that aspect of the case. 
27. The subject of the present action was the sale of clindamycin that had 
been sold both in capsule form and as injection fluid. 
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under the name “Dalacin”. In France, Upjohn marketed the drug under 
the name “Dalacine”.28 
 
Paranova,29 a Danish company, purchased clindamycin capsules in 
France.30 The company also purchased injection phials of clindamycin 
in Greece. Paranova then repackaged the goods before marketing them 
under the trade mark “Dalacin”. It was the parallel importation of goods 
manufactured by Upjohn and the subsequent sale by Paranova of those 
goods in Denmark under an Upjohn trade mark that gave rise to the 
present dispute. 
 
Upjohn applied for an injunction before the national court in 
Denmark.31 The application sought to prevent Paranova from marketing 
clindamycin in that State under the “Dalacin” trade mark. That 
application was dismissed. The decision was reversed on appeal by the 
Østre Landsret32 and the application for an injunction was granted. 
Subsequent proceedings were held in Denmark to confirm that 
injunction.33 It was in those proceedings before the Sø-og Handelsret 
that the instant reference to the ECJ was made. In support of the 
injunction, Upjohn argued that the use of different trade marks in 
Greece, France and Denmark with respect to the marketing of 
clindamycin could be justified objectively in Community law. Paranova 
argued that, since in reality Upjohn had used the same trade mark, in 
consequence, the trade mark rights of Upjohn had been exhausted. In the 
alternative, Paranova submitted that the marketing arrangements 
operated by Upjohn had artificially partitioned the market.34 
The judgment 
The judgment in Pharmacia & Upjohn involved two main 
considerations. The first was whether the opposition of Upjohn, the trade 
mark proprietor, to the action of the parallel importer was to be assessed 
by reference to Art. 7 of Directive 89/10435 or to EC, Arts 28 and 
30.36 Secondly, a clarification of the constituent elements involved in 
the concept of market partitioning. Was the approach adopted by the ECJ 
in Bristol Myers Squibb 37 to be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28. The existence of the differing trade marks is explained by an 
agreement concluded in 1968 between the Upjohn Group and American 
Home Products Corporation. It was an agreement whereby the latter 
agreed not to object to the use by the Upjohn Group of the trade mark 
“Dalacin” in Uruguay. In return, the Upjohn Group agreed to restrict the 
use of the trade mark “Dalacin” to the form “Dalacin” with the addition 
of the letter C or with other additions. However, in a number of 
countries, the Upjohn Group experienced difficulties in securing the 
registration of the trade mark “Dalacin C”. As a result, American Home 
Products authorized Upjohn to use the trade mark “Dalacin” in those 
countries. See the judgment, para. 7. 
29. Belonging to the Paranova Group. 
30. In France, clindamycin capsules had been sold by Upjohn in packets 
of 100. 
31. The Fogedret (Bailiff s Court) in Ballerup. 
32. Eastern Regional Court. 
33. Before the Sø-og Handelsret. 
34. Paranova’s primary argument before the Sø-og Handelsret was that 
the different trade marks used by Upjohn in Greece, France, and 
Denmark in reality constituted the same trade mark. As a result, it argued 
that the trade mark rights of the Upjohn Group had been exhausted. It 
argued that the marketing system operated by Upjohn contributed to 
artificial partitioning of the market. See the judgment, para. 10. 
35. Supra, fn, 9. 
36. ex EC, Arts 30 and 36. 
37. [1996] I ECR 3457. 
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preferred to that of Centrafarm v. American Home Products with respect 
to instances of replacement of the trade mark? 
Dispensing first with the issue of the application of either the statutory 
provisions of the Directive or Arts 30 and 36,38 the ECJ held that, where 
the proprietor of the trade mark had used different trade marks in 
different Member States,39 it was “in the light of Article 36 of the Treaty 
that the legality of the trade mark proprietor’s opposition to the 
replacement of the trade mark falls to be assessed”.40 
 
The judgment in Pharmacia & Upjohn was primarily concerned with 
establishing an approach to the assessment of market partitioning. The 
court held: “The condition of artificially partitioning of the markets 
between Member States, as defined by the Court in Bristol Myers 
Squibb applies where a parallel importer replaces the original mark by 
that used by the proprietor in the Member State of import”.41 The test 
with respect to assessment of market partitioning provided in Bristol 
Myers Squibb imports an objective element. In Bristol Myers-Squibb the 
ECJ held that reliance on trade mark rights to oppose the actions of the 
parallel importer “would contribute to the partitioning of markets 
between Member States”42 in circumstances in which the trade mark 
had been reaffixed. In previous instances involving trade mark 
replacement, the assessment of market partitioning had involved a 
subjective element. In Centrafarm 43 in a situation comparable 
to Pharmacia & Upjohn, the court held that the use of different trade 
marks by the proprietor may be a practice followed “as part of a system 
of marketing intended to partition the markets artificially”.44 This 
imports a subjective element in the equation of market partitioning. To 
the extent that the judgment in Pharmacia & Upjohn has replaced the 
subjective with the objective, the judgment has served to clarify the 
position with respect to assessment of market partitioning. Regardless of 
whether the parallel importer has replaced or reaffixed the trade mark, 
integral to the assessment of market partitioning is now an objective 
element. Where the trade mark has been replaced, the approach adopted 
in Centrafarm with respect to market partitioning is no longer good law. 
 
The condition of market partitioning as formulated in Bristol Myers 
Squibb and its application in the context of trade mark replacement 
implies that an act of replacement must be “objectively 
necessary”.45 This condition is satisfied if “the prohibition imposed on 
the importer against replacing the trade mark hinders effective access to 
the markets of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38. Now EC, Arts 28 and 30 respectively. 
39. In Denmark, France and Greece, the Upjohn Group had marketed 
clyndamycin-based pharmaceutical products under different trade marks: 
Judgment, para. 29. 
40. Judgment, para. 29. “It is clear that the answer to the questions 
referred will in any event be the same whether the issue is analysed by 
reference to the Treaty provisions or Article 7”, Advocate General’s 
Opinion, para. 17. 
41. Judgment, para. 40 (emphasis added). “It is clear that the answer to 
the questions referred will in any event be the same whether the issue is 
analysed by reference to the Treaty provisions or Article 7”, Advocate 
General, para. 17. 
42. Bristol Myers Squibb v. Paranova [1996] I ECR 3457, 3534 
(emphasis added). 
43. Supra, fn. 20. 
44. [1978] ECR 1823, 1841; [1979] C.M.L.R. 326. 
45. It is for the national courts to determine whether in each instance this 
condition has been met: Judgment, para. 45. 
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the importing Member State”.46 It is a condition which will not be 
satisfied where the replacement of the trade mark “is explicable solely by 
the parallel importer’s attempt to secure a commercial advantage”.47 
Comment 
First there was disparity, now there is uniformity. As regards application 
of the concept of market partitioning in the context of reliance on trade 
mark rights, the ECJ in Pharmacia & Upjohn has chosen the new over 
the old, the objective over the subjective. Insofar as the adoption of the 
condition of artificial partitioning of the markets as defined in Bristol 
Myers Squibb is concerned, the judgment in Pharmacia & 
Upjohn provides a welcome clarification of the court’s approach to 
assessment of the condition of market partitioning. Whether it be trade 
mark replacement or reaffixing of the mark, the assessment of the 
proprietor’s right will now encompass an objective element. 
After Pharmacia & Upjohn, the apparent test of intent to partition the 
markets as laid down inCentrafarm, incorporating a subjective element, 
is now no longer good law. 
 
What effect then will the stirring into the pot of market intention of an 
element of objectivity have in instances of replacement of the trade 
mark? In the first instance, it will be more difficult for the trade mark 
holder to rely successfully on trade mark rights. 
In Centrafarm circumstances subjective to the trade mark holder were 
accounted for in the equation of assessment of the de facto use of 
different trade marks. Following Pharmacia & Upjohn, that approach 
has now been jettisoned. For the trade mark holder, however, an 
objective measurement may prove a far higher hurdle to overcome in the 
attempt to seek reliance on trade mark rights. Successful reliance on the 
trade mark will encompass reference to circumstances prevailing at the 
time of marketing, making it necessary for the parallel importer to 
replace the trade mark. Secondly, there is a practical advantage in the 
imposition of the criteria as formulated in Bristol Myers Squibb. As 
identified by the ECJ,48 the importation of the objective element “does 
not require national courts to assess evidence of intention, which is 
notoriously difficult to prove”.49 In Bristol Myers Squibb, Jacobs, AG, 
had argued that the “parallel importer who wishes to repackage goods 
needs to be able to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty 
whether he may lawfully do so. The legality of his conduct should not 
depend on the subjective intentions of another person ”.50The 
forcefulness of this argument is clear, uncertainty will reign where the 
rights of the parallel importer are allowed to hinge upon an accident of 
fact, the mere cosmetic difference between repackaging the goods and 
replacement of the trade mark.51 The solution adopted by the ECJ 
in Pharmacia & Upjohn is practical, an objective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Judgment, para. 43: “That would be the case if the rules or practices 
in the importing Member State prevent the product in question from 
being marketed in that State under its trade mark in the exporting 
Member State. This is so where a rule for the protection of consumers 
prohibits the use, in the importing Member State, of the trade mark used 
in the exporting Member State on the ground that it is liable to mislead 
consumers.” 
47. Judgment, para. 44. 
48. Judgment, para. 41. Also noted by Advocate General F.G.Jacobs, 
Opinion, paras 40–42. 
49. Judgment, para. 41. 
50. Bristol Myers Squibb [1996] I ECR 3457, 3495 (emphasis added); 
referred to in Pharmacia & Upjohn, Opinion, para. 40. 
51. A point made with some force by Advocate General F.G.Jacobs, 
Opinion, para. 41. 
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assessment,52 yet one that retains a flexibility to account for evidence of 
an intention 53 that the use of differing trade marks should partition the 
market.54 
 
The judgment in Pharmacia & Upjohn is evidence of the continued 
support shown by the ECJ for furthering the concept of the free 
movement of goods in Community law and for free trade in general. In 
the context of Pharmacia & Upjohn, the effect of that support is to the 
detriment of national trade mark law. In consequence of Pharmacia & 
Upjohn, the shield of protection offered by national trade mark law to the 
trade mark holder will be likely to be less effective. It is now more 
difficult for the trade mark holder to oppose replacement of the mark. 
There are practical concerns with respect to the present context. With 
particular reference to the pharmaceutical market, problems caused by 
differences in national legislation relating to product packaging and 
marketing will always arise. Only future harmonizing measures in the 
EU pharmaceutical field will alleviate the problem caused by differences 
at the national level. Nevertheless, the “harmonizing” effect 
of Pharmacia & Upjohn with respect to the assessment of market 
partitioning has provided a clarity that was lacking. It is certainly 
arguable that the fact that the success or otherwise of the trade mark 
holder in seeking reliance on the mark could be allowed ultimately to 
depend on a mere accident of fact, as either replacement or reaffixing of 
the mark seemed difficult to justify. The importation of the test with 
respect to market partitioning, as formulated in Bristol Myers 
Squibb, provides at the very least that the trade mark holder in seeking 
reliance on the mark is to be treated in the same way regardless of 
whether the mark has been replaced or reaffixed. 
Timothy Connor* 
 
52. In respect of the necessity to replace the original trade mark. 
53. As the Advocate General observed: “Formulating the criterion of 
artificial partitioning of the markets without including intention does 
not…mean, …that intention will always be irrelevant”: Opinion, para. 
42. 
54. This would occur where there had been an attempt to secure a 
commercial advantage. Judgment, para 44.  
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of the West of England.  
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1999 
Case Comment 
Article 39 (ex 48) E.C. offers no protection where 
restriction on free movement rights arises from act of 
migrant worker 
Timothy Connor 
Subject: Banking and finance. Other related subjects: European Union. 
Landlord and tenant 
Keywords: EC law; Free movement of persons; Leases; Mortgagees powers 
and duties 
Legislation: EC Treaty Art.48 (now, after amendment, Art.39 EC)  
Case: Citibank International Plc v Kessler [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 123 (CA 
(Civ Div)) 
 
*E.L. Rev. 525   
 
 
A recent judgment of the Court of Appeal involved the application of the free 
movement rights of a “worker”, a migrant Community national who had 
migrated to another Member State for the purposes of employment. The 
Community national claimed he was prevented from taking up employment in 
the home State due to the terms of a mortgage deed signed during the time 
of the exercise of free movement rights in the United Kingdom. The Court 
held that Article 39 did not render unlawful the mortgagee's insistence on the 
mortgagor's compliance with the terms of the mortgage deed. 
 
 
 
Facts 
In Citibank International v. Kessler and Another,1 the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal concerned the scope and application of the right of free movement 
under Article 39 E.C.2 Peter Kessler, a German national, had exercised free 
movement rights under Article 39 E.C.3 within the United Kingdom.4 A family 
home in Wokingham was purchased during that time. The property was 
acquired with the aid of two loans,5 both advanced by Citibank Trust Limited 
(“the Bank”). Repayment of the loans was secured by legal charge6 executed 
in favour of the Bank on December 19, 1988.7 The conditions incorporated in 
the legal charge contained a covenant by the mortgagor not, without the prior 
written consent of the mortgagee, to lease or to agree to lease the whole or 
any part of the mortgaged property.8 
 
In September 1991 Mr Kessler left the United Kingdom and returned to 
Germany to work as a business consultant. The Wokingham property had by 
this time become unsaleable.9 To avoid incurring liability for running costs, Mr 
Kessler sought to let the property. The terms of the legal charge required the 
mortgagor to obtain the prior written consent of the mortgagee bank prior to 
an agreement to lease of a lease of the property.10 Permission *E.L. Rev. 
526 from the Bank was sought for a lease of the property to Coca Cola of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.11 That permission was refused. 
 
By the end of 1993,12 Mr Kessler had fallen into arrears with respect to the 
repayments of both the loans secured on the property. The interest of 
Citibank Trust as mortgagee became vested in the Bank with effect from 
December 31, 1993. In 1994, the Bank commenced possession proceedings in 
the County Court in relation to Mr Kessler's property.13 Judgment was given in 
favour of Mr Kessler.14 The Bank appealed from the judgment of the County 
Court to the Court of Appeal.15 Mr Kessler, the respondent, in the action by 
the Bank for repossession of the property in Wokingham, argued16 that the 
legal charge taken by the Bank contained an implied term that consent to 
letting would not be unreasonably withheld.17 Pleading in the alternative, Mr 
Kesslers' defence stated “If the term is not to be implied as a matter of law, 
the requirements of E.C. law under the E.C. Treaty Article[s] 48 [now 39] 
prevail over terms of the Legal Charge by virtue of sections 2(1) and 2(4) of 
the European Communities Act 1972.18 Further, that by the Plaintiff acting in 
breach of Article[s] 48 [now 39] of the EC Treaty, the Plaintiff has committed 
tortious wrongs against ” Mr Kessler.19 Mr Kessler claimed that the Bank's 
refusal to consent20 to the letting of the property was unreasonable and in 
breach of the alleged implied term contained in the Mortgage Conditions.21 Mr 
Kessler quantified his loss as “£400,000 or thereabouts”.22 He alleged that he 
would have been able to repay23the loans to the Bank had he been free to let 
the property.24 
 
The outcome 
 
A Community national may migrate as a worker to another Member State for 
the purposes of employment therein.25 The judgment in Citibank 
International considered the applicability of Community free movement rights 
of the worker in the context of the allegation by the respondent that a 
restriction on their exercise had been caused by the enforcement *E.L. Rev. 
527  of the terms of a mortgage deed. The Court of Appeal held that the 
scope of Article 39 E.C.26 did not protect the migrant worker against strict 
enforcement of the terms of that deed. The respondent in an action for 
repossession, a Community national, was bound by the terms of the mortgage 
deed, even though the claim was that he thereby was unable to accept a 
three year contract of employment in Germany.27 
 
In Citibank International, the judgment of the Court of Appeal can be divided 
into two parts. First, the Court considered the appropriateness of recourse to 
the free movement rights provided to the migrant Community national by 
Article 39 E.C.28 This involved an assessment of both the scope and 
applicability29 of Article 39 E.C.30 Secondly, the Court examined the unrelated 
question whether the mortgage deed contained an implied term that consent 
to letting would not be unreasonably withheld.31 In addressing the first 
consideration, the Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's contention of an 
incompatibility with Community free movement rights. The respondent's 
reliance upon the judgments of the European Court of Justice in Walrave and 
Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Iternationale and others 32 and Union 
Royale Belge des Sociétés Association ASBL and others v. Bosman 33 was 
rejected by the Court, the restrictions in issue in both those cases having 
been levied on the exercise on the right of free movement itself. In Walrave 
and Koch, the relevant rules were “rule aimed at regulating in a collective 
manner gainful employment”.34 
 
Freedom of movement in this context is expressed in terms of the right to “to 
accept offers of employment”.35 Both Walrave and Koch and 
Bosman concerned a challenge to the very heart of the right itself. In the 
Court's view, Citibank International did not present the same challenge to free 
movement rights. In consequence, the claim by Mr Kessler that his inability to 
discharge existing financial commitments in the United Kingdom36 had 
hindered his ability to take up employment in Germany was dismissed by the 
Court of Appeal. The Court was of the opinion that “the obstacle is the Bank's 
wish to rely on its own judgment as to the continuing need for the protection 
of its security. In my view that is simply not the sort of obstacle to which the 
provisions of Article 48 [now 39] of the Treaty are directed [emphasis 
added].37 Consequently, the Bank's insistence “on the *E.L. Rev. 
528  protection which clause 2.17.2 of the mortgage was intended to provide 
is not incompatible with the provisions of Article 48 [now 39] of the Treaty”.38 
 
Having held that Article 3939 protection could not be afforded the migrant, the 
Court proceeded with an examination of the alternative claim put forward by 
the respondent that tortious liability in damages would arise where the 
plaintiff Bank sought to rely on the terms of the mortgage deed to the 
detriment of free movement rights. There were “three routes” by which this 
contention was advanced. First, a term should be implied into the mortgage 
“that the mortgagee will not be entitled unreasonably to withhold consent to a 
letting by the mortgagor”.40 Secondly, that the terms of the mortgage 
deed41 were “in some way” to be subordinated to Article 39 E.C. 
rights.42 Thirdly, tortious liability should be imposed where the refusal by the 
mortgagee “hinder[s] the mortgagor in giving effect to his wish, as a worker, 
to move freely within the Community”.43 
 
As to the first contention of the respondent, that the mortgagee would not 
unreasonably withhold consent “to letting the property,”44the Court held that 
“A term in the form pleaded would go far beyond anything needed to give 
effect to any requirement imposed by Article 48 [now 39]”45 E.C. [Emphasis 
added]. Neither could it be implied by events which had occurred subsequent 
to the execution of the legal charge which Mr Kessler had pleaded in his 
defence. Consequently, the contention that an implied term existed to this 
effect46 was struck out by the Court.47 As to the “second route” to the 
imposition of tortious liability, the Court examined the conditions of the 
mortgage deed in the light of Article 39. The Court held that provisions in 
question applied regardless of the nationality of the mortgagor and there was 
no discrimination on the grounds of nationality. “In so far as they do hinder 
freedom of movement they do so as much in the case of a United Kingdom 
national who wishes to seek work in Germany as they do in the case of a 
German national who wishes to return to work in Germany”.48 The Court 
continued “Nor can it be said that the provisions of [the mortgage deed] 
curtail, or in any way cut down, abrogate or limit, the right to do any of the 
things specified in” Article 39(3). “The right to accept offers of employment, 
the right to move freely within the territory of the United Kingdom or between 
the United Kingdom and other Member States for the purpose of employment, 
the right to stay in the United Kingdom for the purpose of employment or 
after having been employed here all continue to exist unaltered ”49*E.L. Rev. 
529  [emphasis added]. By contrast, in Walrave and Koch,50 the Court of 
Justice had held that the plaintiffs could not accept offers of employment as 
pacemakers to a stayer of a different nationality. “The right of Bosman to 
move for the purposes of employment was limited by the rules of the 
international federation. In consequence, the Court of Appeal in Citibank 
International concluded that the respondent could not rely on Article 39 and 
consequently was bound by the terms of the mortgage deed.51 
Comment 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the Court of Appeal in Citibank 
International found for the plaintiff bank. According to United Kingdom law, 
the Bank was legally entitled to refuse consent to the creation of a lease over 
the mortgaged property by the mortgagor in favour of Coca Cola 
Ltd.52 However, the issues arising in Citibank International are wider than the 
mere power to enforce the covenant contained in a domestic mortgage deed. 
They present a wider concern, that of the application of Community law in the 
sometimes difficult area of the interface between Community and national 
law. 
 
The ease with which the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's arguments 
belie the importance of the issue arising in Citibank International, that of the 
potency of Community law free movement rights, in particular those granted 
by Article 39 E.C. The Court had distinguished both Walrave and 
Koch and Bosman on the grounds that the restrictions on free movement 
related specifically to the contract of employment. In the instant case 
however, the defendant's claim in substance was the same: only by reference 
to the domestic rules of contract rather than other rules imposed at the 
national level, did it differ. Rather than dismiss the defendant's claim, a 
proper assessment by the Court of the merits of that claim would have 
encompassed analysis of the outer limits of Article 39. It was not sufficient for 
the Court to hold that it is “impossible to understand how events subsequent 
to the execution of the legal charge can be relied upon as a basis for implying 
a contractual term into the transaction evidenced or effected by that 
charge”.53 If de facto free movement rights had been restricted by the Bank's 
actions, the Court of Appeal ought to have given some consideration to the 
question as to whether Article 39 protection was merited. The remark by the 
Court that the situation arising in Citibank International “is simply not the sort 
of obstacle to which the provisions of Article 48 [now 39] of the Treaty are 
directed”54 [emphasis added], does not go far enough.55 What is required is a 
proper analysis of the extent of the free movement right under Article 
39.56 With regard to that right, the Court of Justice has in another context for 
example looked *E.L. Rev. 530  beyond the narrow basis of the contract of 
employment. In Ministère Public v. Even 57 it held that the right to “social 
advantages”58 does not depend solely on the existence of the contract of 
employment. By analogy therefore, it is arguable that restrictions need not 
only apply to the right itself. Conceivably any de facto restriction on the right 
could be subject to Article 39 scrutiny. In relation to the instant case, the 
Court argued that “there must be a danger that banks would be less willing to 
lend to those whose occupation was such that they would wish to move 
between Member States for the purpose of seeking employment; if there were 
a risk that provisions which were included in the loan documentation for the 
protection of the lender would be held unenforceable in those circumstances. 
They would prefer to lend to United Kingdom nationals”.59 This is wide of the 
mark. The Court of Appeal at this point openly courts the prospect of 
discrimination against the migrant national. However, it is clear that in 
Community law this would be unlawful.60 Neither does the prospect that 
United Kingdom nationals seeking work in Germany would be treated in the 
same way help. While this might be an accurate statement of fact, it remains 
a comparison that is at best unhelpful. The issue here must remain the lawful 
treatment of the migrant Community national. If the achievement of that end 
means that the home national suffers reverse discrimination, then so be 
it.61 Article 39 E.C. has been held to be horizontally directly effective, so the 
rights provided by it can be enforced against individuals.62 A finding by the 
Court in Citibank International that free movement rights had been impeded 
would have resulted in the imposition of liability upon the bank. 
 
The judgment in Citibank International obfuscates the issue of the scope and 
the application of the free movement rights of Article 39, because it failed to 
examine fully the boundaries of Article 39 protection. Whilst the conclusion 
reached by the Court of Appeal may indeed be an accurate representation of 
the scope of Community free movement rights, a judgment which considered 
more overtly the issues in the context of an attempt to locate the boundaries 
of those rights would have been more helpful. The arguments raised by the 
defence were as innovative as they were far reaching. It is a pity that they 
have not received an airing before the Court of Justice.63 The issues raised 
in Citibank International remain too important to be left for national courts to 
decide.64 
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A recent Court of Appeal Judgment considered a claim for “indefinite leave to 
remain” in the United Kingdom by the spouses of two United Kingdom 
nationals who had returned to the United Kingdom after exercising free 
movement rights elsewhere within the European Community. The spouses 
were of Algerian and Indian nationality. The facts as presented, give rise to a 
consideration of the Community law right of residence given to a member of 
the family of a “worker”. The Court of Appeal chose to assess the residence 
rights of the Algerian and Indian spouses in accordance with national law. 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Mohammed Zeghraba and Sarabjit Singh Sahota[1997] 
3 C.M.L.R. 575. 
 
 
 
 
Background 
 
A Community national is entitled to take up employment within the territory 
of any Member State of the European Community. Considered to be 
a worker in Community law,1 the migrant is the recipient of rights2 given by 
Community law. Associated with the worker status, the purpose of these 
rights is to facilitate the exercise by the worker of the right of free movement. 
 
Not only have Community law rights been extended to the worker, qua 
worker, but also to members of the family of the worker.3 It is one of the 
rights, the right of residence, afforded to the spouse of the worker that was 
the subject of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Mohammed Zeghraba and Sarabjit Singh 
Sahota. It is an interpretation of that Community law right by the national 
court that is the subject of this commentary. 
 
According to Article 4(1), Directive 68/360, the spouse has a right of 
residence with the worker, in the state of migration.4 It is a right given 
irrespective of the nationality of the spouse.5 The right is to be evidenced by a 
residence permit.6 The spouse who is a national of a third state, “shall be 
issued with a residence document which shall have the same *E.L.R. 
185  validity as that issued to the worker ”. [emphasis added]7 It is clear 
from the directive that the residence document given to the spouse must 
mirror that given to the worker. Where for example, the worker is entitled to 
a residence document of unlimited duration, the spouse is similarly so 
entitled. 
 
The appeals in Zeghraba and Sahota arose before the Court of Appeal 
because two non-Community nationals, married to United Kingdom nationals, 
had been refused “indefinite leave to remain” in the United Kingdom. Both 
applicants had claimed that Community law required an acknowledgment that 
their residence in the United Kingdom was to be on the same terms as that 
extended to their spouses as United Kingdom nationals.8 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota raised questions 
as to the nature of the Community law right of residence given to the spouse 
of a worker, where that spouse is not a Community national. 
 
Facts 
 
Sarabjit Singh Sahota was a citizen of India. Mohammed Zeghraba was an 
Algerian citizen. Their spouses were United Kingdom nationals.9 Between 1989 
and 1994, Mrs Amarjit Kaur Sahota resided and worked in Germany.10 In 
1990 she married Sarabjit Singh Sahota.11 In 1994, she returned to the 
United Kingdom accompanied by her husband. Mr Sahota was given leave to 
enter the United Kingdom as a visitor for six months.12 An application later in 
that year by Mr Sahota for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom 
was refused.13 The Home Office however issued a residence document of 
limited duration, valid only until November 24, 1999.14 The authorities 
indicated that Mr Sahota's request for indefinite leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom would be considered once his wife had “ completed four years in 
employment in the United Kingdom”.15 Only at that time would he be issued 
with a residence document of unlimited duration. 
 
Maria Zeghraba, a United Kingdom national married Mohammed Zeghraba, an 
Algerian citizen in the United Kingdom in 1992. In 1993 they moved to the 
Republic of Ireland, where Mrs Zeghraba worked for a few months. In 1994 
they returned to the United Kingdom, Mrs Zeghraba commencing work at a 
restaurant in Ealing. Mr Zeghraba then applied for leave to remain in the 
United Kingdom on the basis that he was “ the husband of an EEC 
worker”,16 his spouse being a British citizen settled and working in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
*E.L.R. 186  Mr Zeghraba was granted leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom. However, the right was made subject to a temporal restriction, until 
May 9, 1999.17 An application was then made by Mr Zeghraba for indefinite 
leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis that he was the spouse of 
a Community worker exercising free movement rights within the 
Community.18 
 
The claim by Mr Zeghraba for indefinite leave to remain was rejected.19 He 
was given a five year residence permit. The United Kingdom authorities stated 
that future consideration for indefinite leave to remain would be made upon 
Mr Zeghraba's application only “after his wife has been living and working in 
the United Kingdom for four years and continues to do so ”.20 
 
Both applicants had been given leave to remain in the United Kingdom. At 
issue on appeal was the identification of the terms on which that leave to 
remain had been given. The Immigration Appeals Tribunal sitting in two 
different constitutions had reached inconsistent and conflicting decisions. Mr 
Sahota had been accorded indefinite leave to remain, “a right of residence in 
line with the right of residence granted to his wife”.21 However, 
in Zeghraba, the tribunal held that the United Kingdom national, on return to 
the United Kingdom had ceased to exercise free movement rights. In 
consequence, her spouse was not entitled to the right of residence extended 
to members of the family of a worker.22 Mr Zeghraba was granted leave to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal by Hirst L.J. 
 
Mr Sahota appealed in the first instance to the adjudicator against the refusal 
by the United Kingdom authorities to grant him indefinite leave to remain. The 
adjudicator dismissed that appeal. Mr Sahota's subsequent appeal to the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal was allowed. The Secretary of State was granted 
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
 
The outcome 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota was founded on 
an interpretation that the right of residence given in Community law to the 
spouse of the worker is a right which could be restricted in duration. After 
reviewing the provisions of Community law with respect to that right, the 
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that “ an unlimited right to reside is not an 
entitlement envisaged by any relevant Community regulation or directive 
”.23 It was a judgment that gave some credence to the view previously 
expressed by the Immigration Appeals Tribunal in Zeghraba that once the 
United Kingdom nationals had returned to the United Kingdom, they had 
ceased to exercise free movement rights. The protection under Community 
law, previously given to their families thereby ceased. 
 
Having found that Community law rights were not the applicable sources of 
residence rights, with respect to Mr Zeghraba and Mr Sahota, the Court of 
Appeal then turned its *E.L.R. 187  attention to consideration of national law 
as a source of such rights. Although the Home Office acknowledged that in 
both instances the application for an indefinite leave had been made under 
Community law,24 the authority for imposition of the five year restriction was 
taken from national law.25 The court was of the view that an extension of an 
unlimited right to reside would in the circumstances extend a privilege “to 
United Kingdom citizens not enjoyed by citizens of other Member States 
entering the United Kingdom in exercise of identical rights of free 
movement”.26 Community law provided a “different and more restricted” right 
of residence than the one offered by United Kingdom law. The rights given by 
national law to United Kingdom nationals, such as the right of abode,27 were 
not similarly acquired automatically on marriage by the spouses who were not 
of United Kingdom nationality. United Kingdom law distinguishes between 
British citizens with a right of abode and Community nationals exercising free 
movement rights.28 The right of abode was defined by the Court of Appeal as 
“an unlimited right to reside”.29 A United Kingdom national with a right of 
abode cannot be deported from that country.30 By contrast, the Community 
law right of residence contemplated a more restrictive right of residence. In 
consequence, the Court of Appeal was of the view that to grant both Mr 
Zeghraba and Mr Sahota an unlimited right to reside would in the 
circumstances “involve a discriminatory distinction in Community law against 
citizens of Member States other than the United Kingdom”.31 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal held to be lawful the decisions by the 
United Kingdom authorities to impose temporal limits on the applicants' 
residence in the United Kingdom. Both Zeghraba and Sahota in the first 
instance were to be entitled to remain in the United Kingdom for only five 
years.32 Their right of residence was limited because at the time of the 
application, the strictures imposed by national law could not be complied with. 
“Indefinite leave” would be granted only after the applicant's spouse had been 
present in the United Kingdom for four years as a family member.33 
 
Comment 
 
The Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota held that recognition of an 
entitlement to an indefinite leave to remain would have been a step too far 
given the circumstances. A hybrid situation had arisen, one for which the 
Community law had not specifically articulated a right of residence. Taken as 
an apparent lacuna in Community law with respect to the provision of 
residence rights afforded to the spouse of a worker, the authorities had 
responded by creating the fiction of United Kingdom nationals being entitled 
to a residence permit of only five years in duration. Using that fiction, the 
residence document given to the non-Community spouse were similarly 
limited in *E.L.R. 188  duration. The requirement imposed by Article 4(4), 
Directive 68/360, that the spouse of the worker be issued with a document of 
“the same validity” as that given to the worker was thereby apparently 
satisfied.34 
 
The fiction of the “deemed” residence35 granted to the United Kingdom 
national appears unconvincing. Its creation by the United Kingdom authorities 
were merely convenient. It has however served only to derail the national 
court from a proper consideration the application of a Community law right. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the applicants' claim for residence was 
founded in Community law.36 Such rights are available to a worker who has 
exercised free movement rights.37 Yet national law was chosen as the basis 
for the assessment of that right. That consideration of Community law was 
jettisoned in favour of national law must be a cause of some concern. 
 
It is arguable that the temporal limitations placed on the applicants' right of 
residence do not adequately reflect the extent of their Community law right. 
The extension of a limited right of residence may be unlawful. In an 
equivalent situation,38 the Court of Justice in R. v. IAT and Surrinder Singh, ex 
parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, held that the spouse, the 
non-Community national, “must enjoy at least the same rights of residence as 
would be granted under Community law if his or her spouse chose to reside in 
another Member State”.39 Both Mrs Zeghraba and Mrs Sahota were United 
Kingdom nationals, each with a right of abode in that country.40 The 
Immigration Act 1971 states that a right of abode means “a right to be free to 
live in, the United Kingdom”.41 Based on the concept of the right of abode as 
an “unlimited right to reside”42 it is arguable that residence rights afforded to 
the spouse as a non-Community national, should accurately reflect the same. 
The returning workers, the United Kingdom nationals, had an unrestricted 
right of residence on their return to the United Kingdom. Community law 
demands that like should be treated with like, the non-Community spouses of 
those nationals were entitled to an acknowledgment of residence rights 
equivalent to an indefinite leave to remain. 
 
The effect of the refusal of the national court to consider properly the source 
of residence rights may have far reaching consequences for the assertion of 
Community rights. It was held in Royer that the right of residence is a right 
“conferred directly, on any persons falling within the scope of Community law, 
by the Treaty, especially Article[s] 48, [and] by its implementing 
provisions”.43 For the spouse therefore, as part of the worker's *E.L.R. 
189  family, the right of residence is a directly enforceable right. The refusal 
of the Court of Appeal to acknowledge Community law as the source of 
residence rights is to be deprecated. It is a refusal which has been effective to 
remove the protection offered by a directly enforceable Community law right. 
 
As far as the United Kingdom judiciary are concerned, Zeghraba and 
Sahota, represents a resurgence of a reluctance to refer to the Court of 
Justice. In Re Sandhu, 44 the House of Lords held that separation and divorce 
ended the rights of the non-Community spouse.45 Where a question of 
interpretation of Community law arises, the House of Lords, as a court of “last 
resort” is under a duty to refer to the Court of Justice.46 In Sandhu, no such 
reference was made. Whether the Court of Appeal can be considered to be a 
court of “last resort” in the present instance, is less clear. Leave to appeal to 
the House of Lords being refused, the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in Zeghraba and Sahota, was prima facie a decision against which there was 
“no judicial remedy under national law”.47 However, the Court of Appeal has 
previously emphasised that leave to appeal to the House of Lords can be 
sought by the parties themselves.48 Although the precise nature of the duty to 
refer in the present circumstances therefore remains unclear, it is arguable 
that as the judgment of the national court is concerned with the nature and 
the extent of a Community right,49 then a reference should have been made 
to the Court of Justice. 
 
It is regrettable that no reference to the Court of Justice was made in 
Zeghraba and Sahota. The Court of Justice in Diatta v. Land Berlin, 50for 
example held that a spouse, a non-Community national, did not thereby lose 
Community residence rights on account of merely living apart from the 
worker. Though the parameters of the Community law right of residence 
offered to the spouse of a worker are at present unclear, it is arguable that 
the Court of Justice would err on the side of extending a security of residence 
to the non-Community spouse. An extension to the applicants of an unlimited 
right to reside in the United Kingdom would appear to be an adequate 
reflection of the residence rights extended by Community law in respect of 
members of the worker's family. The position will however remain unclear 
unless national courts refer the issues raised in Zeghraba and Sahota to the 
Court of Justice for exposition before that court. 
 
Finally, had Zeghraba and Sahota been heard before the Court of Justice, an 
additional avenue of argument might have been available to the applicants in 
support of their claim for indefinite leave to remain. There is merit in the 
argument that not to extend to the non-Community spouse an unrestricted 
right to reside, might be an infringement of the principle of respect for family 
life enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.51 An 
obligation has been placed on the Community to respect human *E.L.R. 
190  rights guaranteed in the Convention.52 The adoption of such an approach 
was rejected as “immaterial” by the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and 
Sahota. 53 In view of the developing jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice54 with respect to the recognition of human rights in Community law, 
such rejection might indeed appear hasty. 
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Non-Community spouses: interpretation of Community 
residence rights 
Timothy C. Connor 
Subject: European Union. Other related subjects: Immigration 
Keywords: EC law; Free movement of persons; Right of abode; Spouses 
Case: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Sahota [1999] 
Q.B. 597 (CA (Civ Div)) 
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A recent Court of Appeal Judgment considered a claim for “indefinite leave to 
remain” in the United Kingdom by the spouses of two United Kingdom 
nationals who had returned to the United Kingdom after exercising free 
movement rights elsewhere within the European Community. The spouses 
were of Algerian and Indian nationality. The facts as presented, give rise to a 
consideration of the Community law right of residence given to a member of 
the family of a “worker”. The Court of Appeal chose to assess the residence 
rights of the Algerian and Indian spouses in accordance with national law. 
 
 
 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Mohammed Zeghraba and Sarabjit Singh Sahota[1997] 
3 C.M.L.R. 575. 
 
Background 
 
A Community national is entitled to take up employment within the territory 
of any Member State of the European Community. Considered to be 
a worker in Community law,1 the migrant is the recipient of rights2 given by 
Community law. Associated with the worker status, the purpose of these 
rights is to facilitate the exercise by the worker of the right of free movement. 
 
Not only have Community law rights been extended to the 
worker, quaworker, but also to members of the family of the worker.3 It is 
one of the rights, the right of residence, afforded to the spouse of the worker 
that was the subject of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Mohammed Zeghraba and 
Sarabjit Singh Sahota. It is an interpretation of that Community law right by 
the national court that is the subject of this commentary. 
 
According to Article 4(1), Directive 68/360, the spouse has a right of 
residence with the worker, in the state of migration.4 It is a right given 
irrespective of the nationality of the spouse.5 The right is to be evidenced by a 
residence permit.6 The spouse who is a national of a third state, “shall be 
issued with a residence document which shall have the same *E.L.R. 
185  validity as that issued to the worker ”. [emphasis added]7 It is clear 
from the directive that the residence document given to the spouse must 
mirror that given to the worker. Where for example, the worker is entitled to 
a residence document of unlimited duration, the spouse is similarly so 
entitled. 
 
The appeals in Zeghraba and Sahota arose before the Court of Appeal 
because two non-Community nationals, married to United Kingdom nationals, 
had been refused “indefinite leave to remain” in the United Kingdom. Both 
applicants had claimed that Community law required an acknowledgment that 
their residence in the United Kingdom was to be on the same terms as that 
extended to their spouses as United Kingdom nationals.8 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota raised questions 
as to the nature of the Community law right of residence given to the spouse 
of a worker, where that spouse is not a Community national. 
 
Facts 
 
Sarabjit Singh Sahota was a citizen of India. Mohammed Zeghraba was an 
Algerian citizen. Their spouses were United Kingdom nationals.9Between 1989 
and 1994, Mrs Amarjit Kaur Sahota resided and worked in Germany.10 In 
1990 she married Sarabjit Singh Sahota.11 In 1994, she returned to the 
United Kingdom accompanied by her husband. Mr Sahota was given leave to 
enter the United Kingdom as a visitor for six months.12 An application later in 
that year by Mr Sahota for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom 
was refused.13 The Home Office however issued a residence document of 
limited duration, valid only until November 24, 1999.14 The authorities 
indicated that Mr Sahota's request for indefinite leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom would be considered once his wife had “ completed four years in 
employment in the United Kingdom”.15 Only at that time would he be issued 
with a residence document of unlimited duration. 
 
Maria Zeghraba, a United Kingdom national married Mohammed Zeghraba, an 
Algerian citizen in the United Kingdom in 1992. In 1993 they moved to the 
Republic of Ireland, where Mrs Zeghraba worked for a few months. In 1994 
they returned to the United Kingdom, Mrs Zeghraba commencing work at a 
restaurant in Ealing. Mr Zeghraba then applied for leave to remain in the 
United Kingdom on the basis that he was “ the husband of an EEC 
worker”,16 his spouse being a British citizen settled and working in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
*E.L.R. 186  Mr Zeghraba was granted leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom. However, the right was made subject to a temporal restriction, until 
May 9, 1999.17 An application was then made by Mr Zeghraba for indefinite 
leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis that he was the spouse of 
a Community worker exercising free movement rights within the 
Community.18 
 
The claim by Mr Zeghraba for indefinite leave to remain was rejected.19 He 
was given a five year residence permit. The United Kingdom authorities stated 
that future consideration for indefinite leave to remain would be made upon 
Mr Zeghraba's application only “after his wife has been living and working in 
the United Kingdom for four years and continues to do so ”.20 
 
Both applicants had been given leave to remain in the United Kingdom. At 
issue on appeal was the identification of the terms on which that leave to 
remain had been given. The Immigration Appeals Tribunal sitting in two 
different constitutions had reached inconsistent and conflicting decisions. Mr 
Sahota had been accorded indefinite leave to remain, “a right of residence in 
line with the right of residence granted to his wife”.21 However, 
in Zeghraba, the tribunal held that the United Kingdom national, on return to 
the United Kingdom had ceased to exercise free movement rights. In 
consequence, her spouse was not entitled to the right of residence extended 
to members of the family of a worker.22 Mr Zeghraba was granted leave to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal by Hirst L.J. 
 
Mr Sahota appealed in the first instance to the adjudicator against the refusal 
by the United Kingdom authorities to grant him indefinite leave to remain. The 
adjudicator dismissed that appeal. Mr Sahota's subsequent appeal to the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal was allowed. The Secretary of State was granted 
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
 
The outcome 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota was founded on 
an interpretation that the right of residence given in Community law to the 
spouse of the worker is a right which could be restricted in duration. After 
reviewing the provisions of Community law with respect to that right, the 
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that “ an unlimited right to reside is not an 
entitlement envisaged by any relevant Community regulation or directive 
”.23 It was a judgment that gave some credence to the view previously 
expressed by the Immigration Appeals Tribunal in Zeghraba that once the 
United Kingdom nationals had returned to the United Kingdom, they had 
ceased to exercise free movement rights. The protection under Community 
law, previously given to their families thereby ceased. 
 
Having found that Community law rights were not the applicable sources of 
residence rights, with respect to Mr Zeghraba and Mr Sahota, the Court of 
Appeal then turned its *E.L.R. 187  attention to consideration of national law 
as a source of such rights. Although the Home Office acknowledged that in 
both instances the application for an indefinite leave had been made under 
Community law,24 the authority for imposition of the five year restriction was 
taken from national law.25 The court was of the view that an extension of an 
unlimited right to reside would in the circumstances extend a privilege “to 
United Kingdom citizens not enjoyed by citizens of other Member States 
entering the United Kingdom in exercise of identical rights of free 
movement”.26 Community law provided a “different and more restricted” right 
of residence than the one offered by United Kingdom law. The rights given by 
national law to United Kingdom nationals, such as the right of abode,27 were 
not similarly acquired automatically on marriage by the spouses who were not 
of United Kingdom nationality. United Kingdom law distinguishes between 
British citizens with a right of abode and Community nationals exercising free 
movement rights.28 The right of abode was defined by the Court of Appeal as 
“an unlimited right to reside”.29 A United Kingdom national with a right of 
abode cannot be deported from that country.30 By contrast, the Community 
law right of residence contemplated a more restrictive right of residence. In 
consequence, the Court of Appeal was of the view that to grant both Mr 
Zeghraba and Mr Sahota an unlimited right to reside would in the 
circumstances “involve a discriminatory distinction in Community law against 
citizens of Member States other than the United Kingdom”.31 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal held to be lawful the decisions by the 
United Kingdom authorities to impose temporal limits on the applicants' 
residence in the United Kingdom. Both Zeghraba and Sahota in the first 
instance were to be entitled to remain in the United Kingdom for only five 
years.32 Their right of residence was limited because at the time of the 
application, the strictures imposed by national law could not be complied with. 
“Indefinite leave” would be granted only after the applicant's spouse had been 
present in the United Kingdom for four years as a family member.33 
 
Comment 
 
The Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and Sahota held that recognition of an 
entitlement to an indefinite leave to remain would have been a step too far 
given the circumstances. A hybrid situation had arisen, one for which the 
Community law had not specifically articulated a right of residence. Taken as 
an apparent lacuna in Community law with respect to the provision of 
residence rights afforded to the spouse of a worker, the authorities had 
responded by creating the fiction of United Kingdom nationals being entitled 
to a residence permit of only five years in duration. Using that fiction, the 
residence document given to the non-Community spouse were similarly 
limited in *E.L.R. 188  duration. The requirement imposed by Article 4(4), 
Directive 68/360, that the spouse of the worker be issued with a document of 
“the same validity” as that given to the worker was thereby apparently 
satisfied.34 
 
The fiction of the “deemed” residence35 granted to the United Kingdom 
national appears unconvincing. Its creation by the United Kingdom authorities 
were merely convenient. It has however served only to derail the national 
court from a proper consideration the application of a Community law right. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the applicants' claim for residence was 
founded in Community law.36 Such rights are available to a worker who has 
exercised free movement rights.37 Yet national law was chosen as the basis 
for the assessment of that right. That consideration of Community law was 
jettisoned in favour of national law must be a cause of some concern. 
 
It is arguable that the temporal limitations placed on the applicants' right of 
residence do not adequately reflect the extent of their Community law right. 
The extension of a limited right of residence may be unlawful. In an 
equivalent situation,38 the Court of Justice in R. v. IAT and Surrinder Singh, ex 
parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, held that the spouse, the 
non-Community national, “must enjoy at least the same rights of residence as 
would be granted under Community law if his or her spouse chose to reside in 
another Member State”.39 Both Mrs Zeghraba and Mrs Sahota were United 
Kingdom nationals, each with a right of abode in that country.40 The 
Immigration Act 1971 states that a right of abode means “a right to be free to 
live in, the United Kingdom”.41 Based on the concept of the right of abode as 
an “unlimited right to reside”42 it is arguable that residence rights afforded to 
the spouse as a non-Community national, should accurately reflect the same. 
The returning workers, the United Kingdom nationals, had an unrestricted 
right of residence on their return to the United Kingdom. Community law 
demands that like should be treated with like, the non-Community spouses of 
those nationals were entitled to an acknowledgment of residence rights 
equivalent to an indefinite leave to remain. 
 
The effect of the refusal of the national court to consider properly the source 
of residence rights may have far reaching consequences for the assertion of 
Community rights. It was held in Royer that the right of residence is a right 
“conferred directly, on any persons falling within the scope of Community law, 
by the Treaty, especially Article[s] 48, [and] by its implementing 
provisions”.43 For the spouse therefore, as part of the worker's *E.L.R. 
189  family, the right of residence is a directly enforceable right. The refusal 
of the Court of Appeal to acknowledge Community law as the source of 
residence rights is to be deprecated. It is a refusal which has been effective to 
remove the protection offered by a directly enforceable Community law right. 
 
As far as the United Kingdom judiciary are concerned, Zeghraba and 
Sahota, represents a resurgence of a reluctance to refer to the Court of 
Justice. In Re Sandhu, 44 the House of Lords held that separation and divorce 
ended the rights of the non-Community spouse.45 Where a question of 
interpretation of Community law arises, the House of Lords, as a court of “last 
resort” is under a duty to refer to the Court of Justice.46 In Sandhu, no such 
reference was made. Whether the Court of Appeal can be considered to be a 
court of “last resort” in the present instance, is less clear. Leave to appeal to 
the House of Lords being refused, the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in Zeghraba and Sahota, was prima facie a decision against which there was 
“no judicial remedy under national law”.47 However, the Court of Appeal has 
previously emphasised that leave to appeal to the House of Lords can be 
sought by the parties themselves.48 Although the precise nature of the duty to 
refer in the present circumstances therefore remains unclear, it is arguable 
that as the judgment of the national court is concerned with the nature and 
the extent of a Community right,49 then a reference should have been made 
to the Court of Justice. 
 
It is regrettable that no reference to the Court of Justice was made 
inZeghraba and Sahota. The Court of Justice in Diatta v. Land Berlin, 50for 
example held that a spouse, a non-Community national, did not thereby lose 
Community residence rights on account of merely living apart from the 
worker. Though the parameters of the Community law right of residence 
offered to the spouse of a worker are at present unclear, it is arguable that 
the Court of Justice would err on the side of extending a security of residence 
to the non-Community spouse. An extension to the applicants of an unlimited 
right to reside in the United Kingdom would appear to be an adequate 
reflection of the residence rights extended by Community law in respect of 
members of the worker's family. The position will however remain unclear 
unless national courts refer the issues raised in Zeghraba and Sahota to the 
Court of Justice for exposition before that court. 
 
Finally, had Zeghraba and Sahota been heard before the Court of Justice, an 
additional avenue of argument might have been available to the applicants in 
support of their claim for indefinite leave to remain. There is merit in the 
argument that not to extend to the non-Community spouse an unrestricted 
right to reside, might be an infringement of the principle of respect for family 
life enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.51 An 
obligation has been placed on the Community to respect human *E.L.R. 
190  rights guaranteed in the Convention.52 The adoption of such an approach 
was rejected as “immaterial” by the Court of Appeal in Zeghraba and 
Sahota. 53 In view of the developing jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice54 with respect to the recognition of human rights in Community law, 
such rejection might indeed  
appear hasty. 
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The Court of Justice has ruled that Community nationals exercising free 
movement rights have access to the “general remedies” provided by the 
Member State with respect to is own nationals and in respect of challenges to 
acts of the administration. In satisfying the requirement of Article 8 of 
Directive 64/221, entitlement to “the same legal remedies” the Court rejected 
the interpretation that the migrant would be entitled to the specific remedies 
provided by the state for its own nationals in respect of such acts. Prior to the 
execution of the administrative decisions identified in Article 9, an opinion of a 
“competent authority” must be obtained in the circumstances identified in 
paragraph 1 of that Article. Decisions identified in paragraph 2, refusal of a 
first residence permit, and expulsion before issue of that permit, therefore 
require an opinion if there is “no right of appeal to a court of law” or where 
only “the legal validity of the decision” can be appealed, or “where the appeal 
cannot have suspensory effect.” The failure of the migrant to appeal against a 
decision on a previous occasion will not prejudice future appeal rights against 
acts of the administration. 
 
 
 
Court of Justice, Judgment of June 17, 1997, Joined Cases C-65/95 & 
111/95 The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Mann Singh Shingara and Abbas Radiom [1997] E.C.R. I-3343; [1997] 3 
C.M.L.R. 703. 
 
Background 
 
A system of procedural guarantees in Community law is available to 
Community nationals who have been denied the free movement rights of 
entry and residence which attach to worker status. The reality of that system 
of guarantees may be rendered in part illusory if the obligations imposed in 
this respect by Directive 64/221, Articles 8 and 91 are not converted by 
Member States into tangible measures which are available to nationals 
exercising free movement rights under Article 48 E.C. The cases of The Queen 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Mann Singh Shingara 
and The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Abbas Radiom, raise important questions as to the nature of two aspects of 
those procedural guarantees. 
 
An obligation is placed on Member States by Article 8, to make available to 
the community national seeking to exercise free movement rights, the “same 
legal remedies” as those available to nationals of the host state in respect of 
decisions concerning entry, renewal of residence permits or expulsion. The 
nature of that procedural protection has been examined 
in Radiom and Shingara in the context of the denial by the Home 
Secretary *E.L.R. 158  of the rights of entry and residence to two migrant 
Community nationals seeking to enter the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
work. 
 
 
Where there is no appeal to a court of law on the merits of a decision, Article 
9, paragraph 1 imposes on the administrative body responsible, an obligation 
to delay implementation of the decision to refuse the renewal of a residence 
permit or the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit from the territory “ 
until an opinion has been obtained from a competent authority of the host 
country ”. The second paragraph of the same Article provides that in the 
instance of a refusal to issue a first resident permit, or an expulsion before 
that residence permit has been obtained, the migrant is to have the right to 
request a review of that decision by the competent authority. The 
administrative authority whose decision is reviewed must consider the opinion 
of the competent authority. 
 
The provisions of the directive as identified secure a minimum level of 
procedural protection to migrants affected by decisions relating to refusals of 
entry, residence and expulsions. 
 
Facts 
 
Under United Kingdom law, Radiom and Shingara had made separate 
applications for judicial review by the High Court of Home Office decisions to 
deny them entry to the United Kingdom. In the course of reviewing these 
decisions, the High Court made a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice. 
 
Radiom, an Iranian national, was a Community national by virtue of 
acquisition of Irish nationality in 1982. He had worked in the United Kingdom 
for the Iranian consular service between 1983 and 1989. In May 1983, based 
upon his marriage to a British citizen, Radiom had been granted indefinite 
leave to remain2 in the United Kingdom.3 
In 1989, the United Kingdom severed diplomatic relations with Iran and in 
consequence, the Foreign Office informed Radiom that if he did not leave the 
United Kingdom within seven days, he would be detained and deported,4 on 
grounds of national security.5 Radiom left the United Kingdom without waiting 
for that threat of detention and deportation to be carried out. A Home Office 
communication6 to Radiom, threatening a future refusal of entry and 
residence without appeal7formed the genus of the present action.8 A 
later *E.L.R. 159 application by Mr Radiom for a residence permit to stay in 
the United Kingdom was refused, again, according to the Home Office, 
without right of appeal.9 
 
Shingara, a French national had been refused entry to the United Kingdom in 
1991 on the grounds of public policy and public security.10He was informed by 
the Home Office that there was no right of appeal against this 
decision.11 Some years later, Shingara was admitted to the United Kingdom 
on production of his French identity card. On that occasion he was arrested, 
and detained as an illegal immigrant. Shingara's application for judicial review 
of that detention was granted at the same time as he was released and 
returned to France.12 
 
Under national law, both Community nationals had been refused the 
opportunity of an appeal against the separate decisions to deny them entry to 
the United Kingdom. Where Community nationals are concerned, that denial 
of appeal rights directly conflicts with the provisions of Article 8, which 
provides that the migrant is “to have the same legal remedies” as nationals of 
the host state. Although the absence of recourse to an appeals process would 
clearly be unlawful, the failure of the Member State to provide access to the 
appeals process raises the issue of the nature of the procedural protection 
offered to the migrant by the directive. 
 
The second aspect to the judgment arose because both applicants for judicial 
review had previously been excluded from the United Kingdom on the grounds 
of public policy or public security. On expulsion, both migrant nationals had 
left the United Kingdom, so the procedural guarantees of Articles 8 and 9 
were available to them. However, no appeal was raised, no advisory opinion 
sought from a competent authority with regard to the decision to exclude. 
Only when both Radiom and Shingara subsequently sought to return to the 
United Kingdom did the effect of their failure to take advantage of the 
procedural protection offered by Directive 64/221 on expulsion became an 
issue. Does the right of reference to an independent competent authority 
given by Articles 8 and 9 extend to migrants in the position of Radiom and 
Shingara who then subsequently return to the Member States concerned? 
 
The compatibility with Community law of lack of rights of appeal given under 
United Kingdom law was the central issue in both cases. The two separate 
actions were joined before the Court of Justice because both involved the 
status of Articles 8 and 9. 
Judicial review is a remedy which is available in the United Kingdom against 
acts of the administration generally. Were the applicants to be entitled to seek 
this general remedy or the remedy specifically available in national law in 
respect of refusals of entry? 
 
*E.L.R. 160  The outcome 
 
Central to the judgment in Radiom and Shingara was the examination of 
substantive issues arising from the existence of the system of procedural 
guarantees concerning appeal rights established by Directive 64/221.13 The 
first issue considered in the judgment concerned the de facto translation into 
national law of the procedural rights given by Article 8. Such rights are either 
a guarantee of exposure to the general system of appeals which exist in the 
Member State “in respect of acts of the administration” or to the particular 
appeal rights provided in specified circumstances. 
 
Article 8 gives to the migrant national “ the same legal remedies[emphasis 
added] in respect of any decision concerning entry, as are available to 
nationals of the State concerned in respect of acts of the administration”. The 
Advocate General14 concluded that the obligation thus placed on the Member 
State was to make available to the migrant national the legal remedies that 
are generally available to nationals of that State in respect of acts of the 
administration. In the judgment of Radiom and Shingara the Court of Justice 
affirmed this view. It held that: 
 
“On a proper construction of Article 8 of the directive, where under the 
national legislation of a Member State remedies are available in 
respect of acts of the administration generally and different remedies 
are available in respect of decisions concerning entry by nationals of 
that Member State, the obligation imposed on the Member States by 
that provision is satisfied if nationals of other Member States enjoy the 
same remedies as those available against acts of the administration 
generally in that Member State” [emphasis added].15 
 
The obligation in Article 8 is therefore satisfied if the migrant national has 
access to the general remedies provided by the national law of that Member 
State in relation to decisions concerning the entry of its own nationals. In 
adopting this interpretation as to the extent of the procedural guarantees of 
Article 8, the court rejected the applicants' contention that the guarantee 
should extend to cover specific remedies established by the Member State in 
respect of entry refusals.16 
 
The judgment in Radiom and Shingara proceeded to explain why the 
entitlement of the migrant national should extend only to the remedies 
generally available against acts of the administration. The right of entry17 is 
extended to Community nationals by virtue of the exercise of the right of free 
movement.18 The right of free movement is not absolute. The source of free 
movement rights in the present context, Article 48,19 permits Member States 
to deny the right of free movement on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health.20 The State is given a margin of discretion, albeit within 
Community law *E.L.R. 161  boundaries as to denial of the exercise of free 
movement rights.21 By contrast, the consequence of holding the nationality of 
a Member State is that a person has a right of entry to that State.22 In 
decisions relating to entry, the Member State has no discretion, it cannot 
deny its own nationals the right of entry to is territory.23 Founded on the 
presence or absence of discretion in decisions involving the migrant national 
or the host national, the Court in Radiom and Shingara distinguished the two 
situations as being “in no way comparable”. In consequence, the obligation 
place by Article 8 on Member States, the right to “the same legal remedies”, 
was held to be satisfied where the migrant enjoyed a right to the general 
remedies provided by the Member State in respect of entry and expulsion 
taken for reasons of public order and public security. As was observed by the 
Advocate General, this conclusion would accord with the rationale behind 
Article 8. It would not be logical for the procedural protection of Article 8 to 
extend to the specific remedies available under national law because 
“nationals of the Member States do not need to challenge acts of the 
administration denying them entry or directing their expulsion they cannot be 
the subject of such measures”.24 
 
Where the decision made by an administrative authority specifically concerns 
either the issue of a first residence permit or expulsion before the issue of 
that first residence permit, Article 9, paragraph 2 gives the migrant national 
the right to request that the decision be reviewed by an independent 
authority. Paragraph 2 remains silent as to the conditions of exercise of that 
right. In Radiom and Shingara, the Court of Justice held that the 
circumstances listed in Article 9, paragraph 1 are to be transposed as 
condition precedents to the exercise of the rights contained in paragraph 
2.25 In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte John 
Gallagher, the Court of Justice held that the distinction between paragraphs 1 
and 2 is one of temporality. The Opinion in Article 9, paragraph 1 must be 
obtained before the decision, those in paragraph 2 being obtained after the 
decision has been made and only at the request of the migrant national.26 As 
the Advocate General observed, the distinction between the two paragraphs is 
“merely attributable to drafting”,27 it is a cosmetic difference. 
 
A decision involving either refusal of the first residence permit, or expulsion 
even before the first residence permit has been obtained, is therefore 
reviewable in circumstances in which there is either no provision for an appeal 
to an appellate court within that state, or if such an appeal exists, it concerns 
only the legal validity of the decision, or the appeal cannot have suspensory 
effect.28 The Court held that if appeals were to be allowed in circumstances 
other than these, the effect would be that the right of appeal would 
exist*E.L.R. 162  even where the remedy made available under national law 
entailed a review of the substance together with an exhaustive examination of 
all the facts and the circumstances. This is not the purpose of the legislation, 
since the Court of Justice in Pecastaing v. Belgian State 29 held that the 
procedure of referral for consideration and opinion provided for in Article 9 is 
intended to mitigate the deficiencies in the remedies referred to in Article 8 of 
the Directive. Intervention by the competent authority referred to in Article 
9(1) is made before a final decision is taken. Its purpose is to enable an 
exhaustive examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case, including the expediency of the proposed measure.30 
 
The final issue in the judgment in Radiom and Shingara was whether the 
migrant's right of recourse to an independent competent authority provided 
under Article 9(2) of Directive 64/221 would remain unaffected by failure to 
utilise its provisions at the time of previous refusal of entry. The Court 
acknowledged the position it had taken in Adoui and Cornuaille that a 
Community national expelled from a Member State may apply for a fresh 
residence permit if that application is made a reasonable time after the first 
decision to expel. The application must be examined by the competent 
administrative authority in that State. If there is then found to be a material 
change in the circumstances which justified the first decision ordering 
expulsion, then the migrant would be entitled to a residence permit. Based 
upon that part of the judgment in Adoui and Cornuaille, the Court held that 
the migrant's failure to appeal a previous decision or to seek an opinion does 
not affect the exercise of such rights on a subsequent occasion. 
 
Commentary 
 
The judgment of the Court of Justice in Radiom and Shingara was concerned 
with delivery to the migrant of the promises of Community law regarding 
procedural rights given to migrant nationals in respect of entry, residence and 
expulsion. 
 
Article 8: the requirement of the “the same legal 
remedies” 
 
In two respects, the obligation to afford the migrant national access to the 
general remedies provided by the Member State against acts of the 
administration ought to be viewed as an effective safeguard for the protection 
of rights. An equality of treatment exists with respect to access to a system of 
appeals, the migrant national cannot be offered a remedy which is less 
effective than one which is available to the host national. The remedy offered 
to the migrant must accord with Community law. 
The obligation placed on the Member State is to provide the migrant national 
with the “same legal remedies”,31 [emphasis added] it does not exhaust legal 
rights where the source of such rights is Community law. Member States are 
required to afford complete *E.L.R. 163  and effective protection to 
individuals in instances where they have directly enforceable rights under 
Community law.32 
 
The evidence of the parity of treatment between migrant and host national 
will be one of fact. It will depend upon the court structure and functions 
peculiar to those courts in any one Member State. Where, for example the 
administrative courts are not empowered to grant a stay of execution or the 
migrant is not protected with regard to an interim stay of execution, that 
power belonging to the ordinary courts of that State, then the migrant is 
entitled to appeal to the latter on the same terms as the host nationals.33 The 
protection for the migrant is that any deficiency in the national legal 
machinery, in that it does not properly reflect the provisions of Community 
law, must be rectified.34 Specifically in the context of the right of free 
movement for the worker, it has been held that the existence of a remedy of 
a judicial nature in respect of administrative decisions refusing free movement 
“is essential in order to secure for the individual effective protection for his 
right”.35 
 
In the United Kingdom, under the national legal system the general means of 
challenging or appealing against acts of the administration is judicial review. 
Allowing the migrant access to this system on the same terms as host 
nationals will satisfy the requirements of Article 8. In rejecting the alternative 
interpretation of Article 8, that the migrant is to be entitled to the specific 
remedies established by the Member State in respect of appeals against 
refusals of entry, residence and expulsion, the Court of Justice has not 
concerned itself with the problem of ruling as to the efficacy of an appeal to a 
lower tribunal. Jurisprudentially, this is correct, as the Court has been called 
upon to interpret the provisions of Article 8,36 not to examine specific 
remedies provided by the Member State against acts of the administration. 
Although the decisions of the national courts in the process of judicial review 
must conform with the requirements of Community law, it is clearly part of 
the acquis communautaire that decisions of all bodies involved in the judicial 
process are subject to the same requirements. Whilst the migrant, in theory is 
well served by enjoying a right of recourse to judicial review, there is a 
forceful argument that appeal rights should also encompass a right of 
recourse to the specific bodies existing within the Member State, as the 
decisions of all such appeal bodies37 must clearly accord with Community law. 
Whilst in no way detracting from access to the general right of judicial review, 
the availability of other conduits of redress would bolster the armoury of the 
migrant national seeking to enforce the provisions of Community law with 
respect to free movement rights. 
 
Appeals to a competent authority 
 
In providing for recourse to a “competent authority”, the purpose of Article 9 
is to compensate for the absence of appeal rights to the national courts. The 
judgment in *E.L.R. 164  Radiom and Shingara now means that the right of 
recourse to the “competent authority” is extended and now exists where the 
decision involves a refusal to issue a first residence permit or an expulsion of 
the migrant before this stage is reached. The practical implication for the 
migrant national is that these decisions are now subject to detailed 
examination by the “competent authority”38 before any final decision is taken, 
and that the decision is now subject to a stay of execution, if appropriate. 
Whilst there is a logicality that the procedural protection given by Article 9 
should extend to all the decisions identified therein, the purpose of that Article 
is to remedy deficiencies in national legislation under which acts of the 
administration can be challenged. It provides the migrant, challenged as to 
the exercise of free movement rights a “minimum procedural safeguard”39 to 
attack those decisions. The judgment in Radiom and Shingara in this respect 
should not be read in isolation, as it does not serve to eclipse the requirement 
that all administrative decisions taken by the Member State should accord 
with Community law. It is of no relevance that the migrant has previously 
failed to exercise appeal rights in similar circumstances. The identification by 
the Court of the terms on which the procedural protection is given in 
paragraph 2, goes some way to ensuring that this is attained. 
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